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Abstract
This thesis is on inequity-averse decisions in operational research, and draws on concepts
from economics and operational research such as multi-criteria decision making (MCDM)
and mathematical modelling. The main focus of the study is developing systematic meth-
ods and modelling to help decision makers (DMs) in situations where equity concerns are
important. We draw on insights from the economics literature and base our methods on
some of the widely accepted principles in this area.
We discuss two equity related concerns, namely equitability and balance, which are
distinguished based on whether anonymity holds or not. We review applications involving
these concerns and discuss alternative ways to incorporate such concerns into operational
research (OR) models. We point out some future research directions especially in using
MCDM concepts in this context. Specically, we observe that research is needed to design
interactive decision support systems.
Motivated by this observation, we study an MCDM approach to equitability. Our in-
teractive approach uses holistic judgements of the DM to rene the ranking of an explicitly
given (discrete) set of alternatives. The DM is assumed to have a rational preference rela-
tion with two additional equity-related axioms, namely anonymity and the Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfers. We provide theoretical results that help us handle the computational
di¢ culties due to the anonymity property. We illustrate our approach by designing an
interactive ranking algorithm and provide computational results to show computational
feasibility.
We then consider balance concerns in resource allocation settings. Balance concerns
arise when the DM wants to ensure justice over entities, the identities of which might a¤ect
the decision. We propose a bi-criteria modelling approach that has e¢ ciency (quantied by
the total output) and balance (quantied by the imbalance indicators) related criteria. We
solve the models using optimization and heuristic algorithms. Our extensive computational
experiments show the satisfactory behaviour of our algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many real life settings involve equity concerns. It is of great importance to address these
concerns because a solution which fails to handle equity concerns is often abandoned by
the stakeholders on the grounds of unfairness.
Various real-life applications exist where equity concerns play a signicant role. The
problems considered so far in the literature include but are not limited to allocation, as-
signment, location, vehicle routing, scheduling and transportation network design settings.
Addressing equity concerns in operational research (OR) is interesting and challenging
because:
 Equity is an ethical concept, on which many discussions exist in various areas such
as philosophy, sociology and economics. Engineering applications tend to quan-
tify equity using some inequality measures but this approach requires su¢ cient
knowledge on the underlying theory of di¤erent measures.
 The underlying motivation for equity and the specics of the problem may result
in di¤erent equity-related concerns, such as equitability and balance. These two
concerns are substantially di¤erent from each other and hence may require di¤erent
methods. Moreover, what is considered as fair depends on the context and the
decision maker (DM)s understanding of a fair allocation. Di¤erent settings may
require di¤erent methods to handle equity concerns.
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 Equity rarely appears as the sole concern in applications. Real life applications
often involve considering tradeo¤s between equity and other relevant criteria such as
e¢ ciency. Therefore, many mathematical modelling approaches to equity use multi-
criteria decision making problems, which are considerably more challenging than
their single objective counterparts in terms of both computational and cognitive
e¤ort needed.
The challenge to address equity concerns in mathematical modelling approaches raises
many stimulating questions some of which are addressed in this work. We mainly aim
to develop good decision support tools for decision makers in such settings by nding
solutions that would be acceptable to many inequity-averse decision makers.
Research Questions:
 What are the mostly used equity-related concepts in OR? How can we incorporate
equity concerns in decision making models? What are the approaches that have
been used so far in the OR literature? What are the advantages and limitations of
these approaches?
We attempt to address this question in the paper called Inequity-averse optimisation
in operational research, which is under review at the European Journal of Operational
Research an invited review. As we will discuss later in detail, there is a broad range of
applications where equity concerns are discussed and incorporated into the mathemati-
cal models in an explicit way. The equity discussions are mostly on two equity-related
concepts: equitability and balance. The key di¤erence between these two concepts is the
anonymity assumption: equitability concern arises in settings where the recipients are in-
distinguishable (hence anonymity holds) whereas balance concern occurs in settings where
the recipients are distinguishable based on for example claims, needs or preferences (hence
anonymity may not hold).
From a modelling point of view, three main approaches are used to handle equitability
concerns:
12
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
 The rst is a Rawlsian approach, where the focus is only on the worst-o¤ entity.
The second is based on using inequality indices in mathematical models.
The third is a holistic (multi-criteria decision making) approach where eq-
uity is addressed by imposing person anonymity and Pigou-Dalton principle
of transfers (PD) conditions on the model of the DMs preferences. We call the
corresponding utility functions representing such preference models equitable
aggregations.
Balance concerns are handled in similar ways, either by using an imbalance indicator
in the model or by converting the problem to an equitability problem by scaling the
alternatives in an appropriate way.
The simplest and crudest of the equitability-handling approaches is the Rawlsian ap-
proach, which assesses equity by the amount allocated to the worst-o¤ entity in a distrib-
ution. In another approach to equitability, one uses well dened inequality indices (based
on relatively restrictive assumptions), which are able to provide a DM with a single al-
ternative that is the best in terms of equity. When equity is the only concern, such
approaches present the DM with a single solution. However, using such inequality indices
in multicriteria decision making environments would involve tradeo¤s between multiple
criteria and selecting the best solution would require using appropriate decision sup-
port. The third approach is a more general approach to equitability, based on commonly
accepted convexity and symmetry axioms (equitable e¢ ciency) but is a more complicated
method and may remain inconclusive since the resulting models always involve multiple
criteria. In such cases one would call for decision support to nd the bestsolution unless
there is a single alternative that is better than others in all criteria.
The problem of obtaining many inconclusive comparisons in multicriteria decision mak-
ing settings can be mitigated by taking into account value judgements which the DM has
provided. That is, we can incorporate information which the DM gives us (for example
that she prefers one distribution to another) into the preference model. Our attempt to op-
erationalise this idea of incorporating DMs preference information for the third approach
13
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to equitability, where we assume anonymity and PD axioms on the preference model of
the DM, led to the following question:
 How can one assist a decision maker who is able to provide limited preference in-
formation in terms of holistic judgements when there are equitability concerns and
hence anonymity property holds in the preference model?
The second part of the thesis focuses on incorporating preference information from
the DM for the methods where equity is addressed using anonymity and quasi-concavity
(convexity) conditions on the model of the DMs preferences. This addresses the problem
of obtaining many inconclusive comparisons and can be used to nd the best alternative,
or a set of goodalternatives, to sort the alternatives into some predened groups, or to
rank the alternatives.
Our attempt to answer this research question led to the following two papers:
  Using Holistic Multicriteria Assessments: The Convex Cones Approach, which
has been published in Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Man-
agement Science. In this article, we discuss the convex cones approach, a well-
known approach in the multi-criteria decision making literature that uses holis-
tic preference information in the decision support process. We discuss this
approach within the classical setting, i.e. for problems where there is no equity
concern.
 Incorporating Preference Information in Multi-criteria Problems with Equi-
tability Concerns, where we suggest an approach for problems with equitability
concerns that takes into account value judgements which the DM has provided.
We extend the theory of convex cones discussed in the previous paper so that
it is applicable to problems where there is anonymity. We also provide a rank-
ing algorithm to illustrate the computational signicance of these ideas in a
practical setting.
Taking our motivation from resource allocation settings, where the DM has equity
14
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(mostly balance) and e¢ ciency concerns we try to address the following question in the
third paper:
 How can we design models for resource allocation problems where balance is a con-
cern alongside e¢ ciency and address the tradeo¤ between these two concerns?
One possible answer to this question is provided in the paper Incorporating balance
concerns in resource allocation decisions: A bi-criteria modelling approach. In this paper
we propose a means to handle balance concerns alongside e¢ ciency concerns in allocation
problems and hence provide a bi-criteria framework to think about trading balance o¤
against e¢ ciency. This article is published in Omega.
Our contributions are the following:
 Providing a comprehensive review of the recent OR literature along with a thor-
ough discussion of equity-related concepts considered in this area
 Providing a classication of the approaches that are used to address equity con-
cerns in optimisation settings and discussing advantages and limitations of these di¤erent
approaches
 Proposing a novel interactive approach, which involves substantial theoretical
results that can be used to nd the best alternative, rank or sort the alternatives in
settings where equitability concerns hold
 Designing an interactive ranking algorithm for the settings where the DM has
equitability concerns and providing computational results. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst multi-criteria ranking algorithm designed in the literature for the problem
settings we consider.
 Dening and classifying balance line-based imbalance indicators
 Proposing a bicriteria modelling approach for handling e¢ ciency and balance
concerns in various resource allocation settings
 Performing computational experiments on the epsilon constraint approach and
a TS algorithm, which are suggested to solve the resulting bicriteria and multicriteria
models
15
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
To sum up, the main body of the thesis is composed of the following chapters, which
are based on the papers discussed above:
Chapter 2: Inequity-averse decisions in operational research
Chapter 3: Using holistic multicriteria assessments: the convex cones approach
Chapter 4: Incorporating preference information in multi-criteria problems with equi-
tability concerns
Chapter 5: Incorporating balance concerns in resource allocation decisions: A bi-
criteria modelling approach
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6.
Individual chapters are intended to be read as self-contained papers: as such, decisions
about the optimal notation to use have been made individually within chapters. Notation
is reintroduced in each individual chapter and notations may subtly di¤er between di¤erent
chapters. The denition of commonly used terms will be repeated.
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Chapter 2
Inequity Averse Optimisation in
Operational Research
2.1 Introduction
There are various real life applications where equity concerns naturally arise and it is
important to address these concerns for the proposed solutions to be applicable and ac-
ceptable. As a result, there exist many articles cited in the operational research (OR)
literature that consider classical problems, such as location, scheduling or knapsack prob-
lems, and extend available models so as to accommodate equity concerns. These models
are used across a broad range of applications including but not limited to airow tra¢ c
management, resource allocation, workload allocation, disaster relief, emergency service
facility location and public service provision. This broad range of applications indicates
that considering these classical models with an emphasis on equity is practically relevant
in addition to being technically interesting.
In this paper we present a literature review on inequity aversion in operational research
and a classication of the modelling approaches used to incorporate concerns about equity
in optimisation problems. The equity concept is often studied in an allocation setting,
where a resource or good is allocated to a set of entities. The concern for equity involves
treating a set of entities in a fairmanner in the allocation. The allocated resource or
17
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outcome can be a certain good, a bad or be a chance of a good or bad. The entities can be
for example organizations, persons or groups of individuals which are at di¤erent locations
or are members of di¤erent social classes.
At this point it may be helpful to look at three small examples. Let us start with a
simple example in which we have two people who are allocated some money. Consider the
following two allocations to these people, who are no di¤erent in terms of claim: (100,50)
and (80,70). Common sense suggests that the second allocation is more equitable than the
rst one. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (PD) formalizes this intuition. The PD
states that any transfer from a richer person to a poorer person, other things remaining
the same, should always lead to a more equitable allocation.
PD allows us to compare allocations that have the same aggregate amount as is the case
in our simple example. However, things get more complicated when we have allocations
that di¤er in terms of the aggregate amount. In many situations an increase in equity
results in a decrease in e¢ ciency, which is usually measured by the total amount of the
good (bad) that is allocated. As an example, consider a case where an emergency service
facility is going be located. Suppose that a number of potential sites for the facility is
already determined and the problem is to choose one of them. The facility will be serving
di¤erent customers and it is important for the decision maker (DM) to ensure an equitable
service to them. The DM evaluates how good a service is by the distance the customers
have to travel to reach the facility: the shorter the distance between a customer and
the facility, the better it is. One can consider choosing an alternative that minimizes
the total distance that all the customers travel to the facility to evaluate how good each
potential site is. However, in such a solution some of the customers may be signicantly
under-served. Figure 2.1 shows a small example with 3 customers located at the nodes
of a network (C1; C2 and C3). Suppose that there are two alternative locations for the
emergency service facility (P1 and P2, respectively). We will represent the two alternative
locations using distance distributions that show the distance that each customer has to
travel. The rst location (P1) results in distance distribution (3,4,4) and the second one
(P2) results in distribution (0,5,5). We see that the second alternative is more e¢ cient in
18
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Figure 2.1: Two alternative locations for an emergency service facility
the sense that the total distance travelled is less. However, this e¢ ciency is obtained at
the expense of customers C2 and C3 who have to travel 5 units of distance. In the rst
alternative, the total distance travelled is larger but the distance travelled by the customers
C2 and C3 is reduced. This is a typical example of the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and
equity, which occurs in many real life situations. The DMs preferences would determine
the better alternative in such cases: there is no objective way to determine which
distribution is better, and reasonable people may take di¤erent views. For example the
DM may argue that the rst alternative is better claiming that the maximum distance
travelled is smaller, or s/he may argue that the second alternative is better as it saves on
total distance travelled.
The above examples show cases where anonymity holds; that is, the identities of the
entities are not important. However, as we will see in the next example, there may be
situations where the entities have di¤erent characteristics and hence anonymity may not
make sense. Suppose that you are the head of an academic department and you have to
decide on the allocation of the next years studentship budget to the PhD students. Which
of the following rules would you use as a base for your decisions?
-Allocate every student the same amount regardless of any other factor
-Allocate the budget proportional to the studentsdeclared needs, which are measured
as the shortfall from target income (students that need more get more)
Di¤erent people would give di¤erent answers to this question. The rst rule respects
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person anonymity and hence is equitable. However, there are other sensible arguments
that would favor other rules, as anonymity may be inappropriate when we have entities
with di¤erent characteristics, such as di¤erent needs. These two rules involve two di¤erent
dimensions of equity, horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity is concerned
with the extent to which entities within a class are treated similarly ([1]); hence giving equal
amounts to the students with the same need would satisfy concerns on horizontal equity.
Vertical equity is concerned with the extent to which members of di¤erent classes are
treated di¤erently. Giving di¤erent amounts to students with di¤erent needs is a decision
regarding vertical equity.
As seen in this example, a reasonable equity concept might involve unlike treatment
of unlikes, such as giving di¤erent amounts to students with di¤erent needs. We call this
equity concept that involves entities which are distinguished by an attribute such as need,
claim or preferences balance.
2.1.1 Review Methodology
The search methodology we use for this review is as follows: We used the Web of Science
database for our search and used the keyword equit* to be able to include the words
such as equity, equality, and equitable. We narrowed down the search by area
(Operational Research/Management science) and we limited the search to Journal Arti-
cles. We note that the results of the search highly depend on which journals are classied
as Operational Research or Management Science journals. For example many articles in
the telecommunications area dealing with equity are not included since those appear in
journals not classied as OR/MS. As our focus is on current practice we surveyed the 10
years from 2003 to the time of analysis and mid way through 2013. We have identied 392
articles. Screening by title, we eliminated the irrelevant ones, most of which use equity
as a nancial term, and obtained 181 articles. We further screened them by abstract. We
focused on the studies that either report a modelling approach that incorporates equity
concerns or discuss equity measures that have been used in the OR literature. We obtained
89 articles this way. Scanning the references of these articles we added 27 articles to our
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review list. In Table 2.1 we report the the journals that contribute to the literature with
2 or more publications. Around 16% of the articles were published in European Journal
of Operational Research, followed by 9% and 8% in Computers and Operations Research
and Transportation Science, respectively. In total there were 40 journals, which shows
that equity considerations arise in various settings and are discussed in publications in a
variety of journals with di¤erent audiences and scopes.
Table 2.1: Number of articles by journal
Journal Frequency
European Journal of Operational Research 17
Computers and Operations Research 10
Transportation Science 9
Annals of Operations Research 7
Interfaces 6
Journal of the Operational Research Society 6
Operations Research 6
Transportation Research Part B 5
Networks 4
Omega 4
Naval Research Logistics 3
Transportation Research Part E 3
Discrete Applied Mathematics 2
IIE Transactions 2
INFORMS Journal on Computing 2
International Journal of Production Research 2
International Transactions in Operational Research 2
Management Science 2
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 2
Networks and Spatial Economics 2
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the two main equity related
terms, which are equitability and balance. We mention some of the applications involving
equity concerns cited in the OR literature. For such problems, we summarize the moti-
vation for equity, the outcome distribution used in assessing equity and the entities for
which equity is sought. In this section we do not attempt to give technical details on how
the equity concerns are incorporated into mathematical models; we rather want to show
that there is a wide range of applications and that equity is regarded as an important
concern in the modelling process. Section 2.3 includes a more detailed discussion of dif-
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ferent approaches taken in the literature to incorporate equitability and balance concerns
in mathematical models. We conclude the discussion in section 2.4, where we point out
future research directions that would be interesting to explore.
2.2 Equitability and Balance
In this section we discuss two equity related concepts, namely equitability and balance.
Equitability is used for comparing allocations across a set of indistinguishable entities.
Balance concerns occur when we allocate goods over entities with di¤erent needs, claims
or preferences. In such situations, ensuring justice might require treating di¤erent entities
di¤erently. We discuss these concepts in an order based on the frequency of appearance
in our review.
2.2.1 Equitability Concerns
Around two thirds of the articles in this review deal with equitability concerns. Equitability
concerns occur when the set of entities are indistinguishable and hence anonymity holds.
The rst two examples used in the introduction (Section 2.1) show two important settings
in which equitability can be a concern. The rst setting is where a xed amount of resource
is being allocated and distributions can be quasi-ordered using PD. The second setting is
where we have allocations with di¤erent total amounts which are not comparable using
PD. This second setting makes things more interesting and complicated as there is often
a tradeo¤ between e¢ ciency and equitability.
We also gave an example regarding horizontal and vertical equity, which we relate to
equitability and balance concepts, respectively. Alongside horizontal and vertical equity,
equity can be quantied in other dimensions such as spatial equity and temporal equity
([1]). Spatial equity is concerned with the extent to which the good is distributed equally
over space, i.e. over the entities at di¤erent locations. Temporal equity, which is also
referred to as longitudinal or generational equity, is the extent to which the good is
distributed to the present or future recipients, i.e. to entities are distinguished by temporal
22
CHAPTER 2. INEQUITY AVERSE OPTIMISATION IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
aspects such as di¤erent generations who are the beneciaries of a road investment or
entities that use an emergency service system at di¤erent times.
Let us introduce some notation that will be used throughout the paper. Suppose that
we have an outcome distribution (allocation) y = (y1; y2; :::; ym) where yi is the outcome
level of entity i 2 I, I being the entity set. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the more the outcome level, the better, i.e. the problem is a maximization problem.
Note that it is possible to dene the outcome distribution in multiple ways using di¤erent
scales. For example, in a resource allocation problem two possible outcome denitions are
the following: one can dene the outcome distribution in terms of the absolute resource
amounts allocated to di¤erent entities (yi) or as the shares of the total resource allocated
to di¤erent entities (yi=
P
i2I yi). An inequality index can be dened for either of the two
distributions. The di¤erence stems from the outcome denition rather than the index itself
as seen in the example. In this work we do not distinguish the inequality indices based on
how the distributions are scaled (see [2] for detailed information and a categorization of
the inequality indices used in location theory).
We now provide a list of some of the many applications cited in the literature along
with a discussion of the motivation for equity in such cases. We classify the applications
based on the underlying technical problem. This classication is summarized in Table 2.2.
Allocation Problems: An equitable allocation of the good or resource over multiple
entities is sought in such problems ([3]). Applications include bandwidth allocation ([4], [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]), water rights allocation ([13]), health care planning ([14], [15],
[16]), WIP (Kanban) allocation ([17]) in production systems, xed cost allocation ([18],
[19], [20]), and public resource allocation such as allocating voting machines to election
precincts ([21]). There are also studies that consider general resource allocation settings
such as [22], [23], [24] and [25].
One classical problem in this group is the discrete knapsack problem. The discrete
knapsack problem selects a set of items such that the total value of the set is maximized
subject to capacity constraints. In some applications equity is a concern as well as e¢ ciency
(total output maximization). A linear knapsack problem with prot and equity objectives
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is considered in [26]. [25] introduce the lexicographically minimum and maximum load
linear programming problems in order to achieve equitable resource allocations.
In resource allocation problems equity may be dened as spatial equity but other
denitions are also possible such as space-time equity across members of the public in
terms of the allocated amount. In water distribution problems, spatial and temporal equity
across demand points is considered. One example of temporal equity concerns is averting
high variation in water decits in a region over multiple periods to avoid extreme decits
[13].
[22] discuss di¤erent fairness concepts that are used to ensure fair allocation of resources
in an abstract environment. The authors derive bounds for the price of fairness, which
is the loss in e¢ ciency when a fair resource allocation is pursued. [23] also focus on
balancing e¢ ciency and equity in resource allocation settings.
Another classical OR problem is the assignment problem which involves allocation of
workload over agents. These problems may involve concerns on fairness among agents.
Equity can be sought in terms of the assigned workload as in [27]. In air tra¢ c manage-
ment, when a foreseen reduction in a destination airports landing capacity is anticipated,
ground delay programs (GDP) are used as the primary tool for tra¢ c ow management.
In a GDP, the departure times of the a¤ected ights are coordinated and hence the air-
craft is delayed on ground. [28] and [29] model the GDP as an assignment problem and
incorporate equity concerns.
Location Problems: One of the main concerns in facility location models is ensuring
an equitable service to the population. Especially in essential public service facility location
models, geographic equity of access to the service facilities is considered as one of the main
requirements for an applicable solution. The access level can be measured in di¤erent terms
such as the distance between demand points (customers) and the facilities (as in [30], [31],
[32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45]) or the time required
to access the facility from the demand points as in [46], [47], and [48]. [49] considers the
generic location problem from a multicriteria perspective and formulates a model where
each individual access level is minimized.
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[32] dene equity over demand points in di¤erent groups, which are not aggregated
based on geographic location and which may be scattered in the whole area. The de-
mand points are categorized based on a common attribute value and equity across these
categories is sought. An example would be ensuring equitable service to di¤erent wealth
classes.
If the facilities are not essential service facilities, which can serve customers within
a limited distance, the amount of population covered at each facility can be used as an
indicator for which an equitable distribution is sought [33]. A related problem is the
equitable load problem, where ensuring an equitable service load distribution over the
service facilities is of concern ([50], [51], [52], [53], [54]).
Other problems include location-price setting problems, where equitable prot sharing
between competing rms is addressed [55]. [56] consider the problem of locating ware-
houses and try to ensure equity in holding inventory among all supply chain members,
because equity in inventory is argued to have a great impact on the future throughput of
the company through competitiveness issues. Realizing that the solution which minimizes
the total inventory often treats some retailers in an inequitable way, the authors seek
equity across retailers in terms of the amount of inventory.
Vehicle Routing Problems: Vehicle routing problems are used in many applications
such as pick-up and delivery service, disaster relief, hazardous material shipment and
reverse logistics (e.g. waste collection).
One of the outcomes over which equity is sought in vehicle routing problems is vehicle
workload ([57]). In an e¤ort to ensure an equitable workload distribution among vehicles
in a multi vehicle pick-up and delivery problem, the expected length of the longest route
is minimized in [58]. Similarly, [59] consider a routing problem, and propose a model that
guarantees that lottery sales representatives travel roads of similar length on di¤erent days.
This ensures an equitable distribution of workload over a time period. Workload balance
is also considered in [60] in a periodic vehicle routing model used to optimize periodic
maintenance operations. [61] deals with an equitable partitioning problem that ensures
a balanced workload distribution to vehicles. [62] consider a reverse logistics network
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problem in which the service areas for multiple depots are dened. Equitable workload
distribution to depots is considered in one of the objectives of their model. The workload
of a depot is measured in terms of the hours needed to serve the service area it is assigned
to.
Equity concerns naturally arise in vehicle routing problems arising in disaster relief
contexts ([63]). In such problems, one of the concerns of the decision makers is ensuring
equitable service distribution to di¤erent a¤ected areas (nodes). Equity of service to
demand nodes is dened in various ways. For example, if all the demand is satised when
a node is visited then the arrival time is used to measure service ([64]).
[65] develop a multiobjective location-routing model, to model a home-to-work bus
service, and try to achieve an equitable extra time distribution across customers. Extra
time is dened as the di¤erence between the bus transport time and the time of a direct
trip from home to work.
An interesting variation on this sort of problem is provided by [66], who introduce
the so called balanced path problem in acyclic networks, which nds paths from an origin
to a destination in an acyclic network such that the cost di¤erence between the longest
and shortest paths is minimized. Similarly, [67] consider the balanced travelling salesman
problem, which nds a Hamiltonian cycle (a spanning cycle in a graph, i.e. a cycle through
every vertex [68]) with the minimum cost range over its edges.
Scheduling: In personnel scheduling, equitable systems attempt to distribute the
workload fairly and evenly among employees [69]. As an example of this, [70] formulate
a bidline scheduling problem as a set partitioning problem and consider workload equity
over pilots in their model.
Fairness across patients is one of the factors considered while designing appointment
systems ([71]). For appointment scheduling for clinical services [72] introduce a model
which includes equity related constraints in order to nd uniform schedules for the patients
assigned to di¤erent slots. The proposed unfairness measures are based on the expected
waiting times at each slot and the number of patients in the system at the beginning of
each slot.
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[73] propose bicriteria models to schedule ambulance crews, the two criteria being the
aggregate expected coverage and the minimum expected coverage over every hour. The
second criterion is included to incorporate temporal equity concerns into the model.
Other examples include [74] who consider reentrant hybrid ow shop scheduling prob-
lem, which allows the products to visit certain machines more than once. In this paper,
the equity concept is used with a di¤erent underlying motive. The authors propose a
bi-criteria model and use equity in order to generate solutions which are good enough in
both criteria. That is, solutions that perform very well in one criterion while performing
very badly in the other are avoided. This idea is explained in Section 2.3.
Transportation Network and Supply Chain Design Problems: In transporta-
tion network design, equity over network users is considered (as in [75], [76], and [77]).
Equity over users is considered while designing access control policies, in which meters
are installed at on-ramps to control entry tra¢ c ow rates. Di¤erent equity concepts are
reported such as temporal equity and spatial equity: The temporal equity measures the
di¤erence of travel time, delay and speed among users who travel on the same route but
arrive at the ramp at di¤erent times while the spatial equity concerns the di¤erence among
users arriving at di¤erence ramps at the same time[78].
Equitable approaches are also used in congestion pricing schemes to ensure fairtreat-
ment of the travelers that are categorized for example by income or geographic locations
([79], [1]). [79] consider a pricing scheme more equitable if it leads to a more uniform
distribution of wealth across di¤erent groups of population.
Equitable capacity utilizations among the participating warehouses and manufacturers
is considered in collaborative supply chain design ([80]).
Other Integer/Linear Programming Problems, Combinatorial Optimization
Problems and Stochastic Models: In an e¤ort to form equitable student case study
teams, [81] proposes an integer programming model which ensures that each team has
similar a priori academic performance. By creating teams that are as equally capable as
possible (i.e. by equitably distributing capability over teams) the author seeks to ensure
that nal grades of the students are not inuenced by the assignment system.
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Punnen and Aneja [82] introduce the lexicographic balanced optimization problem.
Given a nite set E of elements e : e 2 E each with a certain cost value ce, it is assumed
that a a family of subsets of E are dened as feasible solutions and denoted as F (F is
assumed to have a compact representation and the members of F are not listed explicitly).
The problem nds a feasible subset S 2 F that lexicographically minimizes the absolute
di¤erence between maxe2S ce and the kth minimum of fce : e 2 Sg. This problem is a
lexicographic extension of the balanced optimization problem that minimizes the range
(maxe2Sce   mine2Sce). Solution algorithms and generalizations for the problem are
discussed. Turner et al. [83] consider the generalized balanced optimization problem,
which involves nding the feasible subset S that minimizes maxe2S jce kmax(S)j, where
kmax(S) is the kth largest cost coe¢ cient in S. This problem reduces to the balanced
optimization problem, which minimizes the range, for k = 1 and k = jSj.
[84] study the dispersion problem with equity based objectives, i.e. the equitable
dispersion problem. The dispersion problem selects a subset (of a certain cardinality m)
of items from a given set such that a function of the interelement distances (dij for any
two elements i and j) of the selected elements is maximized. The equitable dispersion
problem focuses on equity-based objectives in this context, which are argued to achieve
an equitable dispersion among the elements in the selected subset. This approach is an
alternative to the studies that consider e¢ ciency-based objectives such as maximizing the
total dispersion.
[85], [86], [87], [88] approach equity from a multicriteria perspective and hence formu-
late multicriteria decision making models.
Markov decision process (MDP) models can also be considered with additional equity
concerns. [89] develop an LP model with side constraints on equity to model the dispatch of
emergency medical servers to patients in an MDP framework. Di¤erent equity constraints
are used to ensure both service and resource allocation equity over patients and workload
and job satisfaction equity over servers.
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2.2.2 Balance Concerns
About one third of the articles in our review deal with balance concerns. Balance is a
special type of equity concern in which the entities are not necessarily treated anonymously
since they di¤er in some equity-relevant characteristics such as needs, claims or preferences.
Such problems do not have anonymity and an ideal solution may not give each entity the
same proportion of the total allocation.
Heterogeneity of Needs (or size)
The social equity concept quanties equity based on the extent to which any good
received is proportional to the need ([1]).
As an example, [90] considers equity related concerns in a public policy problem faced
by a municipality which has to select a portfolio of foreclosed homes to purchase to stabilize
vulnerable neighborhoods. A spatial equity based objective is incorporated into the corre-
sponding knapsack model, which minimizes the maximum disparity between the fraction
of all purchased homes in a neighborhood and the number of available foreclosed houses in
that neighborhood across all neighborhoods. In this example, the need of a neighborhood
is quantied by the number of available foreclosed houses in that neighborhood.
In disaster relief settings the demand points have di¤erent needs. If partial satisfaction
of demand is possible, the proportion of demand satised is used as a measure of service.
Such measures are used by [91] in an inventory management model and by [92] and [93]
in multi-objective transportation/distribution models. [91] propose a stochastic program-
ming model for placing commodities and distributing supplies in a humanitarian logistics
network. There are studies that use more complicated service functions combining tim-
ing and proportion of demand satised (see e.g. [94], which consider vehicle routing and
supply allocation decisions in disaster relief). Similarly [95] and [96] consider a drug allo-
cation setting and provide each clinic with a fraction of drug supply which is proportional
to their demand. [97] propose an integer programming model to optimize siding rosters
and ensure that growers with di¤erent amounts of cane maintain approximately the same
percentage of cane harvested throughout the harvest season.
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In locating undesirable facilities such as waste disposal facilities, geographic equity
in the distribution of nuisance e¤ects or social rejection is one of the concerns that is
incorporated into the models [98], [99]. In such problems the towns have di¤erent nuisance
parameters since they have di¤erent sizes. A tenant-based subsidized housing problem is
considered in [100], where subsidy recipients are allocated to regions and equity across the
potential host communities, which di¤er in size, has to be considered.
Heterogeneity of Claims
In some settings the entities are distinguishable based on their claims for a resource.
The claims may be as a result of a previous legal agreement or on agreed upon rules.
For example, in GDPs spreading delay or delay-related costs equitably among multiple
airlines (ights or ight types) is one of the main concerns while assigning landing slots to
airlines. In such settings the schedule which is generated before the disruptions is taken
as a reference solution and hence may provide airlines with a basis to construct claims
regarding the new schedule. For example a ight which was supposed to land rst in the
previous schedule would nd it unfair if assigned as the last one in the new schedule.
[101], [102] develop an airspace planning and collaborative decision making model,
which is a mixed integer programming model. The model is developed for a set of ights
and selects a ight plan for each ight from a set of proposed plans. Each alternative
plan consists of departure and arrival times, altitudes and trajectories for the ight. The
suggested model addresses the equity issues among airline carriers in absorbing the costs
due to rerouting, delays, and cancellations. [103] extends this model by integrating slot
exchange mechanisms that allow airlines to exchange the assigned slots under a GDP. [104]
propose an air tra¢ c ow management model that assigns ground and air-borne delays
to ights subject to both en route sector and airport constraints. The model is described
as a macroscopic version of a previous model by [105], with a di¤erent objective function,
which is argued to spreadthe delay in an equitable way across a¤ected ights. Similarly,
[106] propose integer programming models that are based on the models discussed in [105]
and [107]. The models assign ground holding delays to ights in a multiresource tra¢ c
ow environment that also take equity in delay distribution into account. By considering
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the en route sector capacity constraints, these models di¤er from the GDP models that
only consider arrival airport capacity. [108] consider the runway scheduling problem in
airport transportation, which nds a schedule and corresponding arrival and departure
times for aircraft. Equity among aircraft is ensured by the constraint position shifting
approach. This approach requires that there is no signicant deviation between positions
of the aircraft in the optimized sequence and the rst-come-rst-served sequence. A similar
approach is used in [109]. [110] use a stochastic programming model that assigns ground
delays to ights under uncertainty. The model minimizes expected delay and incorporates
balance concerns among ights using a balance-related constraint.
Another application is scheduling commercials in broadcast television, in which balance
concerns over clients are incorporated into a mathematical model in [111]. Similarly,
[112] propose a bicriteria modelling framework that considers both e¢ ciency and balance
concerns in resource allocation problems.
Heterogeneity of Preferences
In some problems entities have di¤erent preferences which make them distinguishable
from each other. For example, [113] considers (as they call it) the minimum-envy location
problem, where the customers have ordinal preference orderings for the candidate sites.
The problem is opening a certain number of facilities to which the customers will be
assigned. Each customer is assigned to his most preferred facility among those which are
open and the envy between a pair of customers is measured as the di¤erence between the
ranks of the facilities.
Diversity Concerns
Another concept which is related to equity but in an indirect or orthogonal way is
diversity. Around 4% of the reviewed papers use the diversity concept. To see the mo-
tivation for this concept, suppose that you are going to select a set of candidates for a
degree programme. You have concerns on diversity in the sense that you want certain
population groups to have a certain degree of representation in the selected set. These
groups may, for example, consist of people with an inferior socioeconomic background. A
common way of achieving this is to use quotas or proportion targets, i.e. ensuring that a
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certain proportion of the selected people will be from the specic group of concern. This
approach involves treating people with di¤erent characteristics di¤erently such that the
selected team is diversied enough. For example, in an applicant selection model [114]
ensure diversity in the selected team in order to represent certain population groups.
[115] consider the problem of forming teams of service personnel with di¤erent skills.
To treat customers served by di¤erent teams equitably, the author introduces a diversity
measure and ensures that the diversity is above a threshold for all the teams. To take an-
other example of diversity, in hazardous material shipment, spreading risk over population
groups in an equitable way is one of the main concerns [116], [117], [118]. In some studies
the concept of equity of risk is handled by determining spatially dissimilar paths. These
studies incorporate equity concerns by selecting a set of paths to carry the hazardous ma-
terial, which are as dissimilar as possible. Two examples are due to [116] and [118], who
consider the problem of selecting of k routes in multiobjective hazardous material route
planning. They use a measure of spatial dissimilarity and obtain an equitable distribution
of risk over the related region by choosing spatially dissimilar paths to ship the hazardous
material.
We do not devote a separate section to diversity and discuss it in this section under
balance concerns. That is because although these studies address equity in a relatively
indirect way which is based on creating diversity, it is possible to conceptualize diversity
as a balance concern in such settings. For example when selecting candidates for a degree
program, the underlying problem can be considered as allocating admission to the degree
program to population subgroups. Although there is no way in which degree admission
can be allocated equally across people - out of N people, only n can be accepted onto
the programme, and the remaining N   n will have to be rejected- admission can be
allocated in a balanced way across the population subgroups by ensuring that the set of
admitted candidates is diverse. Similarly, when selecting routes in hazardous material
shipment settings, the membership of the selected route(s), i.e. being a node on the route,
is allocated to di¤erent population centres. Diversity ensures an equitable allocation of
membership over di¤erent nodes avoiding inequitable solutions such as a solution in which
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Table 2.2: Classical problems in OR re-considered with equity concerns
Problem Examples
Allocation [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23],
[24], [25], [112], [90], [26], [27], [28], [29], [114], [119],
[115], [120], [121], [95], [96], [94],
Location [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40],
[41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50],
[51], [52], [53], [54], [113], [98], [99], [55], [100],
[56], [122]
Vehicle Routing [58], [59], [60], [62], [61], [64], [92], [94], [65], [66],
[67], [116], [117], [118]
Scheduling [70], [72], [111], [97], [108], [73], [74], [109]
Transportation Network Design [75], [76], [77], [78], [79]
Other [81], [80], [101], [102], [103], [104], [106], [82], [83], [84],
[85], [86], [87], [88], [93], [123], [124], [110], [125], [91],
[89], [126]
most of the routes pass through the same set of nodes exposing these nodes to much higher
risk than the rest.
2.3 Di¤erent Approaches to Handle Equity Concerns
2.3.1 Di¤erent Approaches to Incorporate Equitability
Equity has been widely discussed in the economics literature where it is generally ac-
cepted that there is no one-size-ts-all solution and that special methods are required
to handle equity concerns in particular cases (see e.g. Sen [127], and Young [128], who
discusses di¤erent concepts of equity). Nevertheless, using transparent and explicit rules
that determine what is equitable and what is not or how equitable a given distribution is
on a cardinal or sometimes ordinal scale can be useful in ensuring that the decisions are
applicable and acceptable.
Similarly, in operational research there are many di¤erent ways of incorporating eq-
uitability in the decision process since its precise interpretation depends on both the
structure of the problem at hand and the decision makers understanding of a fairdis-
tribution. In this section, we discuss the operational research approaches that incorporate
equitability concerns in mathematical models.
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One of the most common and simplest ways to incorporate equitability concerns is
focusing on the min (max) level of outcomes across persons. This approach is called the
Rawlsian principle ([129]). The Rawlsian principle is justied using a veil of ignorance
concept, which assumes that the entities do not know what their positions (the worst-o¤,
the second worst-o¤ etc.) will be in the distribution. To illustrate, suppose that you are
given two distributions over two people generically named A and B, such as (5,50) and
(30,25). You have to choose one of the allocations and then will learn whether you are A
or B. You would seriously consider choosing (30,25) as you might be the worse-o¤ person
in a distribution and would get only 5 units if you choose (5,50). This ignorance is a
reason to consider the worst-o¤ entities in the distribution as any entity should nd the
distribution acceptable after learning its position. This approach, however, fails to capture
the di¤erence between distributions that give the same amount to the worst-o¤ entity: two
distributions such as (1,1,9) and (1,5,5) are indistinguishable in terms of inequity from a
Rawlsian point of view although the latter is signicantly more equitable from a common
sense point of view. This drawback can be avoided by using a lexicographic extension,
which will be discussed later in detail.
A more sophisticated approach to incorporate equitability concerns would be using
summary inequality measures in the model. We call such approaches inequality index
based approaches. These approaches can be further categorized based on whether the
index is employed in a constraint while dening the feasible region or is used as one of the
criteria in the objective function.
A more general, and hence more complicated approach would be to use a (inequity-
averse) aggregation function and to maximize it. We refer to such approaches as aggrega-
tion function based approaches. Some studies optimize a specic function of the distribu-
tion and obtain a single equitable solution while others use a multi-criteria approach and
obtain a set of equitable solutions.
The above classication is summarized in Table 2.3. We will discuss these approaches
further in the following sections.
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The Rawlsian Approach (mini yi)
These methods represent equity preference by focusing on the worst-o¤ entity, hence the
minimum outcome level in a distribution ([129]). Some studies try to maximize the min-
imum outcome while others restrict it in a constraint that makes sure that it is above a
predened value. The studies encountered that use a Rawlsian approach to equitability
are [44], [43], [45], [51], [91], [64], [31], [55], [98], [36], [50], [47], [100], [99], [51], [41], [93],
[65], [77], [17], [15], [13], [90], [56], [58], [84], [14], [73], [39], [22], [21], [89], [20] and [30].
Clearly, this is an easy to implement and popular approach.
The Rawlsian approach is the one of the oldest approaches in OR used to incorpo-
rate a fairness concept into the models. Many classical OR problems such as assignment,
scheduling and location have also been studied with bottleneckobjectives. For exam-
ple, the facility location problems that locate p facilities such that the maximum distance
between any demand point and its nearest facility is minimized are known as p-center
problems. These models assign each demand point to its nearest facility, hence full cover-
age of customers is always ensured. p-center location problems are widely considered in
location theory, especially in public sector applications ([130]).
The Rawlsian approach can be extended to a lexicographic approach, which in addition
to the worst outcome maximizes the second worst (provided that the worst outcome is as
large as possible), third worst (provided that the rst and second worst outcomes are as
large as possible) and so on [87]. Lexicographic maximin approach is a regularization of
the Rawlsian maximin approach such that it satises strict monotonicity and PD principle
of transfers. Lexicographic approaches are used in [28], [11], [7], [25], [12], [8], [120], [121],
[6], [5], [4] and [24]. Lexicographic approaches are very inequality averse and considered
by some studies as the most equitablesolution.
Inequality Index Based Approaches
In many studies equitability concerns are incorporated into the model through the use of
inequality indices I(y) : Rm ! R, which assign a scalar value to any given distribution
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showing the degree of inequality. Many inequality measures are studied in the economics
literature (see Sen [127]). Some of them are also used in the operational research literature
when dealing with problems that involve equity concerns alongside e¢ ciency concerns. As
inequality indices are used to assess the disparity in a distribution, they are related to
several mathematical concepts of dispersion and variance. They respect the anonymity
property ([131]) and have a value of 0 when perfect equity occurs. They assign a scalar
value to the distribution ([131]) and are completein the sense that every pair of distri-
butions can be compared under these measures ([127]).
The indices are used to address equitability concerns and do not incorporate any con-
cerns on e¢ ciency. When e¢ ciency concerns are also relevant, the corresponding models
that use an inequality index to handle equity concerns are either designed as multicriteria
models (two of the criteria usually being e¢ ciency and equity related, respectively) or as
single objective models that maximize an e¢ ciency metric and use the index in a con-
straint. For example, Ogryczak [49] works on location problems and develops bicriteria
mean/equity models as simplied approaches. These models deal with the equity concern
by adapting the inequality measures to the location framework and trying to minimize
them. He discusses di¤erent ways to nd e¢ cient solutions to these bicriteria models.
Other bi(multi)-criteria examples include [98], [26], [72], [62], [59], [54], [80], [60], [79] and
[37]. There are also single objective models where equity is handled via constraints which
set minimum levels of allocation for each entity and an e¢ ciency metric is maximized
([89]).
The examples that use an inequality index as the only criterion are [53], [19], [67], [84],
[34], [46], [82], [83], [18], [40], [38], [32], [35], [42], [113] and [81]. [70] minimize a weighted
sum of two inequality measures.
Using an explicit inequality measure has some advantages such as bringing trans-
parency to the decision making process, making the equitability concept computationally
tractable, and hence making it possible to optimize the system with respect to these equal-
ity measures once a suitable measure is agreed upon or to tradeo¤ equity and e¢ ciency.
On the other hand, using an inequality index to incorporate equitability concerns implies
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a certain approach to fairness dictated by the axioms underlying the selected index and
sometimes may result in oversimplication of the discussion on equity. Moreover, di¤erent
indices are based on di¤erent concepts of equity, hence may provide di¤erent rankings for
the same set of alternatives. Selecting an index in line with the DMs understanding of
fairness requires some extra knowledge on the underlying theoretical properties of di¤erent
indices.
Recall that the widely-accepted Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (PD) states that
any transfer from a poorer person to a richer person, other things remaining the same,
should always increase the inequality index value. That is, for any inequality index I(y) :
Rm ! R satisfying PD the following holds: yj > yi ) I(y) < I(y + "ej   "ei); for all y
2 Rm;where " > 0; where ei; ej are the ith and jth unit vectors in Rm. A weak version
of this principle requires such a transfer not to decrease the inequality index value. This
weak version can be considered as the minimal property to be expected from an inequality
index. All the indices discussed below satisfy the weak PD. We will indicate the indices
that additionally satisfy (the strong version of) PD.
We now discuss the most commonly used inequality indices. All the indices except the
last one are familiar from the economics literature.
1) The range between the minimum and maximum levels of outcomes (maxi yi mini
yi): This is the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum outcomes in a distribution.
This index is used in [98], [53], [19], [67], [26], [72], [84], [89], [66], [34], and [46]. [62]
minimize the function (maxi yi miniyiminiyi )  100, hence use a range function normalized by the
minimum outcome.
In this method the equity level of an allocation is assessed by considering the two
extremes; hence this index fails to distinguish allocations that have same level of extremes
but di¤erent levels of the other values. In that sense, this index is rather crude but is used
in many applications owing to its being simple and easy to understand.
[82] consider the lexicographic extension of the range measure, hence in addition to the
di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum outcome (range), they minimize the
di¤erence between the maximum and the second minimum outcome (given that the range
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is as small as possible) and so on. [83] consider a generalization of the range measure in
the sense that jmaxi yi   kth mini yij is minimized, where kth mini yi is the kth minimum
outcome value.
2) (Relative) Mean Deviation: This is the deviation from the mean. Note that in many
cases the mean of the distribution is not known beforehand and is derived endogenously in
the model. It is possible to use the total absolute deviations from the mean (
P
i2I jyi yj;
where y =
P
i2I yi
m j) ([18], [46], [49], [27]) or to use the positive or negative deviations only,
as in [49]. The mean deviation does not satisfy strong PD because it is not a¤ected by
transfers between two entities which are both above the mean or both below it.
[59] use the mean square deviation (
P
i2I(yi   y)2). [46] and [54] use the maximum
componentwise deviation from average as a measure of inequity (Maxi2I jyi   yj).
3) Variance (
P
i2I(yi   y)2=m): [46], [40], [34], [70], [38], and [72] use variance as
a measure of fairness in their models. Variance satises PD. Equivalently, the standard
deviation is also used in some studies ([80], [60]).
4) Gini Coe¢ cient : One of the widely used income inequality measure used by the
economists is the Gini coe¢ cient owing to its respecting the PD ([132]). The Gini coef-
cient has the following formula:
P
i2I
P
j2J jyi yj j
2m
P
i2I yi
: Two examples are [35] and [79], who
use the Gini coe¢ cient in location of service facilities and in design of more equitable
congestion pricing schemes, respectively.
5) Sum of pairwise (absolute) di¤erences (
P
i2I
P
j2J jyi yj j): Sum of absolute di¤er-
ences between all pairs is considered in [46], [42], [37] and [113]. Like the Gini coe¢ cient
and variance, this measure satises the PD. A closely related measure is the sum of square
deviations between all pairs which is used in [76]. [32] consider facility location prob-
lems where they classify demand points into di¤erent demand groups over which equity is
sought. They use the (weighted) sum of squares of di¤erences between service distances to
di¤erent demand groups to measure inequality. This formulation allows demand groups to
include multiple demand points and service distances between any two demand point that
belong to the same group are not considered in the measure. They show that minimizing
this measure is equivalent to minimizing variance when each demand point is a group by
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itself.
The measures discussed so far are also discussed in the economics literature especially
for assessing income inequality. The rst two measures (range and relative mean deviation)
are relatively crude measures and hence not as popular as the others for assessing income
inequality. However, they are used in OR models arguably because these indices have
simpler formulations than the others and so lead to more tractable optimisation problems.
Some other examples that minimize deviation from a point of perfect equality are due
to [81] and [61]. [81] propose an integer programming model to form student teams to
undertake a case study. For equity purposes the teams are required to have similar a priori
academic performance, hence the maximum deviation of a teams academic performance
from the class average is minimized in the proposed model. The squared deviation func-
tions are also used ([52]). [61] partitions a region into subregions such that a subregion is
served by a vehicle. He ensures that the workload distribution to the vehicles is equitable,
i.e. all vehicles have (asymptotically) equal load.
As discussed above, there are many di¤erent inequality indices and selecting one implies
certain assumptions on the decision makers attitude to equity. For example, in a resource
allocation environment, if the range is used then the focus is on the most and least deprived
parties.
Inequity-averse Aggregation Function Based Approaches
One natural way to achieve an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ without specifying an inequity
index is to use an aggregation function of the distribution vector in the model that would
encourage equitable distributions. An example would be a symmetric function under
which a convex combination of two distributions which have the same functional value
would achieve a higher value than these distributions (e.g. if the function is symmetric
(40,50) has a higher value than (30,60) or (60,30)). Such a function is inequity averse in
the sense that the averaging operation improves the distribution. By maximizing such
aggregation (value) functions, we can avoid distributions that give some entities too much
while depriving some others.
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We call these approaches aggregation function based approaches. Unlike an inequality
index which only focuses on the inequity in a distribution, an inequity-averse aggregation
function reects concerns for both equity and e¢ ciency. There are several approaches
to how the equity should be captured. There are studies that use value functions which
are Schur-concave, (symmetric) quasi-concave or concave with the aim of obtaining equi-
table solutions. Note that when allocating a bad, a Schur-convex, quasi-convex or convex
aggregation (cost) function is minimized.
In these approaches, one uses an aggregation function U : Rm ! R; and modies the
original problem as follows: maxfU(y) : y 2 Y g where Y 2 Rm is the feasible outcome
space. For a specied function form to be inequity-averse, it has to satisfy some properties.
First of all, such a function should be symmetric to respect anonymity and should reect
concerns in terms of inequity-aversion and the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. We call the set
of symmetric functions that satisfy the strict Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and strict
monotonicity equitable aggregation functions.
Denition 1 An equitable aggregation function is a function U : Rm ! R for which the
following hold:
y1 < y2 then U(y1) < U(y2); for all y1; y2 2 Y , i.e. U is strictly increasing with respect
to every coordinate.
U(y) = U(l(y)); where l(y) is an arbitrary permutation of the y vector, i.e. U is
symmetric.
yj > yi ) U(y) < U(y   "ej + "ei); for all y 2 Rm; where 0 < " < yj   yi; where ei;
ej are the ith and jth unit vectors in Rm, i.e. U satises PD.
All equitable aggregation functions are strictly Schur-concave [87]. Similarly, in a
minimization environment, for example in cost distribution, equitable aggregations are
Schur-convex functions. We now give the denition of Schur-concave functions. Let us
rst give the denition of a bistochastic matrix.
Denition 2 A bistochastic (doubly stochastic) matrix (Q) is a square matrix which has
all nonnegative entries and each row and column of the matrix adds up to 1.
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Permutation matrices, which reorder the elements of a vector, are special cases of
bistochastic matrices.
The well-known Birkho¤von Neumann theorem [133] states that the set of doubly
stochastic matrices of order m is the convex hull of the set of permutation matrices of the
same order. Moreover, the vertices of this polytope are the permutation matrices. That
is, a bistochastic matrix of order m is a convex combination of the set of permutation
matrices of the same order.
Denition 3 A function f is strictly Schur-concave (Schur-convex) if and only if for all
bistochastic matrices Q that are not permutation matrices, f(Qx) > f(x) (f(Qx) < f(x)).
Schur-concave functions are symmetric by denition. Schur-concavity relates to more
familiar concavity concepts in the following way: All symmetric (strictly) quasi-concave
and symmetric (strictly) concave functions are (strictly) Schur-concave.
Maximizing (minimizing) a specic (strictly) Schur-concave (convex) function that
aggregates the outcomes is discussed in a number of papers in the literature. Ball et al.
[29] investigate a class of models for assigning ights to slots in ground delay problems
and discuss the use of Schur-convex aggregation functions as a way of obtaining equitable
solutions within this setting.
Marin et al. [122] use ordered median functions as objective functions of discrete
location problems. Ordered median functions are weighted total cost functions, in which
the weights are rank-dependent. As the weights are rank dependent, these functions are
symmetric and if the weights are chosen appropriately, ordered median functions can be
inequity-averse in the sense that they are strictly concave. They show that both the range
and sum of pairwise di¤erences functions can be modeled using this approach, hence are
particular cases of their model.
In communication engineering, one of the commonly used fairness concepts is pro-
portional fairness, which can be obtained by maximizing
P
i2I log(yi). An allocation y
is proportionally fair if for any other feasible allocation y0 the total proportional change
(
P
i2I(y
0
i yi)=yi) is zero or negative when all outcomes are nonnegative. The proportional
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fairness concept can be advocated from a game theoretic point of view as a proportionally
fair allocation is also the Nash bargaining solution, satisfying certain axioms of fairness
([22], [134], [135]). Proportional fairness is a specic case of a more general fairness scheme
called  fairness, which maximize the following parametric class of utility functions for
  0 ([23]):
U(y) =
8><>:
Pm
i=1
y1 i
1  for   0;  6= 1Pm
i=1 log(yi) for  = 1
:
Lexicographic maximin approach, which is a regularization of the Rawlsian maximin
approach such that it satises strict monotonicity and PD, is another example.
There are also approaches that use a Schur-concave function and hence respect the weak
version of the PD only while failing to satisfy the strong version. For example, Hooker
and Williams [16] consider allocation of utilities to individuals (or classes of individuals)
and propose a weakly Schur-concave aggregation function to be maximized. The function
is based on the idea of combining objectives of equity -they use a Rawlsian approach- and
e¢ ciency. The authors provide a mixed integer linear programming formulation of the
allocation problem and apply the formulation to a healthcare planning example.
A di¢ culty with equitable aggregation functions is that the decision maker or modeller
has to select a specic aggregation function. In most settings there may not be a natural
choice of equitable aggregation. A set of approaches based on the concept of a unanimity
order have been developed to address this issue. Given a set F of functions f 2 F , the
unanimity order with respect to F is the binary relation <over outcome vectors and
dened as follows: for any two allocation vectors y1 and y2 2 Y , y1 < y2 () f(x) <
f(y) for all f 2 F .
Note that unanimity order is a quasiorder. The approaches discussed so far in this
section maximize a particular concave, quasi-concave and Schur-concave function in their
models. We note that rather than using specic functions, if we consider the unanimity
order for the set of all concave, quasi-concave or Schur-concave functions, there is no dif-
ference between the resulting order. This important result is summarized in the following
theorem.
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Theorem 4 For two allocation vectors y1 and y2, the following cases are equivalent:
1. U(y1)  U(y2) for all U : U is increasing and Schur-concave [136]. (Note that [136]
uses a strict version of the PD; hence strictly Schur-concave functions)
2. U(y1)  U(y2) for all U : U is symmetric, increasing and quasi-concave ([137])
3. U(y1)  U(y2) for all U : U is symmetric, increasing and concave ([137])
4. U(y1)  U(y2) for all U : U is additive. That is, U(g) =
X
i2I u(yi) where u is
increasing and concave ([136], [137])
Parts of Theorem 4 for the special case where
P
i2I y
1
i =
P
i2I y
2
i are proven by Atkin-
son [138] and Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett [139] based on the results by Hardy, Littlewood,
and Polya [140] on majorization (see also [141]). The results for the more general case
(
P
i2I y
1
i 6=
P
i2I y
2
i ) can be found in Rothschild and Stiglitz [137] and Shorrocks [136].
This theorem states that the unanimity ordering of a given set of alternatives under the
set of all Schur-concave functions is equivalent to the unanimity ordering under the set of
all quasiconcave, concave functions or additive functions of concave functions.
A multicriteria perspective: Equitable E¢ ciency and Schur-concavity
The above approaches use particular functions in order to capture equity concerns.
The specic functional forms used are context dependent and di¤erent forms are adopted
in di¤erent studies. Two common properties of these functions are that they are increasing
or nondecreasing (in a maximization problem) and inequity-averse in the sense that they
satisfy PD, though sometimes in a weak way as in [16]. Considering the aggregation
function approach from a multicriteria perspective, one can relate such functions to the
DMs preferences and specify a set of properties that an equity-averse DMs preference
model should satisfy. [142] and [87] take this point of view and introduce the concept
of equitable e¢ ciency. Given two distributions, the more equitableone is distinguished
based on a set of axioms dened on the DMs preference model. They call a social welfare
function which is in line with this specic set of axioms an equitable aggregation function
and a solution which maximizes an equitable aggregation function equitably e¢ cient. This
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multicriteria decision making perspective is based on dening each element of the outcome
vector as a separate criterion to be maximized as explained below. This discussion is based
on the theory introduced in [142].
Consider the following problem: maxff(x) : x 2 Qg where X 2 Rn is the decision
space, Y 2 Rm is the outcome space and f(x) is a vector function that maps X to Y
and Q is the feasible set. A typical outcome vector is yk = (yk1 ; y
k
2 ; :::; y
k
m), where y
k
i is
the outcome value corresponding to entity i 2 I (i = 1; 2; :::;m) and k is the index of the
alternative.
We denote the weak preference relation of the DM as  (the corresponding strict and
indi¤erence relations are denoted by  and , respectively). Assume that the DM has a
preference model in which the preference relation satises the following axioms [87]:
1.Reexivity (R): y  y for all y 2 Y .
2.Transitivity (T): (y1  y2 and y2  y3)) y1  y3, for all y1; y2; y3 2 Y:
3.Strict monotonicity (SM): y1 < y2 then y1  y2; for all y1; y2 2 Y .
4.Anonymity (A): (y)  l(y) for all l = 1; :::;m!; for all y 2 Rm; where l(y) stands
for an arbitrary permutation of the y vector.
5.Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (PD): yj > yi ) y  y   "ej + "ei; for all y
2 Rm;where 0 < " < yj   yi; where ei; ej are the ith and jth unit vectors in Rm.
The anonymity axiom states that the corresponding preference relation should treat
all the permutations of a vector as indi¤erent. That is, the identities of the entities are
irrelevant. This is in contrast to what we have called balance problems. The preference for
equity is stated by the PD axiom. The preference relations that satisfy R, T, SM, A and
PD are called equitable rational preference relations. Using equitable rational preference
relations, the relations of equitable dominance, equitable indi¤erence and equitable weak
dominance can be dened as follows:
Denition 5 For any two outcome vectors y1 and y2;
y1 e (= e = e) y2 (y2 equitably dominates/ equitably weakly dominates/is equitably
indi¤erent to y1) i¤ y1  (=  = ) y2 for all equitable rational preference relations .
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Note that "rational dominance", i.e. the normal dominance concept, which is the
intersection relation of all preference relations satisfying R, T and SM, implies equitable
dominance but not vice versa. This is clear from the fact that the set of axioms used
to dene rational dominance, which is the standard multicriteria dominance concept, is a
subset of the axioms used to dene equitable dominance.
Equitable dominance is also called generalized Lorenz dominance (see [136]). General-
ized Lorenz dominance is an extension of the well-known Lorenz dominance concept used
in the economics literature to the cases where the means of the distributions are not nec-
essarily equal. An alternative is equitably e¢ cient if there is no alternative that equitably
dominates it. Note that the set of equitably e¢ cient solutions is a subset of the Pareto
e¢ cient set.
We have already dened (see denition 1) equitable aggregation functions. It so happens
that the equitable aggregations, i.e. Schur-concave functions are the functions that respect
axioms 1-5. That is, if an equitable rational preference relation is representable by a
utility function, the function has to be increasing strictly Schur-concave in a maximization
problem [87]. The equitably e¢ cient set is the set of alternatives each of which maximizes
at least one increasing strictly Schur-concave function.
There are two possible equity modelling approaches using such aggregations: The rst
approach is choosing a suitable equitable aggregation function (Schur-concave function)
and optimizing it in the model. Optimizing a predened aggregation function will return
one of the (possibly many) equitably e¢ cient solutions. The aggregation function based
approaches discussed previously, which optimize a strictly Schur-concave (Schur-convex)
function are in this category.
The second approach is nding the set of equitably e¢ cient solutions without specifying
the aggregation function further. This way one would obtain a set of alternatives that is
guaranteed to include the DMs most preferred alternative as long as her utility function
is (strictly) Schur-concave. This approach is discussed in ([142], [85]) and [87] for multiple
criteria linear problems and nonlinear problems, respectively. Baatar and Wiecek [88]
dene the equitable preference structure using a cone-based approach and propose a two
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step method including two single objective nonlinear programs in order to nd equitably
e¢ cient solutions.
As an application example, Ogryczak et al. [10] consider equitable optimization in
bandwidth allocation. For practical purposes, they consider a restricted set of criteria and
nd equitable solutions for the restricted model using the reference point approach. A
similar approach is taken in [9].
Mut and Wiecek [86] generalize the concept of equitability. They dene two di¤erent
relations which are more general than e and investigate the axioms that these new
relations satisfy. They derive the conditions under which the new preferences satisfy the
original and modied axioms of equitable preference.
In most of the above approaches the whole set of nondominated points or a subset of
it is found; hence the algorithms return multiple alternatives without using an interactive
setting. The studies we encountered that consider interactive approaches are [87], [9]
and [10], which use a reference point approach and Karsu et al. [143], which use the
convex cones approach to incorporate DMs preference information to guide the selection
or ranking process.
The classical multicriteria decision making problem settings include criteria that do
not have the same range, hence it is not appropriate to use equitable aggregation over
the original criteria values. However, in the reference point method, the outcome vectors
are converted to achievement vectors using scalarizing functions. The scalarizing function
transforms the outcomes into a uniform scale, which makes it possible to apply an equi-
table aggregation on the transformed achievement scores. Kostreva et al. [87] make this
observation and discuss the use of equitable aggregations for the reference point method.
Using the same idea, Dugardin et al. [74] use the equitable dominance concept in a
well-known multi-criteria solution approach (Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
2) to discard the alternatives which are competitive in only one criterion. The authors
introduce a function which scales di¤erent components of the objective vector. This is an
application where the equity concept is used in order to choose goodalternatives in a
multi-criteria problem that does not have the impartiality property. These applications
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show the two way link between the Pareto e¢ ciency and the equitable e¢ ciency concept.
In addition to generating equitably e¢ cient solutions using the classical MCDM solution
methods designed to generate Pareto e¢ cient solutions, one can also use the equitable
e¢ ciency concept to come up with Pareto e¢ cient solutions once the outcome vectors are
modied using appropriate scalarizations.
2.3.2 Handling Balance
Most of the approaches handle balance concerns by using an imbalance indicator, which
measures deviation from a predened level, which is chosen e.g. based on claims, needs or
preferences. This approach is similar to an inequality index based approach to equitability,
however an imbalance indicator does not necessarily achieve its minimum at a distribution
where each entity receives the same amount.
Examples of applications handling the balance concept using this approach are as
follows. In a heterogeneous server system model, [126] consider equity over servers with
di¤erent service rates. They formulate the problem as a Markov decision process and solve
a related LP model, in which the customer waiting time is minimized along with a fairness
constraint on the workload division over servers with di¤erent skill levels. Specically, they
use a constraint set that controls the fraction of the idle time that the server groups with
di¤erent paces have. These fractions are ensured to have pre-determined values, which are
set by the decision maker. Cook and Zhu [119] allocate a xed cost among the existing
Decision Making Units (DMU). In order to treat the DMUs in an equitable way, the
authors ensure that the e¢ ciencies of the DMUs remain unchanged after the allocation.
[48] and [33] incorporate balance concerns over users of a public service provision system
by minimizing weighted negative and positive deviations from a standard service level
specied by the DM.
In ground delay programs, the ration-by-schedule (RBS) rule is used as a reference.
This rule assigns the landing slots to unassigned ights on a First Scheduled First Served
(FSFS) basis based on the arrival times submitted at the beginning of the daily opera-
tions. The studies that use the deviation from the FSFS solution as a measure of inequity
48
CHAPTER 2. INEQUITY AVERSE OPTIMISATION IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
(imbalance) in arrival slot allocations are [110], [108], [106], and [125]. Karsu and Mor-
ton [112] propose a two dimensional framework to trade balance o¤ against e¢ ciency in
resource allocation problems motivated by problems in R&D project selection. They use
imbalance indices which measure the deviation of an allocation from an ideally balanced
allocation the DM provides.
The deviation (cost) function, i.e. the imbalance indicator, can be the total absolute
deviation ( [125]) or the sum of negative or positive deviations. There are also studies that
minimize the maximum componentwise deviation ([110], [92]) or use a constraint which
ensures that maximum componentwise deviation is below a pre-dened level ([109], [108]).
In some models designed to improve an existing system (e.g. the current transportation
network) any negative deviation from the status quo is forbidden by constraints as in
[75]. They propose a transportation network improvement model, which ensures that no
origin-destination pair gets worse than the status quo in terms of consumer surplus, i.e.
the di¤erence between what travelers would be willing to pay for travel and what they
actually pay. There are also studies that use a weighted total deviation from the weighted
mean such as [101], [102], [103] (
P
i2I wijyi  
P
i2I wiyij, where
P
i2I wi = 1):
The above studies focus on keeping the total deviation from a predened level at
minimum, which may result in some componentwise deviations to be signicantly larger
than others. Similar to equitable aggregation functions, convex functions are optimized in
some models to handle balance concerns. Such convex functions encourage fairness in the
distribution of deviation (cost) and hence avoid some entities deviate signicantly for the
sake of minimizing total deviation. In that sense, convex functions can be considered as
special types of imbalance indicators, which measure deviation using a convex function.
Exponential (cost) functions and squared deviation functions are examples of such convex
functions ([124], [52]). Mukherjee and Hansen [124] propose a dynamic stochastic integer
programming model for the GDP that allows one to revisit the assignment in case of a
change in airport operating conditions. They use a convex ground delay cost function in
their objective in order to ensure a uniform spread of ground delay across di¤erent ight
categories. Kotnyek and Richetta [123] consider the stochastic GDP and ensure that the
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FSFS holds by using convex ground-hold cost functions. [104] use the same idea in an
Air Tra¢ c Flow Management model, where an equitable distribution of delay is achieved
by using objective function cost coe¢ cients that are a convex function of the tardiness
of a ight. Similarly, Barnhart et al. [106] use an exponential delay penalty function.
For each ight a worst-case FSFS delay is calculated and each interval delay beyond this
worst-case FSFS delay is penalized by an exponentially increasing amount. Similarly,
[111] minimizes a piecewise linear penalty function of deviations from goals. In an access
control policy design problem, Zhang and Shen [78] incorporate spatial equity into the
model by using the weighted square sum of the average delay over di¤erent entry points.
[94] use convex disutility functions of unsatised demand percentages of each node in a
relief routing model. Hence, the whole demand of each node is not necessarily supplied so
as to save supply for other nodes.
It is also possible to use a scaling approach and dene the outcome distribution as the
per capita allocation, i.e. yi=ni where ni is an attribute value, such as a measure showing
the size or need of an entity. For example in disaster relief models, the proportion of
demand satised in di¤erent demand nodes is used as a measure of service. This scaling
approach allows one to assume anonymity over the scalarized outcome distribution and
hence handle the balance concerns in an equitability environment. Examples that use this
scaling approach are used in di¤erent settings including public policy ([90], [100]), disaster
relief ([91], [92], [93]), drug allocation to clinics ([95], [96]), water resources allocation
([120], [121]), transportation network design ([76]) and scheduling ([97]).
2.4 Conclusion
Although most (of the early) attempts in operational research focused on e¢ ciency con-
cerns, there is a vast amount of applications where equity is an additional, sometimes
the sole, concern. The need for equity is appreciated by the OR practitioners and acad-
emicians as can be observed by the recent increase in the number of OR papers, which
re-consider some of the well-known problems such as knapsack, assignment and location
50
CHAPTER 2. INEQUITY AVERSE OPTIMISATION IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
problems with an e¤ort to incorporate equity concerns. The applications that require
explicit consideration of equity appear in a broad range of situations both in the public
and private sector.
In this paper, we provide a review of the approaches that are used to handle equity
concerns by optimizing mathematical models. We rst discuss two equity related concepts:
equitability, and balance. We discuss the di¤erences between these two concepts along with
their applications. Most of the approaches in our review can be classied as either being
concerned with equitability, i.e. assuming anonymity or with balance, i.e. distinguishing
entities with respect to an attribute indicating for example need, claim or preference.
Handling equity by promoting diversity is an indirect approach which is discussed only in
a few papers and it is possible to dene such diversity concerns as a special case of balance
concerns.
We provide a detailed discussion of the solution approaches designed to incorporate
equitability and balance concerns. We categorise the solution approaches to problems
involving equitability concerns into three categories. The rst and the crudest approach
is the Rawlsian (maxmin) approach, which compares alternative distributions based on
the amount the worst-o¤ entity receives. In the second approach, an inequality measure is
used either in a constraint or as a criterion so as to quantify equity. When the inequality
index is used in a constraint in the model, inequity is kept below a certain threshold
by this constraint. The inequality measure can also be dened as a separate criterion
alongside other e¢ ciency related criteria, resulting in a multi-criteria model. Bicriteria
equity/e¢ ciency models dened this way are easy to solve. Inequality indices are useful as
summary measures but should be used with caution as they may lead to oversimplication
of the equity concept. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each index and
choosing the most appropriate one requires some knowledge of the underlying theory of
inequality measurement.
The last approach to equitability is based on using inequity-averse aggregation func-
tions of the outcome distributions. Some studies using this approach maximize specic
inequity-averse functions in their models. Multicriteria decision making concepts provide
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us with a means to relate a set of inequity-averse functions with a set of axioms on the
underlying preference relation of a DM. Two equity-related axioms are additionally as-
sumed for a rational DMs preference relation: anonymity and the Pigou-Dalton principle
of transfers. The set of functions that represent such preference relations are called equi-
table aggregations and all such functions are Schur-concave in a maximization problem.
These aggregations can be used as scalarizing functions to obtain the set of nondominated
(equitably e¢ cient) solutions or as the single objective function to be optimized to obtain
a specic nondominated solution.
Balance concerns are handled in two main ways. The rst one is based on using
imbalance indicators, which measure the deviation from a reference solution which is
considered as balanced. These indicators can be functions of various forms including
convex deviation functions, which distribute deviation in an equitable way across the
entities. The second way to handle balance concerns is to convert balance problems into
equitability problems by normalising allocations, hence making it possible to use any of
the equitability-handling approaches.
Among the approaches used to handle equitability concerns, nding the set of equitably
e¢ cient solutions can be used as a gold standard for other approaches owing to its
reasonably weak assumptions on the underlying preference relation (the DM can have any
type of Schur-concave function). This multicriteria approach is more attractive than an
inequality index based approach as specifying an inequality index may be di¢ cult for the
DM. On the other hand, the approaches that nd the set of equitably e¢ cient solutions are
computationally complex. One way to choose from these two extremes would be relying
on the equitable aggregation concept when the underlying optimization problem at hand
is relatively simple and easy to solve; and using an inequality index when the problem is
less tractable.
We see great potential for further research in improving the decision support process
in multicriteria problems where equity is a concern. Further research on guiding the DM
through the set of candidate alternatives (e.g. the nondominated alternatives) could be
usefully performed. This applies to multicriteria models in both inequality (or imbalance)
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index based and aggregation function based approaches. Selecting the bestalternative
requires information on the tradeo¤ between the criteria unless there is a single alternative
which is better than the others in terms of all criteria, which is unlikely. Hence, in most of
the multicriteria mathematical modelling approaches which address equity concerns using
inequality or imbalance indices, a single alternative is obtained by maximizing a weighted
sum of the criteria with predetermined weights. A more robust approach would be pre-
senting the DM with a subset of solutions or using an interactive procedure rather than
predened weights. Which approach is more appropriate depends on the problem context.
In some cases, presenting the DM a subset of goodsolutions for further evaluations may
be required from the analyst whereas in some others decision support may be required
until the decision maker makes the nal selection. Similarly, in equitable aggregation
based multicriteria models, even if some or all the equitably e¢ cient solutions are found
and presented to the DM, it may be di¢ cult for him to choose from this set. Appropriate
decision support would be required if the decision maker wants to obtain a single solution.
This renders interactive approaches relevant and necessary in such settings.
Most of the problems in OR can be categorized into one of three classes based on what
is required from the decision support. These are nding the best solution (or a subset of
good solutions), ranking and sorting ([144], [145]). All the papers in our review of the
operational research literature consider the rst type although there may be ranking or
sorting problems in which equity should be considered. An example of a ranking problem
involving equity concerns arises naturally in intercountry comparisons based on income
inequality and social welfare. This is one of the classical topics in the theory of equity
as it has been discussed in economics. MCDM optimisation tools can be relatively easily
adapted for ranking and sorting problems that involve equity concerns: See Sen [127] for
a discussion and Karsu et al. [143] for an interactive ranking algorithm that is based on
the equitable e¢ ciency concept. An interesting application would be nding ways to sort
di¤erent countries in terms of social welfare, or to sort di¤erent policy decisions in terms
of the resulting social welfare.
In many cases addressing fairness concerns results in a decrease in e¢ ciency. A relevant
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question is how much one sacrices from e¢ ciency when a fairsolution is adopted. Ob-
serving the tradeo¤ between e¢ ciency and equity would make the DMs more comfortable
when making decisions and communicating the decisions to the stakeholders. For exam-
ple, if the e¢ ciency loss is negligible, the DM would nd it easier to support a solution
that ensures fairness. On the other hand if the e¢ ciency loss is signicant, a compro-
mise solution can be selected. There are studies in the literature that analyze the price
of fairness, i.e. the e¢ ciency di¤erence between the following two cases: selecting a very
aggressive inequality averse approach and not using an inequality averse approach [22],
[23]. This concept can be generalized to see the extend to which selecting the wrong
inequality approach a¤ects the solutions. Analyzing robustness of solutions with respect
to di¤erent inequity-averse approaches awaits further attention. There are some initial
attempts to explore the similarities of di¤erent inequality measures used in the location
context (see e.g. [146], [42] and other references therein) but there is still more research to
be done. As pointed out in [42] an axiomatic introduction of the equality (and imbalance)
measures could throw some light on the question of how similar di¤erent measures are.
Even when an inequality or imbalance index is chosen and used in a constraint, which
controls its value by a threshold, sensitivity analysis can be performed to see the e¤ect of
the threshold value on the optimal solution. Such an analysis would help us to suggest
more robust solutions but was not discussed in most of the studies (see Batta et al. [30] for
an analysis in the context of a p-median problem on a network, where the authors try to
nd how bad a locational choice can be provided that the decision makes use dispersion,
population and equity criteria).
To sum up, we believe that being a practically relevant and theoretically challenging
concept, equity can stimulate a number of research questions for operational researchers
especially in the areas of decision support, di¤erent problem types, and robustness.
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Chapter 3
Using Holistic Multi-criteria
Assessments: the Convex Cones
Approach
3.1 Introduction
Consider a general multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) problem which can be formu-
lated as follows:
Maxz = f(x) = (f1(x); :::; fp(x)) (3.1)
s:t: x 2 X
where x is the decision vector, X  Rn is the feasible decision space, fj(:) is the jth
criterion (objective) function and z is the criterion vector. The above formulation uses
the decision space representation of an MCDM problem. One can also formulate MCDM
problems in the criterion space as follows:
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Maxfz1; :::; zpg (3.2)
s:t: z 2 Z
where Z = fz 2 Rp : z = f(x) : x 2 Xg is called the (feasible) criterion space. That
is, Z is the image of the feasible decision set (X ) in the criterion space. Throughout the
text we refer to both x and z as the solutions (alternatives) of the MCDM problem.
A classication of the MCDM problems can be made based on whether the solutions
(alternatives) are explicitly or implicitly dened. Problems where a nite set of alterna-
tives is explicitly given are called multiple-criteria evaluation problems (or multi-criteria
evaluation problems) and problems where the set of alternatives is implicitly dened by
constraints are called multiple-criteria design problems or multiple objective (mathematical
programming) problems (MOPs) [147]. When the problem considered is an MOP, X 2 Rn
can be discrete or continuous.
Note that the maximization of a vector in models 3.1 and 3.2 is not a well dened
operator. Therefore, solving an MCDM model may refer to di¤erent things depending on
the context. Most MCDM approaches try to identify the best alternative, i.e. to nd the
alternative that is most preferred by the decision maker (DM). Some other cases are also
possible. For example, three kinds of problematiques are reported to be generally used in
practice in order to support decision makers in multi-criteria evaluation problems ([144],
[145]). These are as follows:
1) Identify the best alternative or a small subset of good alternatives
2) Rank the alternatives from the best to the worst
3) Classify / sort the alternatives into predened homogeneous groups
If the MCDM problem is an MOP, i.e. the set of solutions is implicitly dened by
constraints, the number of solutions can be innite (in the continuous case) or prohibitively
large (in the discrete case) hence the ranking and sorting problematiques are not typically
considered. In such cases one may want to identify the best alternative or a small subset
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of good alternatives.
Unless there is a single alternative which is better than the others in terms of all
the criteria, which typically is not the case when there are conicting objectives, the
need to distinguish di¤erent solutions from each other makes some information on the
DMs preferences necessary. This makes MCDM theory closely connected to the theory
on preference relations and utility. Basic notation and denitions used in the theory of
preference relations are provided in the next section.
In this chapter we provide a review of the literature on interactive MCDM approaches
which use convex cones as a means of representing the DMs preference structure. In the
next section we discuss the relation between preference relations and value (utility) func-
tions. Specically, we provide the assumptions made on the DMs underlying preference
relation by the MCDM solution methods using the convex cones approach. In Section
3.3 we cover the basic theory on the convex cones approach and show how the cones can
be used to obtain the best solution in a given set. We also discuss a related concept:
the use of polyhedra whose vertices are the cone generators in MCDM ranking or sorting
problems. We then provide a review of the MCDM approaches that use the convex cones
and we conclude the discussion in Section 3.4.
3.2 Preference Relations and Value Functions
We rst dene and discuss the properties of a weak preference relation, denoted by ,
which completely characterizes the preference model in the criterion space. Next, we
introduce the term rational preference along with its underlying properties and discuss
the relation between preference relations and value functions. We then provide the as-
sumptions on the DMs preference relation that allow us to use convex cones in MCDM
approaches.
For two alternatives z1 and z2 the statement z1  z2 is used to symbolize that z2 is
weakly preferred to z1 .
Denition 6 Given a relation of weak preference, the corresponding relations of strict
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preference and indi¤erence are dened as follows:
z1  z2 (z2 is strictly preferred to z1), (z1  z2 and not z2  z1)
z1  z2 (z2 is indi¤erent to z1), (z1  z2 and z2  z1):
We now dene some properties for a preference relation.
Denition 7 A preference relation  is complete if either z1  z2 or z2  z1, for all
z1; z2 2 Z.
A preference relation  is transitive if (z1  z2 and z2  z3) ) z1  z3, for all
z1; z2; z3 2 Z:
Preference relation  satises strict monotonicity if z1 < z2 then z1  z2, for all
z1; z2 2 Z.
The relation  is called a rational preference relation if it is complete, transitive and its
strict part () is strictly monotonic. Based on rational preferences we can dene (rational)
dominance, which is the intersection relation of all rational preference relations [142].
Denition 8 For any two alternatives z1 and z2;
z1 r z2 (z2 (rationally) dominates z1) if z1i  z2i for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg where at least
one strict inequality holds.
z1 r z2 (z2 weakly dominates z1) if z1i  z2i for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg.
Having dened these preference relations we can now discuss their relation with value
functions.
Denition 9 The preference relation  is said to be represented by a value function v(:)
if 8z1; z2; v(z1)  v(z2) if and only if z1  z2:
A preference relation is not necessarily representable by a value function. However, one
can derive the conditions under which a preference relation is representable by a specied
form of value function. We provide below one of the well-known results on representability
by Debreu [148], [149].
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Denition 10 A set A is closed if and only if it contains all of its limit points. A
preference relation is continuous if for all z 2 Z; fy 2 Z j y  zg and fy 2 Z j z  yg are
closed.
The well-known representation theorem by Debreu [148], [149] is as follows.
Theorem 11 If a preference relation on a set Z  Rp is complete, transitive and contin-
uous, then it is representable by a continuous utility (value) function.
In an MCDM problem, if the DM has a rational preference relation representable by
a value function, then this function is strictly increasing. Further structural assumptions
on the value function imply further assumptions on the underlying preference relation of
the DM.
MCDM solution strategies under the value maximization approach assume that the
DMs preferences are representable by an underlying value function (v : Z ! R) and
involve maximizing this value function. Di¤erent forms of value functions have been
studied such as linear ([150], [151]), quasiconcave [152], and monotonicly increasing [153].
There are also algorithms for partially ranking [154] or sorting [155] alternatives based on
an implicit quasiconcave value function assumption.
The MCDM approaches can also be categorized based on when the information is
taken from the DM as follows (see [145], Chapter 16):
 Methods based on the prior articulation of preferences: In such methods, the prefer-
ence information from the DM is taken at the beginning.
 Methods based on the progressive articulation of preferences: These approaches are
called interactive approaches. In such methods we iteratively reduce the solution
space and approach the best solution (or a subset of good solutions), eliciting pref-
erence information from the DM at each iteration. Interactive value maximization
strategies assume an implicit value function and employ an interactive search process
that makes use of the structural assumptions on the value function (see [156] and
[157] for two reviews).
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 Methods based on the posterior articulation of preferences: These methods try to
nd a good approximation of the nondominated frontier and present it to the DM.
Preference information can be gathered in di¤erent forms. The DM can be asked
to provide pairwise comparisons of alternatives, provide reference points [158], reference
directions, trade-o¤s, information on strength of preferences [159] etc.
A review of the literature on interactive MCDM approaches using convex cones as a
means of representing the DMs preference structure is provided in this study. A convex
cone is a convex polyhedral set in the objective function (criterion) space that contains
solutions that are less preferred by the DM than a given set of solutions [152].
In most of the approaches using convex cones, the DMs preference model is assumed
to be representable by a value function which is (strictly) quasiconcave and increasing.
A function g(:) is strictly quasiconcave if for all z1; z2 : z1 6= z2 and  2 (0; 1) we have
g(z1 +(1 )z2) > minfg(z1); g(z2)g. Similarly g is quasiconcave if g(z1 +(1 )z2) 
minfg(z1); g(z2)g.
The quasiconcavity assumption of the DMs value function implies that the DMs
rational (i.e. complete, transitive and strictly monotonic) preference relation also satises
an additional convexity assumption.
Denition 12 A preference relation  satises (weak) convexity if for all z1; z2; z3 2 Z
such that z1  z2 and z3 2 (z1; z2], we have z1  z3. ( z3 2 (z1; z2] means that there
exists a real ; 0 <   1 such that z3 = z1 + (1   )z2. That is, z3 is a convex
combination of z1 and z2).
The quasiconcavity assumption for the value function corresponds to requiring the
indi¤erence curves (contours) to be convex to the origin. This assumption is quite reason-
able since it corresponds to decreasing marginal rate of substitution, which is a commonly
accepted property underlying consumer preferences in economics literature [160]. As the
name implies, marginal rate of substitution, is the maximum amount of one good a con-
sumer would be willing to give up in order to obtain an additional unit of another. The
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marginal rate of substitution between two goods usually depends on the amount of goods
the consumer currently has. For example, consider a case where the consumer has two
types of goods: Good 1 and Good 2. When the consumer has a large amount of Good
1 and a very small amount of Good 2, she would probably be willing to give up quite a
large amount of Good 1 (as she already has plenty) to obtain one more unit of Good 2
(as Good 2 is scarce). In the opposite case where the consumer has a small amount of
Good 1 and plenty of Good 2, s/he would probably be willing to give up only a very small
amount of Good 1 to obtain more of Good 2. This is called the decreasing marginal rate
of substitution (DMRS). As seen in the example, DMRS implies that, as the consumption
of one good increases and the other decreases, the consumer would be willing to give up
smaller quantities of the latter in exchange of a further unit of the former [160].
3.3 Convex Cones and Polyhedra
We now provide a review of relevant results and studies from the literature on the use of
convex cones in solving MCDM problems.
3.3.1 Basic Theory
We start with a discussion of two studies by Korhonen et al. [152] and Hazen [161], who
introduce the basic theoretical results underlying the convex cones approach in indepen-
dent works. The two results slightly di¤er in the underlying assumptions; hence, we will
consider them separately. The main di¤erence is that, the rst assumes a value function
exists whereas the second one relaxes this assumption. We start with the rst results by
[152] and then provide the more general case which is given by [161].
Assuming an implicit value function
Given a set of k vectors such that z1; :::; zk 2 Rp and an increasing quasiconcave function
f(:) dened on Rp such that f(zk) < f(zi) for all i 6= k the following denitions are made:
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Denition 13 We dene the cone C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) where zi : i 6= k are the upper gen-
erators and zk is the lower generator as follows:
C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) = fz j z = zk +Pi 6=k i(zk   zi); i  0g.
The cone dominated region of C(z1; :::zk 1; zk) is denoted by CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) and
dened as follows:
CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) = fz0 j z0  z where z 2 C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk)g:
Lemma 14 For any z 2 C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk), f(z)  f(zk):Moreover, for any z0 2 CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk);
f(z0)  f(zk).
Denition 15 We dene the polyhedron spanned by the vectors z1; :::; zk as follows:
P (z1; :::; zk) = fz j z = Pizi; Pi = 1; i  0 for all ig.
The upper side of P (z1; :::; zk) is denoted by UP (z1; :::; zk) and dened as follows:
UP (z1; :::; zk) = fz0 j z  z0 where z 2 P (z1; :::; zk)g.
Lemma 16 For any z 2 P (z1; :::; zk), f(zk)  f(z). Moreover, for any z0 2 UP (z1; :::; zk);
f(zk)  f(z0):
Assume that we have k points such that z1; :::; zk 2 Rp and zk  zi for all i 6= k;
where  is the DMs preference relation. We assume that  is a rational preference
relation. If the DM has a quasiconcave value function f(:), by Lemma 14, for any z 2
C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) we have f(z)  f(zk); hence z  zk. Moreover, for each point z0 : z0  z
where z 2 C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk), z0  zk, i.e., the points in the cone dominated region will
be at most as preferred as zk: We will call each such point z0 2 CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) cone
dominated. Note that if we assume strict quasiconcavity we have z  zk for z 6= zk and
z0  zk for z0 6= zk .
Similarly, by Lemma 16, for any z 2 P (z1; :::; zk 1; zk), f(zk)  f(z); hence zk  z.
Moreover, for each point z0 : z  z0 where z 2 P (z1; :::; zk), zk  z0, i.e. the points lying
on the upper side of the polyhedron spanned by the k points will be at least as preferred
as the lower generator, zk. If we assume strict quasiconcavity we have zk  z and zk  z0.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a 2-point cone in R2+
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a 2-point cone in R2+. The thick solid line is the cone
C(z1; z2) and the area with diagonal grey lines is the cone dominated region, CD(z1; z2).
The line segment between z1 and z2 is the polyhedron P (z1; z2) and the region above this
line segment is the upper side of the polyhedron, UP (z1; z2).
Figure 3.2 shows an example of a 3-point cone in R2+. The region lled with the
diagonal lines is C(z2; z3; z1) and the grey region including the dark grey part and the
diagonal lines is the cone dominated region. We refer the interested reader to Figure 1.b
in [162] for an illustration of a 3-point cone in R3.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of a 3-point cone in R2+
We will visualize the additional information implied by the quasiconcavity using an
example. Recall that a quasiconcave value function implies the convexity assumption on
the DMs preference relation. See Figure 3.3 for the criteria space of a bicriteria example
where two of the alternatives (z1 and z2) are seen. Suppose that the DM has a rational
preference relation which can be represented by a value function and prefers z2 to z1
(z1  z2). By strict monotonicity one can say that the points in region A are less preferred
to z1. By convexity (quasiconcavity), we gain information about region B, which is cone
dominated; hence the points in that region are less preferred to z1.
Similarly, using monotonicity, we can conclude that any alternative in regions C and D
are preferred to z1: Since z1  z2, transitivity ensures that the points in region E, which
are vector dominating z2, are also preferred to z1. Using convexity (quasiconcavity),
we are able to say that the points in region F are preferred to z1. Therefore, we gain
information about regions F and B by assuming a quasiconcave value function. Observe
that the amount of the additional information gained depends on the two alternatives
selected. One line of research in convex cones theory in MCDM focuses on nding smart
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Figure 3.3: Using quasiconcavity
ways of selecting the sets of alternatives to ask the DM.
A more general result
Hazen [161] discusses the same results by showing that consideration of explicit responses
(preference information) in the presence of increasing quasiconcave utility yields a stronger
order than the strict componentwise vector order (<). He directly works on the DMs
preference relation dened over the set of alternatives rather than assuming that it is
represented by a value function.
Hazen assumes the following axioms for the DMs preference relation.
For a relation :
1. Irreexivity (I): not z  z , for all z 2 Rp:
2. Transitivity (T): (z1  z2 and z2  z3)) z1  z3; for all z1; z2; z3 2 Rp:
3. Strict Monotonicity (SM): z1 < z2 ) z1  z2; for all z1; z2 2 Rp:
4. Weak convexity (WC): z1  z2 and z3 2 (z1; z2] =) z1  z3; for all z1; z2 2 Rp:
5. Convexity (C) : z1  z2 and z3 2 (z1; z2] =) z1  z3; for all z1; z2 2 Rp:
6. Preference Data (P): z1  z2  :::  zm is provided by the DM.
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Note that if the binary relation  is representable by a value function, weak convexity
and convexity axioms correspond to the quasiconcavity and strict quasiconcavity of the
function, respectively.
The preference data axiom stands for the preference information provided by the DM,
which is in the form of ranking m alternatives.
Hazen uses the concept of unanimity order which is analogous to the dominance con-
cept in MCDM and denes it as follows.
Denition 17 Assume that the decision makers preference relation satises I, T, SM,
WC, C and P; and denote the set of binary relations satisfying these properties with B.
The unanimity order with respect to B is the binary relation < over outcome vectors x
and y and dened as follows: x < y () x  y for all 2 B:
Note that rational dominance is another unanimity order where B is the set of binary
relations satisfying axioms reexivity, transitivity and strict monotonicity.
The concept of unanimity order is important in MCDM as it allows us to infer results
without knowing the exact preference relation of the DM over the whole decision space. If
we know that the preference relation of the DM satises a set of properties, any result that
holds for the corresponding unanimity order will hold for the DMs preference relation.
Hazens main result is the following theorem. Note that we changed the terminology
to ensure consistency in presentation. (See the original paper for the original notation and
the corresponding proof).
Theorem 18 Suppose z1; z2; :::; zm : z1  z2  :::  zm are distinct elements of Rp.
Dene the binary relation mon Rp as follows:
x m y () x < y or 9j < m such that x 2 CD(zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; zj) and y 2
UP (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; x) and y 6= x:
Then <= m unless zj 2 P (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm) for some j; in which case, <= RpRp:
(In which case, the DM is inconsistent).
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This theorem is valid for any case where we replace the componentwise strict vector
partial order < by any irreexive conical order (see the original paper [161]). For an
arbitrary vector space A,  is a conical order if it is a binary relation on A represented
by a convex cone K. That is, for all x; y 2 A; x  y () y   x 2 K.
Given preference data z1  z2  :::  zm and the assumptions on the DMs preference
relation, Theorem 18 provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition to conclude that a
solution y is strictly preferred to solution x by the DM (without any further information):
Either x < y or there is an alternative zj in the given preference set, for which x lies in
CD(zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; zj) and y lies UP (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; x).
When the DM is consistent we have x < y () x < y or 9j < m such that x 2
CD(zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; zj) and y 2 UP (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; x) and y 6= x:
It is easy to see that the su¢ ciency part of this proof holds as follows:
 If x < y then x < y (hence x  y). This is trivial from strict monotonicity.
 If z 2 CD(zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; zj) for some zj then x  z:j by convexity, hence x  zj+k
for k = 1; :::;m j by transitivity. Therefore any point y : y 2 UP (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm;
x) and y 6= x will be strictly preferred to x due to convexity.
The necessary part of the statement is not obvious. By proving the necessary con-
dition, Hazen shows that under given assumptions on the DMs preference relation, for
any two solutions x and y we cannot state that x  y; unless at least one of the two
conditions is satised (x < y or 9j < m such that x 2 CD(zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; zj) and
y 2 UP (zj+1; zj+2; :::; zm; x) and y 6= x). This implies that under stated assumptions,
by checking whether the conditions hold for two alternatives, a decision analyst will be
making maximum use of the preference information available and if the conditions do not
hold, s/he can be sure that it is not possible to conclude that one is preferred to the other
without additional information.
This result is more general than the results provided in Lemmas 14 and 16 since the
transitivity axiom allows indi¤erence to be nontransitive, i.e. it includes some cases where
the DMs preference relation is not representable by a value function. Moreover, Theorem
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Figure 3.4: Example case
18 applies to any irreexive conical order. Therefore, Lemmas 14 and 16 are special cases
of Theorem 18.
An example
We will illustrate the results discussed so far using an example. We will show that under the
same set of assumptions, the results provided in Lemmas 14, 16 and Theorem 18 provide
us the same information. In the example, we assume that the DMs preference structure is
representable by a strictly quasiconcave value function and use the componentwise strict
vector partial order < for Theorem 18.
Figure 3.4 shows the criteria space of a bicriteria problem where the DM strictly prefers
y to x, i.e., x  y.
By Lemmas 14 and 16 we have the following:
1. t 2 CD(y;x) so t  x.
2. k 2 UP (y; x) hence x  k. We have t  x  y and t  x  k. Based on the rst
ranking one can generate P (y; x; t).
3. Observing that h 2 P (y; x; t) we say that h is preferred to t. So we have t  x  y;
t  x  k and t  h.
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According to Theorem 18, given x  y;
1. t 2 CD(y;x) and x 2 UP (y; t) hence t  x. Now we have t  x  y:
2. x 2 CD(y;x) and k 2 UP (y; x) hence x  k: We have t  x  y and t  x  k:
3. Finally, t 2 CD(y; x) and h 2 UP (y; t) hence t  h. We obtain the same results:
t  x  y; t  x  k and t  h.
3.3.2 Operationalizing the Theory
In this section we discuss how to operationalize the theory of convex cones. The research
seeking to operationalize the convex preference cone ideas originated from the team Ko-
rhonen, Wallenius and Zionts, and their students and co-workers.
Checking cone dominance
The MCDM methods using convex cones gather preference information from the DM,
usually in terms of pairwise comparisons. Using this information, more information is
extracted about the other feasible alternatives which are not in the preference subset the
DM provided. Given preference information, one can generate cones and check for each
candidate point whether it is in a cone dominated region. If the objective is nding the
best alternative out of a set, the cone dominated alternatives can be eliminated from
further consideration. If we have a ranking or sorting problem, the information that an
alternative is inside or in the upper side of the corresponding polyhedron is also useful.
Therefore, one can also check the status of an alternative with respect to the generated
polyhedra based on the preference information.
We can perform these checks using Linear Programming (LP) problems as follows.
Suppose that we want to check whether alternative z is dominated by C(z1; :::; zk 1; zk):
Then we solve the following LP:
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Max  (LP1)
s:t:
k 1X
i=1
i(z
k   zi)    z   zk
i  0 for i = 1; :::; k   1:
Let us rewrite the rst constraint set as follows: zk +
Pk 1
i=1 i(z
k   zi)  z + :
For each feasible i value, the left hand side of the constraint corresponds to a point in
the cone. If z is not dominated by any of the points in the cone, the maximum value
that  can take should be negative. Otherwise, if   0, the rst constraint set implies
zk +
Pk 1
i=1 i(z
k   zi)  z. Then for any nondecreasing quasiconcave function f(:); we
have f(zk +
Pk 1
i=1 i(z
k   zi))  f(z). That is, z is at most as preferred as a point in the
cone, i.e., z 2 CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) and f(zk)  f(z) by Lemma 14.
To check whether x 2 UP (z1; :::; zk) we solve the following LP:
Max  (LP2)
s:t:
kX
i=1
iz
i +   x
kX
i=1
i = 1
i  0 for i = 1; :::; k:
One can see that if   0 then x 2 UP (z1; :::; zk):
In each iteration we gain new information leading to new cones and polyhedra.
Tree representation of preferences and size of cones
Interactive approaches are based on gathering preference information from the DM through-
out the process. Hence, such algorithms must keep track of the preference information
gathered so far and generate the corresponding cones. A tree representation for preferences
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Figure 3.5: Tree representation
is suggested for this purpose in [163]. An example tree is given in Figure 3.5 where each
node represents an alternative and each arc represents the preference relation between
these alternatives. Using the tree representation it is possible to identify all distinct cones
and polyhedra that can be generated given preference information.
Note that, the size of each cone as well as the number of total cones generated will a¤ect
the number of alternatives eliminated by the cones and hence the amount of information
required from the decision maker. The computational time will also be a¤ected. Di¤erent
strategies can be used as follows:
 One might choose to generate all the possible cones with maximum number of gen-
erators. That is, for each alternative which is a candidate to be a lower generator
(less preferred to at least one solution in the tree) one can generate a cone using all
the alternatives preferred to that alternative as the upper generators. By doing so,
one will be making maximum use of the information provided by the DM and hence
less information is required from the DM ([152], [164]). In the example given in
Figure 3.5 this corresponds to generating C(z1; z2; z3; z4; z5; z6), C(z1; z2; z3; z4; z5),
and C(z1; z2; z3). This is called the minimal set of cones.
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 As the above method may be cumbersome and may result in high computational
e¤ort, one might choose to generate smaller cones ([152],[163]). In the literature
in most cases only 2-point cones are used. In the example case in Figure 3.5 the
distinct 2-point cones are C(z1; z3), C(z2; z3), C(z3; z5), C(z4; z5), and C(z5; z6).
Note that it is also possible to generate more 2-point cones using transitivity: e.g.
C(z1; z5); C(z1; z6); C(z2; z5); C(z2; z6). [152] report that in their experiments the
computation time saved in using 2-point cones instead of the minimal set of cones
was minimal and suggest using the the minimal set of cones. The use of cones
with the most number of generators possible is suggested also in [162] owing to the
decrease in the preference information required from the DM in that case.
Selecting the candidate solutions
Another issue to be considered in any interactive algorithm using convex cones is selecting
the candidate solutions to be asked to the DM. The method used to select the alternatives
depends on the characteristics of the problem. There are studies that use an estimated
value function in an e¤ort to select good candidates. At each iteration the parameters of
the value function are updated and a solution that maximizes this value function (see e.g.
[152]) is found and the DM is asked to compare this solution with its adjacent e¢ cient
alternatives (for an alternative z in the criterion space, adjacent e¢ cient alternatives
are the ones whose convex combinations with z are not dominated by any other convex
combination generated by the rest of the alternatives). There are also studies selecting
the candidates based on their distance to an ideal point (see e.g. [165]).
Interaction type
The interaction type refers to the type of the questions asked to the DM.
In the solution frameworks designed to select the best alternative, the DM is usually
asked for pairwise comparisons of alternatives. Other strategies are also possible like
providing the DM with m alternatives and ask him to select the best/ worst alternative
in the set or rank these alternatives.
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In the solution frameworks designed for sorting alternatives, the DM can also be asked
to assign some alternatives to the predetermined groups. These alternatives are then used
to generate cones and polyhedra.
3.3.3 Related Works in Literature
Many interactive MCDM methods using convex cones are proposed in the literature. Al-
though not as common as convex cones, polyhedra are also used in sorting and partial
ranking. The studies mainly di¤er in terms of the nature of the problem and the nature
of the solution procedure, i.e, based on the way to elicit the preference information, the
way to select the alternatives that will be presented to the DM for information gathering
and the size of the generated cones.
The rst problems considered are mostly multi-criteria evaluation problems where there
is a nite set of alternatives. A series of papers that extend the application of convex cones
to other problem types e.g. Multi-criteria Linear Problems (MCLP), Multi-criteria Integer
Problems (MCIP) follow. There are also studies on increasing the e¢ ciency of the solution
procedures by nding ways to increase the region eliminated by cones and determining the
number of the cone generators to be used. Recently, there has been an interest in using
convex cones and polyhedra to sort and partially rank a nite set of alternatives.
We now review these applications of convex cones and polyhedra reported so far for
MCDM problems.
Korhonen et al. [152] design an interactive algorithm for nding the best alternative
in multi-criteria evaluation problems. They use convex cones to represent the preference
structure. They generate cones and eliminate the alternatives which are inferior to these
cones. By doing so, they successively restrict the solution space and try to obtain the best
alternative after a number of iterations. In order to determine the alternatives to be asked
to the decision maker, they use a composite linear value function of the form
P
jxij where
j > 0 are multipliers and xij is the performance score of alternative i in criterion j. They
nd the alternative that maximizes this function and ask the DM to compare it with other
selected alternatives (the adjacent e¢ cient alternatives). They start with an arbitrary set
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of multipliers and use the DMs responses to update the (feasible) set of multipliers. Note
that this method approximates a nonlinear value function by a composite linear value
function, hence it is possible that there are no set of multipliers consistent with the DMs
preferences. This is handled by deleting the restriction on multipliers that correspond to
the oldest information from the DM. In the proposed algorithm the information from the
DM is gathered in terms of pairwise comparisons. The authors conduct experiments and
report statistics on the number of pairwise judgements the DM has to make for various
problem sizes. They rst try generating all the cones and then repeat the experiments
using only 2-point cones. Based on the results they conclude that the savings in the
computational time when one is using only 2-point cones does not justify the increase the
judgements DM has to make and hence suggest generating the minimal set of cones.
A few variations of the above algorithm is proposed by Köksalan et al. [166], Köksalan
and Taner [167] and Köksalan and Sagala [168]. These studies address the same problem as
in [152] and propose improvements in the solution algorithm. They suggest using dummy
alternatives as one of the cone generators in order to increase the region eliminated by
the convex cones. They discuss di¤erent ways to generate and select appropriate dummy
alternatives. The authors report improvements in results compared to the algorithm used
in [152] in terms of the total number of pairwise comparisons required to nd the best
alternative. In [168], which generalizes the results of the previous two papers ([166], [167]),
two dummy alternatives are used simultaneously, one of which is (hopefully) less preferred
to a real alternative so that it can be used as an upper generator of the cone. Another
dummy alternative is generated as a potential lower generator. The dummy points are
selected with the help of an estimated value function which is updated at each iteration.
Malakooti [169] also discusses di¤erent ways to select the cone generators as in [166],
including the idea of using dummy alternatives to increase the area that is eliminated by
the cone. He also discusses the use of local gradients, i.e., tradeo¤ information, at a point
to eliminate worse alternatives and nd better ones.
Ramesh et al. [163] study the underlying theory of the convex cones and the repre-
sentation structure for the DMs preferences based on convex cones. They dene rules to
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detect redundant cones, the cones which are already implied by other existing cones, in
order to avoid unnecessary computations. They discuss two ways to represent the DMs
preferences. The rst one is an explicit representation, which is used in methods that use a
single composite function of the multiple objectives. In these methods the preferences are
represented using linear inequalities on the weights of this composite function thus the set
of feasible weights is successively reduced. The second representation scheme is based on
the convex cones. They conclude that representation via cones is more accurate than rep-
resentation via linear constraints on weights of the objectives. This is due to the fact that
by using a composite objective function one fails to accurately represent nonlinear value
functions. The authors conduct experiments on the use of convex cones in solving both
multi-criteria design (MCLP, MCIP (in the experiments bicriteria problems are solved))
and multi-criteria evaluation problems and report the percentage of questions saved using
convex cones.
Ramesh et al. [164] incorporate the convex cones representation method into the
algorithm of Zionts and Wallenius [170] for multicriteria linear programming problems.
The authors assume that the DM has a pseudoconcave value function. Convex cones are
used to obtain an accurate and robust representation of the DMs preferences. The DM is
asked for pairwise comparisons of alternatives, one of them is an alternative that maximizes
a composite linear value function and the other is an adjacent e¢ cient alternative. Only
2-point cones are generated.
Ramesh et al. [171] develop an algorithm for the multi-criteria integer problems where
the underlying value function of the DM is assumed to be pseudoconcave. They use the
method previously proposed by Zionts and Wallenius [170] for MCLP in a branch and
bound framework and use convex cones for the preference structure representation. The
cones are used for fathoming candidate nodes in the branch and bound tree. They only
generate 2-point cones and report computational results for bicriteria problems with up
to 80 variables and 40 constraints.
Köksalan [165] proposes an interactive method using convex cones to identify and
rank a most preferred subset of alternatives in multi-criteria evaluation problems. The
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DM is asked for pairwise comparisons. Initially, candidate solutions are selected based on
their distance to an ideal point and throughout the algorithm new candidate solutions are
generated using a weighted quadratic value function as in [166].
Taner and Köksalan [172] conduct an experimental study on how to determine the
number of cone generators, to select the cone generators and determine the order of pair-
wise comparisons to ask the DM. They also propose an algorithm based on the results of
the experiments. In the proposed algorithms, m(m = 1; 2:::; 7) alternatives are selected
by three methods, which use equal weighted linear, estimated linear and quadratic value
functions, respectively. Then the least/most preferred alternative in the selected set is
found by asking the DM a number of pairwise comparisons. Based on the preference in-
formation elicited from the DM, all the possible cones are generated. They conclude that
the version where m = 3 and the least preferred alternative is found provides the best
results in terms of the average number of comparisons the DM has to make. They point
out that the results of the experiments are not very conclusive hence a more elaborate and
detailed study awaits further attention.
Prasad et al. [162] observe that in the computations, although most of the solutions
are not cone dominated, quite a few of them are nearly cone dominated. Motivated by this
observation, they introduce the concept of near cone dominanceor p cone e¢ ciency.
A p value is used to show how close an alternative is to being dominated by the generated
cone. They suggest using this measure to choose the challengers of the incumbent that will
be presented to the DM for pairwise comparison. That is, the alternatives are presented
to the DM for comparison in an order based on how close they are to be inferior. This
heuristic extension is suggested to accelerate the search by reducing preference information
requirement. Another use of this idea is for early termination. That is, for an incumbent
solution, the p cone e¢ ciencies of its adjacent solutions are calculated and the algorithm
is terminated if maximum of these p cone e¢ ciencies is below a given threshold. They
illustrate the idea by incorporating it within a solution framework for solving MOLP
problems.
Ulu and Köksalan [155] propose interactive approaches to partition a set of discrete
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alternatives into acceptable and unacceptable sets. Assuming the DM has a quasiconcave
value function they use the convex cones and polyhedra in a sorting algorithm. Note that
the proposed sorting algorithm is for the special case where the number of classes is two,
rather than for the general case with more than two classes.
Another study that includes a sorting approach based on convex cones is Fowler et
al. [173]. They propose an evolutionary algorithm, a genetic algorithm, for MCDM
problems assuming that the DM has a quasiconcave preference function. Genetic algorithm
is a widely studied method for approximately solving NP-hard problems. In a genetic
algorithm the output is obtained by evolving an initial population of solutions through
multiple generations by breeding and mutation. Hence, how the parents are selected
becomes a critical issue to ensure o¤spring with good quality. The authors suggest partially
sorting the population with the help of convex cones and polyhedra. The information taken
from the DM is in terms of nding the best and worst in a given set of six solutions. Using
this information they generate four 2-point cones (consisting of the best as the upper
generator and each of the other points except the worst) and one 6-point cone (having the
worst as the lower generator and the others as upper generators). They report that using
convex cones in sorting is e¤ective and improves the output solution.
Recently, Dehnokhalaji et al. [154], propose an approach which uses convex cones and
polyhedra to partially order a nite set of alternatives. Similar to the p cone e¢ ciency
concept discussed in [162], an alternative is classied as surely better than, surely worse
than, or possibly better/possibly worse than the lower generator of the cone. This makes
the suggested approach exible in the sense that it can be used as an exact or approx-
imate approach by adjusting some parameters. They generalize the idea used in [162]
and employ it to obtain a strict partial order. This approach is suggested to be used to
partially rank alternatives or as a supplementary method in other solution approaches
such as Evolutionary Multi-Objective Optimization as discussed in [173]. Developing an
interactive solution algorithm based on the approach is pointed out as a subject of future
research.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we consider the use of convex cones in interactive MCDM approaches, which
is based on the DMs holistic assessments. We describe the assumptions on the DMs
preference relation and the value function that allow us to implement the convex cones
approach in solution algorithms for MCDM problems. We summarize the basic theoret-
ical results from the literature, which show that convex cones can be used to iteratively
approach the most preferred solution(s) by eliminating the ones that are less preferred.
The results also show that, in multi-criteria evaluation problems, polyhedra can be used
alongside the convex cones for sorting or obtaining a quasiordering of the alternatives.
We provide a review of the studies that implement the convex cones approach over the
last three decades. A large body of literature exists that use the convex cones approach
in various algorithms designed to solve both multi-criteria evaluation and multi-criteria
design problems. There are also studies on how to select good candidate solutions (cone
generators) to be asked to the DM. We mention below a few challenges regarding convex
cones approach awaiting further research.
 Further research can be performed on using convex cones to solve more di¢ cult
problems, like Multi-Objective Combinatorial Optimization (MOCO) problems.
 Asking too many or relatively di¢ cult questions increase the cognitive burden on
the DM and may make the decision support system less attractive. Therefore, one
needs to choose the type of interaction with the DM carefully. Further research
can be conducted on nding the best way to minimize the cognitive burden while
ensuring an e¤ective decision support. Di¤erent types of questions can be asked to
the DM. These include making pairwise comparisons, determining the best (worst)
alternative in a given subset, or ranking a small subset of alternatives. Experimental
studies that compare these di¤erent interaction modes and discuss their advantages
and disadvantages in di¤erent problem settings can be performed.
 As the size and number of cones used in an algorithm increase, more alternatives are
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eliminated but the computational time may increase as well. By generating merely
two-point cones one may not be utilizing the available information fully. To the best
of our knowledge, it is not studied in detail how well this approach works compared
to generating the minimal set of cones in terms of the information required from the
DM throughout the procedure. In other words, it is still an open question how to
determine the cone sizes that best balance the computational time with the amount
of information required from the DM for di¤erent problem settings.
 Using the information provided by the polyhedra in ranking and sorting environ-
ments is also a promising area. More research on the use of polyhedra as well as
convex cones for sorting and ranking purposes awaits further attention.
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Chapter 4
Incorporating Preference
Information in Multicriteria
Problems with Equitability
Concerns
4.1 Introduction
Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) problems deal with evaluation of alternatives
based on a number of criteria. In most of the MCDM problems that have been studied
so far, we do not measure the criteria using the same type of measure. We will call
such criteria unlike and the MCDM problems with heterogenous criteria classical MCDM
problems.
In this study we discuss a special type of multicriteria decision making problem where
we have equitability concerns. These problems are motivated by the cases where we are
concerned with nding an equitable allocation of a good or bad among multiple parties
who are anonymous. That is, the identities of the parties are irrelevant and do not a¤ect
the decisions. In these problems, we have a single type of good (or bad), and the multiple
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parties receive an amount of this good (bad). For example, we may dene a location
problem where the parties are location points and the good is distance or time. Similarly,
we may have a problem where the parties are individuals or groups of individuals and the
allocated good is income, service etc. One can dene such problems as MCDM problems.
In an alternative, each criterion value corresponds to the amount of good allocated to a
party. Hence, unlike a classical MCDM problem, the criteria in these problems are like,
i.e., each criterion is measured in the same scale with the same measure.
Problems with equity concerns are encountered especially in the public sector. The
problems include location problems where we try to nd the best location of public service
facilities such as hospitals or re stations. In these location problems, the good is usually
taken as the distance of the service facility to the demand points and we try to reach a
feasible solution in which the demand points are treated as equitably as possible [174].
Income distribution problems are another example. In such income distribution problems
the decision maker (DM) is faced with di¤erent policies that will result in di¤erent income
distributions among the population. These income distribution proles are analogous to
the allocation proles used in the health economics literature, where the outcome is mea-
sured in terms of the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) that an individual is expected
to live as a result of a health policy [175]. Other application areas include distribution of
funds [176] and nancial portfolio optimization [177], where the rate of return for each se-
curity considered is given by a nite discrete distribution and the investor has a risk-averse
attitude.
Since those problems have di¤erent properties than a classical MCDM problem, they
require di¤erent approaches than the classical methods. In this study, we discuss an
approach that is appropriate for such problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the basic con-
cepts and discuss the existing theory. We especially discuss the case where equity concerns
are incorporated in the preference relation. Next, we present our problem formulation and
discuss relevant results and methods from the literature. In Section 4.3, we discuss our
contributions and present our work on how to extend the convex cones theory for problems
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that have the anonymity property. The results we provide in this section are general in
the sense that they can be used in di¤erent settings where the objective is nding the best
out of a set, ranking or sorting. We present an interactive ranking algorithm in Section
4.4 and report the results of our computational experiments in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
concludes the study with our main ndings and future research plans.
4.2 Problem Denition
In a typical multicriteria evaluation problem we have a (nite) set of alternatives (dened
in the criteria region) denoted by Z with a typical member as zi = (zi1; :::; z
i
p); where z
i
j
is the performance score of solution zi on criterion j and p is the number of criteria. We
evaluate the alternatives based on these criteria. Di¤erent problematiques can be dened
depending on the desired outcome: nding the best alternative or a limited set of the best
alternatives, ranking the alternatives or sorting them into predened groups [145].
In this study we focus on multicriteria problems with like criteria. In our setting,
each alternative zi 2 Z shows a distribution of a good among p parties and hence zij is
the amount of good that party j gets in alternative i. Although our theoretical results
on convex cones are applicable to any type of problematique (selecting the best, ranking
or sorting), we will focus on the ranking problematique. This is because ranking can be
considered as a generalization of nding the best: once you rank the alternatives, you
obtain the best alternative in the set. Moreover, if we have a ranking of the alternatives,
it may be easier to sort them into groups.
4.2.1 Equity and E¢ ciency
We consider the problem settings where we try to rank the alternatives considering both
e¢ ciency and equity (fairness). For a problem where we have a desirable good, equity
and e¢ ciency preferences are our preferences for having a more equitable allocation and
a higher mean, ceteris paribus. We will try to explain the e¢ ciency and equity concepts
and the tradeo¤ between them by using a small example. Note that, although we have a
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general problem formulation which is applicable to di¤erent settings with di¤erent types
of goods and parties, from now on, we will be giving examples of income distribution
problems to explain our ideas.
Example 19 Suppose that we have a 2-person population and we have a set of alterna-
tives, each corresponding to an income distribution between these two people. Assume that
equity is taken into account by obtaining an index by using inequality measure.
If we increase e¢ ciency while keeping the inequality level the same, we obtain a better
distribution. For example if we have (3; 3) and (4; 4) as two alternatives, we can directly
say that (4; 4) is preferred to (3; 3), since both alternatives have complete equality while in
(4; 4) the total amount of income is higher. This corresponds to our e¢ ciency preference.
If we have a more equitable alternative while keeping the e¢ ciency level constant,
we obtain a better distribution. For two distributions that have the same total income,
the e¢ ciency levels are the same. Hence, we will base our decisions on the inequality
levels. For example alternative (3; 5) is preferred to (2; 6) since it is more equitable. This
corresponds to our equity preference.
One cannot make such judgements when the distributions concerned do not have the
same level of (in)equality or e¢ ciency. Moreover, even the measurement of inequality is
a problem in itself; so when we use inequality measures to incorporate equity preferences,
we will get di¤erent results for di¤erent types of measures. For instance, we cannot say
anything about how the preference should be between (4; 4) and (3; 6). In this example the
alternative with the higher total income, (3; 6); is also more unequal. We can observe the
tradeo¤ between equity and e¢ ciency here.
There are di¤erent ways to incorporate both of these preferences into a decision model.
Throughout this work we assume that an increase in any individuals income is desirable
as long as none of the other individuals is worse o¤. This assumption will allow us to draw
conclusions about the alternatives that are vector dominating each other. For example,
when faced with alternatives (4; 4) and (4; 5); (4; 5) should be preferred to (4; 4). While this
may seem as a simplifying assumption ignoring or undermining the e¤ect of the increase
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in the envy of the people whose incomes did not increase on the choice made, this is
a standard assumption used in many solution approaches. This assumption helps us to
compare some alternatives where the inequality level is not the same. By increasing the
number of comparisons that we can make, this assumption will help us to come up with
a practical solution procedure as discussed in Shorrocks [136].
The equitability concern is usually considered using the well-known Pigou-Dalton (PD)
principle in inequality theory, which ensures that transferring a small amount of money
from a person to a relatively worse o¤ one without changing their relative positions to
each other, results in a more preferred alternative. To illustrate, if we have z = (3; 5)
transferring 1 unit of income from the second person to the rst one, we obtain (4; 4),
which is equally e¢ cient but more equitable, thus is considered as a better alternative.
Those ideas will give shape to the axioms of the preference model that we will assume.
4.2.2 Equity and Impartiality in Preference Relations
In the problems that we study, dealing with uniform criteria brings the property of
anonymity to the preference model, i.e. the corresponding preference relation should treat
all the permutations of a vector as indi¤erent. The rational preference relations satisfying
anonymity (impartiality) are called impartial rational preference relations by [142].
The equity preference can be taken into account by an axiom based on the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfers.
We assume that the DM has a preference model in which the preference relation
satises the following axioms [87]: Reexivity (R), Transitivity (T), Strict Monotonicity
(SM), Anonymity (Impartiality) (A) and Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (PD).
1.Reexivity (R): z  z for all z 2 Z.
2.Transitivity (T): (z1  z2 and z2  z3)) z1  z3, for all z1; z2; z3 2 Z:
3.Strict monotonicity (SM): z1 < z2 then z1  z2; for all z1; z2 2 Z.
4.Anonymity (Impartiality, Symmetry) (A): (z)  l(z) for all l = 1; :::; p!; for all
z 2 Rp; where l(z) stands for an arbitrary permutation of the z vector.
5.Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (PD): zj > zi ) z  z   "ej + "ei; for all z
84
CHAPTER 4. INCORPORATING PREFERENCE INFORMATION IN
MULTICRITERIA PROBLEMS WITH EQUITABILITY CONCERNS
2 Rp;where 0 < " < zj   zi; where ei; ej are the ith and jth unit vectors in Rp.
The preference relations that satisfy R, T, SM, A and PD are called equitable rational
preference relations and the relation of equitable dominance (e) is the intersection rela-
tion of all equitable rational preference relations. Equitable dominance implies rational
dominance, which is the intersection relation of all rational preference relations (satisfying
R, T and SM), but not vice versa. This is clear from the fact that the axioms used to
dene rational dominance is a subset of the axioms used to dene equitable dominance.
Following Kostreva and Ogryczak [87], we can introduce the ordered vector and cu-
mulative ordered vector for an alternative z as follows:
Denition 20 Given z 2 Rp; let  !z denote the permutation of z such that  !z :  !z 1 
 !z 2  :::   !z p.  !z is called the ordered vector of z and  !R p = f !z : z 2 Rpg is called the
ordered space.
Denition 21 Given z 2 Rp; let  : Rp ! Rp be the cumulative ordering map dened as
follows:
(z) = (1(z); 2(z); :::; p(z)) where i(z) =
Pi
j=1
 !z j for i = 1; 2; :::; p. (z) is called
the cumulative ordered vector of z.
The following result is proved by [142]:
Theorem 22 For any two alternatives z1 and z2;
z1 e z2 () i(z1)  i(z2) for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg where at least one strict inequality
holds.
z1 e z2 () i(z1)  i(z2) for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg, that is (z1)  (z2).
This relation will allow us to use rational dominance concept, hence vector inequality,
on the cumulative ordered vectors to check equitable dominance relation for two alterna-
tives.
Note that the PD axiom is an axiom of convexity, but dened only for the alternatives
that have the same total amount. One can dene a convex preference by replacing the
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PD axiom with the convexity axiom that involves alternatives with di¤erent sums. We
use the following convexity axiom:
6.Convexity (C): z1  z2 and z3 2 (z1; z2) =) z1  z3. Here z3 2 (z1; z2) means
that there exists a real ; 0 <  < 1 such that z3 = z1 + (1  )z2.
We will call relations satisfying R, T, SM, A and C impartial convex rational preference
relations. The corresponding dominance relation, impartial convex dominance, will be
implied by rational dominance and equitable dominance. That is because the axioms used
for rational dominance is a subset of the axioms used for impartial convex dominance and
C is a more general (restrictive) condition than PD. In fact, given impartiality, C reduces
to PD for the alternatives with the same total.
If an equitable rational preference relation is representable by a utility function, the
function has to be increasing strictly Schur-concave. If we assume that the DM has an
impartial convex rational preference relation which is representable by a utility function,
then the function has to be symmetric increasing strictly quasiconcave.
Denition 23 A function f is quasiconcave if for all z1; z2 : z1 6= z2and  2 [0; 1]
we have f(z1 + (1   )z2)  minff(z1); f(z2)g. Similarly f is strictly quasiconcave if
f(z1 + (1  )z2) > minff(z1); f(z2)g for all f(z1) 6= f(z2) and  2 (0; 1):
Each symmetric quasiconcave function is a Schur-concave function. On the other
hand a Schur-concave function is not necessarily a symmetric quasiconcave function. For
example, the following function:
f(z1; z2) = z1z2 is Schur-concave although it is not quasiconcave in R2 [141].
Note that, if we assume monotonicity rather than strict monotonicity then the corre-
sponding utility function is nondecreasing rather than increasing. Moreover, if we relax
the convexity condition, PD or C, and replace the term strictly better thanwith at
least as good as, the corresponding function does not have to be strictly Schur-concave
(strictly quasiconcave) but Schur-concave (quasiconcave).
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4.2.3 Problem Denition
We consider the following problem:
Given Z  Rp, provide a ranking for all z 2 Z based on , where  is an impartial
convex rational preference relation representing DMs preferences. Recall that equitable
preference implies impartial convex preference.
 is a relation of weak preference, satisfying A and C axioms and we will denote the
corresponding strict preference and indi¤erence relations as  and , respectively. In this
study, we do not require that  is represented by a utility function but if it is so, the
function is symmetric increasing strictly quasiconcave.
4.3 Convex Cones in MCDM Problems with Equitability
Concerns
A large body of literature dealing with classical multi-criteria problems is based on the
use of convex cones to incorporate preference information in the model. However, all the
problems discussed are classical MCDM problems, hence do not consider equity issues. To
the best of our knowledge, the concept of equitability in multi-criteria problems is relatively
new. Kostreva and Ogryczak [142] are the rst ones who introduce the equitability concept
in the MCDM environment. Other studies are due to Ogryczak [174], Kostreva et al. [87],
Baatar and Wiecek [88], and Mut and Wiecek [86]. These studies do not provide us with
a direct way to incorporate DMs preference information in the model. To the best of our
knowledge, there are not many approaches that incorporate DMs preference information in
the model for an MCDM problem with equitability concerns. There are a few studies that
mention the possibility of using the reference point method (e.g. [10]) with very limited
computational experiments and discussion. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge there
are no studies that apply the convex cones approach in a symmetric environment. We try
to ll this gap by analyzing the use of convex cones in that context.
In this section we discuss the use of convex cones in multicriteria problems where we
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have equitability concerns, hence anonymity and convexity properties. We extend the
current theoretical framework for convex cones by introducing the anonymity property.
4.3.1 Denitions and Notations
Denition 24 Given z 2 Z dene s(:) as the permutation function : s(z) = Isz;
s = 1; :::; p! where Is is a matrix rearranging elements of a vector.
Note that each vector of size p will have p! permutations and the DM is indi¤erent to
all these permutations. If a utility function exists, each will have the same utility value.
Denition 25 We will dene the lower section of z as follows: L(z) = fy j y e zg and
the upper section of z as U(z) = fy j z e yg:
We have U(s(z)) = U(z) and L(s(z)) = L(z); 8s:
See Figure 4.1 for a two dimensional (2D) example. The green and blue regions include
the alternatives that equitably dominate (4; 3)=(3; 4) and are dominated by (4; 3)=(3; 4);
respectively.
z2 = z1
U
L
(4,3)
(3,4)
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
z1
z2
Figure 4.1: Upper and lower sections of (3; 4)=(4; 3)
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Given a set of k vectors z1; :::; zk 2 Rp such that zi  zk for all i 6= k , where 
denotes an impartial convex rational preference relation, we will dene the following:
We dene the cone C(z1; :::; zk) where zi : i 6= k are the upper generators and zk is
the lower generator as follows:
C(z1; :::; zk) = fz j z = zk +Pi 6=k i(zk   zi); i  0 8i 6= kg:
We dene the corresponding cone dominated region CD(z1; :::; zk) as follows:
CD(z1; :::; zk) = fz0 j z0 e z where z 2 C(z1; :::; zk)g:
Note that CD(z1; :::; zk) includes C(z1; :::; zk). Let us denote the set of all impartial
convex rational preference relations consistent with the given preference information as IC
(Impartial Convex). For any z 2 CD(z1; :::; zk), z  zk for all preference relations in set
IC. Each such point is equitably dominated by C(z1; :::; zk) and will be called as equitably
cone dominated. Note that we use weak dominance here, i.e. when we say an alternative
is equitably cone dominated, that means it is equitably weakly dominated.
Let I = f1; 2; :::; kg.The polyhedron spanned by the vectors z1; :::; zk is dened by the
following expression:
P (z1; :::; zk) = fz j z = Pi2I izi; Pi = 1; i  0 for all i 2 Ig:
We dene its upper side as follows:
UP (z1; :::; zk) = fz0 j z e z0 where z 2 P (z1; :::; zk)g:
We again note that UP (z1; :::; zk) includes P (z1; :::; zk). For any z 2 UP (z1; :::; zk),
zk  z for all weak preference relations in set IC. This is a direct result of the convexity
axiom.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below show a 2-point cone, C((2; 6); (3; 4)) with its equitably dom-
inated region and P ((2; 6); (3; 4)) with its upper side, respectively. In Figure 4.2 the line
between points A and B is C((2; 6); (3; 4)) and the blue region with diagonal lines is the
equitably cone dominated area. In Figure 4.3 the black line is P ((2; 6); (3; 4)) and the
upper side is the green region with diagonal lines.
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z2=z1
(6,2)
(2,6)
(4,3)
(3,4)
B
A
0 2 4 6 8 10
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2
4
6
8
10
z1
z2
Figure 4.2: C((2; 6); (3; 4)) and its equitably dominated region
z2=z1
(6,2)
(2,6)
(4,3)
(3,4)
B
A
0 2 4 6 8 10
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2
4
6
8
10
z1
z2
Figure 4.3: P ((2; 6); (3; 4)) and its upper side
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Based on the reported satisfactory performance of the convex cones approach in non-
symmetrical MCDM settings, we propose using convex cones and polyhedrons in solving
MCDM problems with equitability concerns, i.e. in a symmetrical setting. The main idea is
the same: we obtain some preference information from the DM, generate the corresponding
cones and use them to determine the alternatives that are equitably dominated by the cone,
hence less preferred than the cone generators. Similarly, by using the polyhedron, we can
determine the alternatives that are preferred to the lower generator of the polyhedron.
However, the impartiality property brings computational di¢ culties. This is because once
we get preference information about a set of alternatives, we have information on the
relation of all permutations of these alternatives, each leading to a di¤erent cone. To
illustrate, given z1; z2 2 Rp such that z1  z2 , we can generate p!  p! 2-point cones such
that C(r(z1); s(z2)) 8r = 1; :::; p! and 8s = 1; :::; p!. We call each C(r(z1); s(z2)) a
permutation cone.
Table 4.1 below illustrates the complexity that anonymity brings.
Table 4.1: Computational complexity due to impartiality
pD 2-point cones pD k-point cones
# of binary comparisons # of cones # of k-ary comparisons # of cones
1 p!p! 1 (p!)k
n n  p!p! n n  (p!)k
Example: Suppose that we have only two people in our population (that is, p = 2)
and suppose that the DM has an impartial convex rational preference relation.
We have a number of possible income distributions for these two people, two of which
are (6; 2) and (3; 4). Note here that (6; 2) is more unequal than (3; 4) in the sense that
the gap is bigger between the two income levels, but the total income in this distribution
is larger than the latter one. Hence, these two distributions are not equitably dominating
one another. We need some extra information about the DMs preferences and we will
gather it by asking him/her to choose one of the alternatives. Based on the preference
information that the DM provides, we can generate the corresponding cones.
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Suppose that the DM prefers (6; 2) to (3; 4). Thanks to our anonymity (symmetry,
impartiality) axiom, this preference is valid for all the permutations of our alternatives.
That is we have, (6; 2)  (3; 4); (6; 2)  (4; 3); (2; 6)  (3; 4) and (2; 6)  (4; 3): Figure 4.4
below shows the four 2-point cones that are generated based on this information.
z1
z2
z2=z1
(6,2)
(2,6)
(4,3)
(3,4)
B
A
C D
E
Figure 4.4: Cones generated based on (6; 2)  (3; 4)
C((6; 2); (3; 4)) is the purple line connecting (3; 4) and point A. C((6; 2); (4; 3)) is the
yellow line connecting (4; 3) and point B etc.
In this 2D example, one can easily see that C((2; 6); (3; 4)) and C((6; 2); (4; 3)) are
symmetric with respect to the equality line (z2 = z1). The same holds for C((2; 6); (4; 3))
and C((6; 2); (3; 4)).
In the next part we provide some theoretical results that will help us to deal with the
computational complexity due to symmetry. We start by analyzing the case where we
only generate 2-point cones. Next, we provide some results for the case where we have
k-point cones where k > 2.
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4.3.2 Results for the 2-point Cones Case
Recall our PD axiom which is also called Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. In an al-
ternative, we call a transfer that takes an amount of good from a party and gives it to a
poorer party without changing their relative positions to each other a Pigou-Dalton (P-D)
transfer.
Lemma 26 If z e z0 then there is a z00 2 Rp such that z00  z0; and z00 is obtainable from
z by a nite number of P-D transfers.
Proof. See Ok [178], Lemma 1 for the proof.
Lemma 27 Let z and z0 2 Rp such that zi = z0i 8i 6= h; h+ 1: Then z e z0 if and only if
Minfzh; zh+1g Minfz0h; z0h+1g and zh + zh+1  z0h + z0h+1:
Proof. In this proof, we use the basic axioms that dene our preference model. Recall
that we assume A, SM and C, which implies PD.
Necessity:
This proof comes from the denition of equitable dominance. Minfzh; zh+1g Minfz0h; z0h+1g
and zh + zh+1  z0h + z0h+1 imply (z)  (z0); hence z e z0:
Su¢ ciency:
From Lemma 26, if z e z0 then there is a z00 2 Rp such that z00  z0; and z00
obtainable from z by a nite number of P-D transfers. Suppose that we have obtained a
z00 such that z00  z0 holds. Without loss of generality suppose that Minfzh; zh+1g = zh
and Minfz0h; z0h+1g = z0h: If this is not the case, we can arrange them accordingly since we
have anonymity.
Suppose that at least one of the following holds:
zh > z
0
h or zh + zh+1 > z
0
h + z
0
h+1 (A1)
z0i = zi 8i 6= h; h+ 1, so for z00  z0 to hold, the P-D type transfer in distribution z to
obtain z00 should be from zh+1 to zh.
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That is, z00h = zh + ; z
00
h+1 = zh+1   ; where 0    zh+1   zh:
z0i = zi = z
00
i 8i 6= h; h+1 and z00  z0 ) z0h  z00h = zh+  and z0h+1  z00h+1 = zh+1  :
That is, z0h  zh and z0h + z0h+1  zh + zh+1, which is a contradiction to our initial
assumption A1.
Lemma 28 Given z1; z2 2 Rp+, if z 2 C(z1;
 !
z2) then z 2 CD( !z1; !z2) (i.e. z is equitably
dominated by C(
 !
z1;
 !
z2)).
Proof. Let z1 6=  !z1 (Otherwise, the result is immediate). Let h be the minimum value
for which z1h > z
1
h+1 holds. Dene z
10 as the permutation obtained from z1 by swapping
z1h and z
1
h+1. That is, z
1 = (z11 ; z
1
2 ; :::; z
1
h; z
1
h+1; :::; z
1
p) and z
10 = (z11 ; z12 ; :::; z1h+1; z
1
h; :::; z
1
p)
where z1h > z
1
h+1. We will show the following holds:
If z 2 C(z1; !z2) then z 2 CD(z10; !z2):
Suppose for an arbitrary   0 we have a point z : z =  !z2 + ( !z2   z1); that is z
2 C(z1; !z2): Dene z0 2 C(z10; !z2) : z0 =  !z2 + ( !z2   z10):
One can easily show that z and z0 have the same elements except the hth and h+ 1th
elements, which are as follows:
zh =
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h);
zh+1 =
 !
z2h+1 + (
 !
z2h+1   z1h+1);
z0h =
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h+1);
z0h+1 =
 !
z2h+1 + (
 !
z2h+1   z1h)
From Lemma 27 we know that z e z0 if Minfzh; zh+1g  Minfz0h; z0h+1g and zh +
zh+1  z0h + z0h+1: Let us check (Recall that z1h > z1h+1):
Minfzh; zh+1g = Minf[
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h)]; [
 !
z2h+1 + (
 !
z2h+1   z1h+1)]g
=
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h) = zh:
We do not know what Minfz0h; z0h+1g is, hence we will compare zh with both z0h and
z0h+1:
zh =
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h) 
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h+1) = z0h
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zh =
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h) 
 !
z2h+1 + (
 !
z2h+1   z1h) = z
0
h+1: Hence,
Minfzh; zh+1g Minfz0h; z0h+1g (4.1)
zh + zh+1 =
 !
z2h + (
 !
z2h   z1h) +
 !
z2h+1 + (
 !
z2h+1   z1h+1)
= z0h+1 + z
0
h: That is,
zh + zh+1  z0h + z0h+1 (4.2)
From 4:1 and 4:2 the conditions of Lemma 27 is satised so z e z0. Since  is arbitrary,
this result is valid for every z 2 C(z1; !z2):
We showed that if z 2 C(z1; !z2), then z 2 CD(z10; !z2); where z10 is the permutation
obtained by a single swap of two consecutive elements of z1 as dened above. Note that
any permutation of vector z1 will result in
 !
z1 if we apply a nite number of such binary
contiguous swaps. Starting from the rst element which is higher than its consecutive
element, these type of swaps will eventually result in
 !
z1. Hence, we have the following
result:
For any z1; z2 2 Rp+, if z 2 C(z1;
 !
z2) then z is equitably dominated by C(
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
Let us show this result on our simple example. We claim that if z 2 C((6; 2); (3; 4))
then z is equitably dominated by C((2; 6); (3; 4)): In this example this can be veried by
simple observation since we can see from Figure 4.5 below that C((6; 2); (3; 4) 2 L((3; 4))
so any z 2 C((6; 2); (3; 4)) is equitably dominated by (3; 4) itself.
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z2=z1
(6,2)
(2,6)
(4,3)
O 0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
z1
z2
Figure 4.5: Relation between permutation cones
Theorem 29 For any z1; z2; z 2 Rp+, if z 2 CD(z1; z2) then z 2 CD(
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
Proof. If z 2 CD(z1; z2) there exists a z0 2 C(z1; z2) : z e z0.
Let z1 = s(
 !
z1) and z2 = q(
 !
z2): Then z0 = q(
 !
z2) + (q(
 !
z2)   s( !z1)): Let the
inverse permutation of q be r and let r(s) = t. Then r(z0) 2 C(t( !z1); !z2):
If r(z0) 2 C(t( !z1); !z2) then r(z0) is equitably dominated by C( !z1; !z2) 8t; implied
by Lemma 28 proved above. Then from transitivity, z 2 CD( !z1; !z2). Recall that equitable
dominance is the intersection relation of all equitable rational preference relations hence
it satises the transitivity axiom.
For our example, this means that if an alternative is equitably dominated by any of the
other permutation cones it will also be equitably dominated by C((2; 6); (3; 4)). Note here
that the reverse condition does not hold. That is, not all the points equitably dominated
by C((2; 6); (3; 4)) are also equitably dominated by C((6; 2); (3; 4)): See Figure 4.6, the
region ADFE which is in CD((2; 6); (3; 4)) is not in CD((6; 2); (3; 4)):
Theorem 29 shows that we can check the status of any point z with respect to any
C(z1; z2) by checking the status of it with respect to C(
 !
z1;
 !
z2): So instead of generating
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Figure 4.6: Inferior regions of permutation cones
all the permutation cones, it is su¢ cient to generate this single cone.
It is possible to provide similar results for the polyhedrons. See Appendix A Section
4.A.
4.3.3 Checking Equitable Dominance in 2-point Cones Case
In MCDM problems without impartiality property the common practise is to solve Linear
Programming (LP) models to check the status of an alternative with respect to a cone or
a polyhedron. These LPs are for the rational dominance check, i.e. checking whether an
alternative is rationally dominated by a cone, hence we should make some modications
in these LP formulations to check equitable dominance. We now discuss a mathematical
model that can be used to check equitable dominance by a cone.
Remark 30 Equitable dominance is symmetric, hence if z 2 CD( !z1; !z2) then  !z 2
CD(
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
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Dene P = f1; 2; :::; p!g. From Theorem 29 we know that if z 2 S
i2P
j2P
CD(i(
 !
z1);j(
 !
z2))
then z 2 CD( !z1; !z2): And by Remark 30 z 2 CD( !z1; !z2) =)  !z 2 CD( !z1; !z2):
Based on the above results we suggest working on
 !
R p; i.e. the space where all the
alternatives are ordered from minimum to maximum. Recall that we refer to this space
as the ordered space.
Working on
 !
R p involves mapping all the alternatives in Rp to
 !
R p: That is, the
cone (polyhedron) generators and the points that we check with respect to the cones
(polyhedrons) will be the ordered vectors. For each alternative z we check whether
 !z 2 CD( !z1; !z2); i.e. there exists z0 2 C( !z1; !z2) :  !z e z0:
Before proposing our method we introduce a few models discussed in [85]:
Proposition 31 For any z 2 Rp,  !z n (nth minimum) is the optimal value of the following
LP problem:
MOD-N-MIN (Model nth Minimum)
 !z n = Max rn
subject to
rn   zi Mtni for i = 1; :::; p
pX
i=1
tni  n  1
tni 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; :::; p
The above model can be extended to nd the cumulative sum of the rst n terms of
 !z as follows.
Proposition 32 [85]For any z 2 Rp;n(z) ( =
Pn
i=1
 !z i) is the optimal value of the
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following LP problem:
MODCUM-1(Model Cumulative-1)
n(z) = maxnrn  
pX
i=1
dni (4.3)
subject to
rn   dni   zi  0 for i = 1; :::; p (4.4)
dni Mtni for i = 1; :::; p (4.5)
pX
i=1
tni  n  1 (4.6)
dni  0; tni 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; :::; p (4.7)
Proof. Denote the optimal rn value as rn. From the model MOD-N-MIN we know that
rn =
 !z n. Note that at most n   1 of the tni variables can be 1 in a feasible solution.
Minimizing
Pp
i=1 dni with the constraint sets 4.5 and 4.6 ensure that at optimality the
following hold:
dni = 0 for all i : zi   !z n
dni > 0 and d

ni =
 !z n   zi for all i : zi <  !z n.
Hence at optimality n(z) =
Pn
i=1
 !z i = n !z n  
Pn 1
i=1 (
 !z n    !z i) = nrn  
Pp
i=1 d

ni.
Theorem 33 [85] For any z 2 Rp;n(z) is the optimal value of the following LP problem:
MODCUM-2
n(z) = maxnrn  
pX
i=1
dni
subject to
rn   dni   zi  0 for i = 1; :::; p
dni  0 for i = 1; :::; p
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Proof. The proof is based on showing that the model MODCUM-2 has the same optimal
value with the model MODCUM-1. First of all, ignoring the tni variables, it is clear that
each feasible solution to MODCUM-1 is also a feasible solution to MODCUM-2. The
feasible solutions to MODCUM-2 which have less than n positive dni variables are feasible
for MODCUM-1 as well. In MODCUM-2 we do not restrict the number of positive dni
variables to n   1. However, one can show that for any feasible solution (rn,d) to this
problem with s  n positive dni variables, another feasible solution (r0n,d0) can be found
with s  1 positive dni variables as follows:
Set  = Minfdni : dni > 0g. d0ni = dni    for dni > 0:
Set d0ni = dni for dni = 0:
Set r0n = rn   :
Then nr0n  
Pp
i=1 d
0
ni = n(rn   )   (
Pp
i=1 dni   s) = nrn  
Pp
i=1 dni + (s   n) 
nrn  
Pp
i=1 dni.
Based on this result we propose the following model to check whether z 2 CD( !z1; !z2):
(LP3)
Max 0
subject to
z0i   (
 !
z2i  
 !
z1i ) =
 !
z2i for i = 1; :::; p (4.8)
nrn  
pX
i=1
dni 
nX
j=1
 !z j for n = 1; :::; p (4.9)
rn   dni   z0i  0 for i; n = 1; :::; p (4.10)
  0 (4.11)
dni  0 for i; n = 1; :::; p (4.12)
This model checks whether there exists z0 2 C( !z1; !z2) such that (z)  (z0): Con-
straint sets 4.8 and 4.9 ensure that z0 2 C( !z1; !z2) and (z)  (z0), respectively. Con-
straint set 4.10 is used to ensure that n(z0) =
Pn
i=1
 !
z0 i = nrn  
Pp
i=1 d

ni, where r

n and
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dni are the optimal values of these decision variables based on Theorem 33.
This is an LP problem with p2 + 2p+ 1 variables and p2 + 2p constraints excluding the
set constraints.
4.3.4 Results for the k-point Cones Case
In this section we provide some results for k-point cones case, where k > 2. We rst
show that the previous result given in Theorem 29 is not generalizable to cases where
k > 2 by providing a counter example. That is, for any k vectors z1; :::; zk 2 Rp+ such
that zi  zk for all i 6= k and z 2 Rp+ we cannot claim that if z 2 CD(z1; z2; :::; zk) then
z 2 CD( !z1; !z2; :::;
 !
zk).
Example 34 Suppose that we have a case where k = 3 and p = 3, that is we have 3-point
cones and we work in R3+. Suppose that the DM has the following utility function:
f(x) = x1x2x3.
Suppose that we present the following alternatives to the DM for him to compare:
z1 = (25; 4; 15)
z2 = (7; 11; 27)
z3 = (6; 7; 33)
The corresponding utility values are f(z1) = 1500; f(z2) = 2079; f(z3) = 1386: Hence
the DM will provide us with the information that z2  z3 and z1  z3. Based on this we
can generate the corresponding 3-point cones.
We will show that there exists a point z : z 2 C(z1; z2; z3) and z =2 CD( !z1; !z2; !z3).
z = (4:82; 4:65; 37:2) is such an example.
z 2 C(z1; z2; z3) since z = z3 +P2i=1 i(z3   zi) where 1 = 0:03 and 2 = 0:62:
Let us check whether z 2 CD( !z1; !z2; !z3): We solve the following LP which is the LP3
discussed in the previous section.
Max 0
subject to
z01   201 + 102 = 6
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z02 + 801 + 402 = 7
z03   801   602 = 33
r1   d11   d12   d13  4:65
2r2   d21   d22   d23  9:47
3r3   d31   d32   d33  46:67
rn   z0i   dni  0 i; n = 1; 2; 3
01; 02  0
dni  0 i; n = 1; 2; 3
The above problem is infeasible, which shows that there is no z0 2 C( !z1; !z2; !z3) : z e z0
(i.e., (z)  (z0)): Hence z =2 CD( !z1; !z2; !z3):
Having shown this counterexample, it is clear now that we have to nd another way
to deal with symmetry in k-point cones case. We try to do it by dening a region which
encompasses all the information provided by the equitably dominated region of all the
permutation cones. First, let us discuss some observations.
Given the information zi  zk for i 2 I r fkg; for each permutation of
 !
zk; say s(
 !
zk),
we can generate a permutation cone of the form
C(1(
 !
z1); :::;p!(
 !
z1); :::;1(
  !
zk 1); :::;p!(
  !
zk 1);1(
 !
zk); :::;p!(
 !
zk); s(
 !
zk))
Note that this cone contains all permutations of the lower generator as upper generators
as we have s(
 !
zk)  l(
 !
zk) 8s; k 2 P = f1; 2; :::; p!g:
For notational simplicity from now on we denote the above cone as follows
C(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk); s(
 !
zk)) 8l 2 P and i 2 I r fkg
This is the largest cone that we can generate for s(
 !
zk) as the lower generator given
this preference information. We have p! such cones each having a di¤erent permutation of
 !
zk as the lower generator. The following remark shows that all these cones have the same
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equitably dominated region since they are reections of each other.
Remark 35 CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk);
 !
zk) = CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk); s(
 !
zk)) for any s 2 P , 8l 2 P
and i 2 I r fkg:
Proof. CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk);
 !
zk) = fz : z e z0 and z0 2 C(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk);
 !
zk)g.
z0 =
 !
zk +
Pp!
j=1
Pk 1
i=1 ji(
 !
zk  j( !zi )) +Pp!j=1 j( !zk  j( !zk)) for ji > 0 and j > 0
by denition.
Apply s so that
s(z0) = s(
 !
zk) +
Pp!
j=1
Pk 1
i=1 ji(
s(
 !
zk) j( !zi )) +Pp!j=1 j(s( !zk) j( !zk)):
That is, s(z0) 2 C(l( !zi );l(
 !
zk); s(
 !
zk)) by denition.
z e z0 =) z e s(z0) hence z 2 CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk); s(
 !
zk)):
Hence all the points that are equitably dominated by any of the permutation cones lie
in CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk);
 !
zk):
From now on we denote CD(l(
 !
zi );l(
 !
zk);
 !
zk) as U1.
Denition 36 For zi 2 Rp : zi  zk for all i 2 Irfkg; U1 =
 !
zk+
P
trt such that t  0
and rt are the rays in R, where R is the set of all rays
 !
zk   l(
 !
zk) 8l : l(
 !
zk) 6=
 !
zk1 and
 !
zk  j( !zi ) for all j; l 2 P and for all i 2 I r fkg.
U1 is a convex set, dened by an extreme point (
 !
zk ) and the extreme rays in set R.
In our 2D example U1 corresponds to the region ABOC seen in Figure 4.7.
1A special case occurs when l(
 !
zk) =
 !
zk and l(:) is not the permutation provided by the identity
matrix. That is
 !
zk has at least two elements that have the same value.
In such cases we can not talk about ray
 !
zk l(
 !
zk): Instead, we use points from the close neighborhood
of
 !
zk in order to represent the ray corresponding to the PD axiom. We dene the following:
For each i and j such that i 6= j and
 !
zki =
 !
zkj dene
zk0 : zk0h =
 !
zkh for all h 6= i; j and zk0i =
 !
zki    and zk0j =
 !
zkj + 
zk
00
: zk
00
h =
 !
zkh for all h 6= i; j and zk00i =
 !
zki +  and zk
00
j =
 !
zkj   
where  is a small positive value and use the rays
 !
zk   zk0 and
 !
zk   zk00 instead.
See Figure 4.8 for a 2D example.
From now on, we assume that this special case is considered when we talk about
 !
zk  l(
 !
zk):
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Figure 4.7: Region U1
z2=z1
zk'=(3.9,4.1)
zk''=(4.1,3.9)
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Figure 4.8: Special case in 2D (
 !
zk1 =
 !
zk2) Rays
 !
zk   zk0 and
 !
zk   zk00 where  = 0:1
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Denition 37 For a set A, an alternative z is equitably dominated by A if there exists
an alternative z0 2 A : z e z0:
Given zi  zk for i 2 I r fkg Remark 35 shows that every point that is equitably
dominated by any of the permutation cones will also be equitably dominated by U1: On
the other hand, since U1 is a convex cone having
 !
zk as the lower generator it consists of
points which are at most as preferred as
 !
zk.
To sum up, U1 is a region that encompasses all the information provided by all the
permutation cones generated based on zi  zk; i 2 I r fkg. Based on these results we
propose to use U1 and for each alternative z we check whether z is equitably dominated
by U1.
We now analyze U1 in more detail. We claim that in region U1, the rays given by
zk j( !zi ) for i 2 Ir fkg, where j( !zi ) 6=  !zi are not extreme, hence can be written as a
nonnegative combination of the other rays in R. In other words the cones C(j(
 !
zi );
 !
zk) :
j(
 !
zi ) 6=  !zi do not lie on the boundary of the region U1. In our 2D example tis corresponds
to claiming that the ray (3; 4)  (6; 2); i.e. ( 3; 2), is not an extreme ray for U1 and this
is clearly seen in Figure 4.7.
Lemma 38 In set R, the rays given by
 !
zk  j( !zi ), where j( !zi ) 6=  !zi can be written as
a nonnegative combination of the rays
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk) 8j :
 !
zk 6= j(
 !
zk) and
 !
zk   !zi .
Proof. We will prove this for an arbitrary element i 2 I r fkg:
Let zi 6=  !zi as assumed. Let h be the minimum value for which zih > zih+1 holds.
Dene zi0 as the permutation obtained from zi by swapping zih and z
i
h+1. That is, z
i =
(zi1; z
i
2; :::; z
i
h; z
i
h+1; :::; z
i
p) and z
i0 = (zi1; zi2; :::; zih+1; z
i
h; :::; z
i
p) where z
i
h > z
i
h+1. We rst
show the following holds:
 !
zk   zi = Ptrt where rt are in the set f !zk   j( !zk) 8j :  !zk 6= j( !zk) and  !zk   zi0g:
That is,
 !
zk   zi can be written as a nonnegative combination of
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk) for all j and
 !
zk   zi0.
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For zi; zi0 as dened above the following holds:
 !
zk   zi =
 !
zk   zi0 +
 
zih   zih+1 !
zkh+1  
 !
zkh
!
(
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk))
where j(
 !
zk)i =
 !
zki 8i 6= h; h + 1 and j(
 !
zk)h =
 !
zkh+1; 
j(
 !
zk)h+1 =
 !
zkh (all the
elements of
 !
zk are the same in j(
 !
zk) except for hth and h+ 1th being swapped).
It is clearly seen when we analyze the vectors in detail as below:0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1   zi1
:::
 !
zkh   zih
 !
zkh+1   zih+1
:::
 !
zkp   zip
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1   zi1
:::
 !
zkh   zih+1
 !
zkh+1   zih
:::
 !
zkp   zip
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
+

zih zih+1 !
zkh+1 
 !
zkh

0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1  
 !
zk1
:::
 !
zkh  
 !
zkh+1
 !
zkh+1  
 !
zkh
:::
 !
zkp  
 !
zkp
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
In the above equation if
 !
zkh+1 >
 !
zkh then

zih zih+1 !
zkh+1 
 !
zkh

 0; that is we are able to write
the ray that corresponds to
 !
zk   zi as a nonnegative combination of the rays
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk)
8j :
 !
zk 6= j(
 !
zk);
 !
zk   zi0:
Note that a special case occurs when
 !
zkh+1 =
 !
zkh, hence
 !
zk = j(
 !
zk): As discussed
before we use
 !
zk   zk0 and
 !
zk   zk00 instead of
 !
zk   j(
 !
zk) where zk0 (and zk00) are the
vectors obtained from
 !
zk by subtracting (adding)  from (to) hth element and adding
(subtracting)  to (from) the h+ 1th element.
 !
zk   zi =
 !
zk   zi0 + 2

zih zih+1
zk
00
h  zk
00
h+1

(
 !
zk   zk00): Note that zk00h   zk
00
h+1 = 2.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1   zi1
:::
 !
zkh   zih
 !
zkh   zih+1
:::
 !
zkp   zip
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1   zi1
:::
 !
zkh   zih+1
 !
zkh   zih
:::
 !
zkp   zip
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
+ 2

zih zih+1
2

0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 !
zk1  
 !
zk1
:::
 !
zkh   (
 !
zkh + )
 !
zkh+1   (
 !
zkh+1   )
:::
 !
zkp  
 !
zkp
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Note that any permutation of vector zi will result in
 !
zi if we apply a nite number
of such binary contiguous swaps. At each such step we will be able to write the rst ray
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(
 !
zk zi) as a nonnegative combination of the rays (
 !
zk j(
 !
zk) 8j :
 !
zk 6= j(
 !
zk);
 !
zk zi0):
Starting from the rst element which is higher than its consecutive element, these type of
swaps will eventually result in
 !
zi .
Hence, we have the following result:
In set R the rays given by
 !
zk   j( !zi ), where j( !zi ) 6=  !zi can be written as a
nonnegative combination of the rays
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk) 8j :
 !
zk 6= j(
 !
zk) and
 !
zk   !zi .
Corollary 39 In U1 the rays (
 !
zk   zi ): zi 6=  !zi where i 2 I r fkg are not extreme rays.
Proof. By Lemma 38,
 !
zk   zi where zi 6=  !zi can be written in terms of the other rays in
R: Hence such (
 !
zk   zi)s are not extreme rays of U1.
Denition 40 We change the denition of U1 as follows:
U1 = fz : z =
 !
zk +
Pk 1
i=1 i(
 !
zk    !zi ) +Pp!j=1 j( !zk   j( !zk));where i  0; j  0
8i 2 I; j 2 Pg
The following theorem is our main result which is based on the results that we have
provided so far. For notational simplicity we will dene a region ED (Equitably Domi-
nated) which is the inferior region that we can obtain through the convex cones approach
given zi  zk where i 2 I r fkg in Rp+:
Denition 41 ED = fz : z 2 S
s2P
CD(l(
 !
zi ); s(
 !
zk))g:
Theorem 42 If z 2 ED then z is equitably dominated by U1:
Proof. z 2 ED =) z 2 CD(l( !zi );
 !
zk) due to Remark 35. Hence z is equitably
dominated by U1.
Theorem 42 states that all the points that are equitably inferior to the permutation
cones will be equitably dominated by region U1. That is, all the information that we can
infer using cones is provided by equitably dominated region of U1. Moreover, denition of
U1 (see Denition 40) provides us a way to partially handle the permutational complexities
since it does not include all the permutations of the upper generators (zis); we just use
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the corresponding ordered vectors (
 !
zi s). Note that we still use all the permutations of the
lower generator (
 !
zk) to dene U1. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next section.
For similar results that apply to the corresponding polyhedrons see Appendix Section
4.B.
4.3.5 Checking Equitable Dominance by a Point in U1
Recall that by Theorem 42 if z 2 ED then z is equitably dominated by U1. Hence, for
each alternative z we have to check whether there exists z0 2 U1 : z e z0: Using Corollary
39 we can dene each point z0 2 U1 using the equation z0 =
 !
zk +
Pk 1
i=1 i(
 !
zk    !zi ) +Pp!
j=1 j(
 !
zk  j(
 !
zk)).
Suppose that we work on Rp+. The following model will be used for checking equitable
dominance of an alternative z by U1 :
(LP4)
max 0
subject to
z0h  
k 1X
i=1
i(
 !
zkh  
 !
zih) 
p!X
j=1
j(
 !
zkh  j(
 !
zk)h) =
 !
zkh for h = 1; :::; p (4.13)
nrn  
pX
h=1
dnh 
nX
h=1
 !z h for n = 1; :::; p (4.14)
rn   dnh   z0h  0 for h; n = 1; :::; p (4.15)
i  0 for i = 1; :::; k   1 (4.16)
j  0 for j = 1; :::; p! (4.17)
dnh  0 for h; n = 1; :::; p (4.18)
This model checks whether there exists z0 2 U1 such that (z)  (z0): Constraint sets
4:13 and 4:14 ensure that z0 2 U1 and (z)  (z0), respectively. The objective function
and constraint set 4:15 are used to ensure that n(z0) =
Pn
i=1
 !z 0i = nrn  
Pp
h=1 d

nh,
where rn and dnh are the optimal values of these decision variables based on Theorem 33.
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It is an LP problem with p!+p2 +2p+k 1 variables and p2 +2p constraints excluding
the set constraints. Hence it is practical to solve this LP for cases where p is small ( 5):
Recall that the permutational term (p!) is due to the necessity of using all permutations of
the lower generator. This seems to be restricting the size of problems that can be solved
by an algorithm that uses this result. However, note that, we work on problems where we
ask the DM to compare alternatives, i.e. vectors. Requesting the DM to compare vectors
is only meaningful when the size of the vectors (p) is reasonable. Hence we already have
a natural limit on p due to the cognitive limitations of the DM.
One can show similar results for the polyhedrons. See Appendix Section 4.C.
Table 4.2 below summarizes our main theoretical results (See Appendix for LP5).
Table 4.2: Summary of the main results
2-point cones case k-point cones case
z 2 CD(z1; z2) =) z 2 CD( !z1; !z2) z 2 CD(z1; :::; zk 1; zk) =) 9 z0 2 U1 : z e z0
z 2 UP (z1; zk) =) z 2 UP ( !z1;
 !
zk) z 2 UP (z1; :::; zk 1; zk) =)  !z 2 UP ( !z1; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk)
Work on
 !
R p. Use LP3 and LP5: Use LP4 and LP5:
In the next section we propose an interactive ranking algorithm which is based on our
theoretical results.
4.4 An Interactive Ranking Algorithm
In this section we introduce a solution algorithm that uses the idea of convex cones for
the ranking problematique. In this algorithm we test our method to deal with symmetry.
We rst provide a general description of the approach, followed by a simple numerical
example. Next, we explain the algorithm in detail.
4.4.1 General Overview of the Algorithm
We propose an algorithm that can be used to obtain a ranking of a discrete set of al-
ternatives given. In the algorithm, we gather preference information from the DM by
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presenting him/her some pairs. Using the information he/she provides, it is possible to
generate cones and polyhedrons as discussed before. For each alternative in the set we
check whether it is cone dominated or lies in the upper side of the polyhedron generated.
We perform these checks by using models LP4 and LP5 discussed in the previous section.
Note that, at the beginning of the algorithm, before asking questions to the DM, we will
perform an initial check to see whether there are alternatives equitably dominating each
other. Theorem 22 in Section 4.2.2 provides us the link between vector dominance and
equitable dominance. Based on this theorem, in order to check equitable dominance, we
will check rational dominance for the cumulative ordered vectors of the alternatives ((:)).
Hence, for practical reasons, we will nd (:) vector for each alternative in our set at the
beginning of the algorithm. This information will also be used in the LPs to check the
status of an alternative z, since these LPs use
Pi
h=1
 !z h , which is i(z), as a parameter.
Suppose that we are given a nite number of alternatives each showing a distribution
prole for p parties. We can summarize our algorithm with the following steps:
S.1. Map the alternatives to (Rp) and check whether any alternative is equitably
dominated by the other for each pair of alternatives.
S.2. Select k alternatives (k  2) based on a predetermined rule. Get the preference
information from the DM by asking him to compare these alternatives. Denote the least
preferred alternative as zk and the rest as zi for i = 1; 2; ::; k   1:
S.3. Based on the preference information obtained, check for each alternative z whether
z  zk by solving LP4. If not, then check whether zk  z by solving LP5.
S.4. Update the result accordingly. If the result is not satisfactory, continue with Step
2.
4.4.2 Numerical Example
Let us show the general idea using a 2D example. Note that our results are valid for any
p-dimensional case, we are providing a 2D example for simplicity.
Example 43 Suppose that a DM is trying to reach a partial ordering for the following
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Table 4.3: Example problem step 1. mapping the alternatives to the cumulative ordered
space
Alternative (z) Ordered Vector ( !z ) Cumulative Ordered Vector ((z))
z1 (1,2) (1,3)
z2 (2,3) (2,5)
z3 (2,2) (2,4)
z4 (3,4) (3,7)
z5 (2,6) (2,8)
z6 (0.5,8) (0.5,8.5)
z7 (0,10) (0,10)
z8 (3.5,3.5) (3.5,7)
z9 (2.5,5) (2.5,7.5)
z10 (4,6) (4,10)
income distributions in a 2-person population:
z1 = (1; 2); z2 = (3; 2); z3 = (2; 2); z4 = (3; 4); z5 = (6; 2) ; z6 = (0:5; 9); z7 = (10; 0);
z8 = (3:5; 3:5) ; z9 = (5; 2:5) ; z10 = (6; 4). Let us apply the algorithm.
S.1. Map the alternatives to (R2) and check whether each alternative is equitably
dominated by the other for each pair of alternatives.
Based on Theorem 22 we check equitable dominance by checking rational dominance
of the corresponding cumulative ordered vectors. Through inspection one can see that the
following holds:
z1  z3  z2  z5  z10
z1  z3  z2  z4  z8  z10
z1  z3  z2  z9  z10
z6  z10
z7  z10
Figure 4.9 shows this information in a tree like form.  () is represented by an arrow
from the preferred alternative to the less preferred one.
Example 44 S.2. Now suppose that we have preference information from the DM that
z4  z5:Then, we know that z1  z3  z2  z5  z4  z8  z10.
S.3. Based on the preference information obtained, check for each alternative z whether
z  z5 by solving LP4. If not, then check whether z5  z by solving LP5.
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Figure 4.9: Preference tree after S1
Since we already know the statuses of z1; z2; z3; z4; z8 and z10 with respect to z5; we
perform the checks for z6; z7 and z9:
S.3.1 Check whether z6  z5:
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To do this we will solve the following LP:
Max 0
z01   ( !z 51   !z 41)  ( !z 51    z 51) =  !z 51
z02   ( !z 52   !z 42)  ( !z 52    z 52) =  !z 52
r1   d11   d12  (z6)1
2r2   d21   d22  (z6)2
r1   d11   z01  0
r1   d12   z02  0
r2   d21   z01  0
r2   d22   z02  0
;   0
dni  0 8i; n
That is, we solve the following LP:
Max 0
z01 + + 4 = 2
z02   2  4 = 6
r1   d11   d12  0:5
2r2   d21   d22  8:5
r1   d11   z01  0
r1   d12   z02  0
r2   d21   z01  0
r2   d22   z02  0
;   0
dni  0 8i; n
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The above LP is feasible. Hence z6  z5:
S.3.2 Check whether z7  z5:
When the above LP is solved for z7, a feasible solution can be found. Hence z7  z5:
S.3.3 Check whether z9  z5:
The corresponding LP model is not feasible. So we can not conclude that z9  z5: Now
we will check whether z9 2 UP ( !z 4; !z 5) by solving the following LP:
Max 
z01   ( !z 51)  1( !z 41) = 0
z02   ( !z 51)  1( !z 41) = 0
z01 +   (z9)1
z01 + z
0
2 +   (z9)2
+ 1 = 1
; 1  0
Writing down the parameters explicitly, we have the following LP:
Max 
z01   2  31 = 0
z02   6  41 = 0
z01 +   2:5
z01 + z
0
2 +   7:5
+ 1 = 1
; 1  0
Since  = 0  0; z9 2 UP ( !z 4; !z 5); hence z5  z9:
S.4. Using the preference information (z4  z5) that the DM provided and using the
convex cones, we obtained the information that z6  z5; z7  z5 and z5  z9: Now we
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know the following:
z1  z3  z2  z5  z9  z10
z1  z3  z2  z5  z4  z8  z10
z6  z5  z9  z10
z7  z5  z9  z10
See Figure 4.10 for a tree representation of these preferences.
Figure 4.10: Preference tree after S4
Example 45 If this quasi-ordering is not satisfactory, one can go back to Step 2, choose
another pair and ask the DM for new information. For example we can ask her to compare
z8 and z9:
4.4.3 Detailed Description of the Algorithm
Example 43 shows the idea that our ranking algorithm is based on. The algorithm that
we propose di¤ers from the above sketch in a number of aspects. Unlike the example
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case, as long as new information is available, which allows us to generate new cones, we
repeat Step 3. That is, we try to use the available information as much as possible before
presenting the DM a new sample. After all the checks are performed, we continue with
Step 4. We now provide a detailed description of the algorithm using subroutines.
For a problem including n alternatives showing allocation to p parties, that is with p
criteria, the pseudocode of our algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 46 Initialize the parameters and generate data using Initialization subrou-
tine
Check equitable dominance relation between each pair of alternatives using Domi-
nancecheck subroutine
Repeat
Get preference information from the DM using Getinfo subroutine
newinfo=1 //This parameter is used to check whether any new information is
obtained that can allow us to generate new cones
Repeat
Perform the checks related to the cones and polyhedrons using Conegener-
ation subroutine
Until newinfo=0
Count the number of alternatives whose ranks are known using Countassigned
subroutine
Until n-unassigned<n or CPUtime>1800
Display results and performance measure values
Let us now explain each subroutine in more detail.
Initialization
This subroutine is used to initialize the parameters and generate the set of alternatives.
At the end of this subroutine, the cumulative ordered vectors for all the alternatives are
also found and kept in memory.
Dominancecheck
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As discussed before (see Theorem 22) equitable dominance is checked by checking ratio-
nal dominance of the corresponding cumulative ordered vectors. We store the information
on dominance relations in an n  n matrix called Dominancemat. Dominancemat(i,j) =1
if alternative i equitably dominates alternative j; 0 otherwise.
Getinfo
This subroutine gathers information from the DM by providing him with a set of alter-
natives. The size of this set is controlled by a parameter called samplesize. The alternatives
are selected according to a predetermined rule. In the rst iteration we rank the alterna-
tives according to their Euclidean distances to an ideal point (IP) whose coordinates are
dened as follows:
IPi = Max
(z)
(z)i 8i = 1; :::; p:
We select the ones having the least distances to the IP.
In the following iterations, we select the alternatives on whose ranks we have the least
information. We keep track of the information on an alternatives possible ranks using an
n  2 matrix called boundmatrix. In this matrix each row is dedicated to an alternative
and the two values in each row show the minimum and maximum possible ranks of the
alternative, respectively. At the beginning these values are set to 1 and n for all the
alternatives. Whenever new information is available, this matrix is updated accordingly.
While asking the DM for preference information, we choose the alternatives for which the
di¤erence between the maximum and minimum rank is larger.
The preference information gathered is in form of ranking of the alternatives in the
sample. If samplesize is two, this corresponds to a pairwise comparison. For samples with
more than two alternatives, the DM ranks these alternatives from the best to the worst.
When preference information is obtained, it is stored in an n n matrix called Userprefer-
ence. This matrix keeps the information for cone and polyhedron generation. When new
information is gathered, the Userpreference matrix is updated based on transitivity. For
example, if from previous iterations we know that alternative i is preferred to alternative
j and in the current iteration we are given j is preferred to alternative k, then we update
the matrix setting Userpreference(i,k)=1. This allows us to generate the largest cone for
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a given lower generator.
Conegeneration
Given available information on the preferences, in this subroutine we perform the cor-
responding checks related to the cones and polyhedrons. The two LPs, LP4 and LP5, are
generated and solved in this subroutine. Whenever possible, redundant cones/polyhedrons
and checks are avoided. We do not generate a cone/polyhedron that we generated before.
Moreover, we do not solve these LPs for an alternative if we already know that it is eq-
uitably dominated by/equitably dominates or less preferred/more preferred to the cones
lower generator. Since some of the new information obtained through these checks leads
us to new cones and polyhedrons, we repeat this subroutine until there is no useful new in-
formation. We check this condition by using a binary variable called newinfo. A owchart
of this subroutine is provided below in Figure 4.11:
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Count the # of alternatives
that are preferred to(but not
dominating) alt. j.
Store in notdom.
Set lastnotdom(j)=notdom.
Generate the cone and
polyhedron.
(Set the parameters of LP4
and LP5 accordingly.)
notdom>0
(Can we generate a cone?)
&
Notdom>lastnotdom(j)
(Is this a new cone?)
j=1
Newinfo=0
j=j+1
i=1
Is status of i with respect
to j is known?i=i+1
Formulate and solve LP4
to check whether alt. i is
dominated by the Cone
Is alt. i cone dominated?
Formulate and solve LP5
to check alt. i’s position
with respect to the
Polyhedron
Is alt . i in/in the upper side
of the polyhedron?
Update Userpreference.
Set Newinfo=1.
i<n+1
j<n+1
STOP
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Figure 4.11: Flowchart of Conegeneration subroutine
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Countassigned
Recall that we keep the lowest and highest possible ranks for an alternative in bound-
matrix. At the end of each iteration, for each alternative, we count the alternatives that
it dominates/is preferred to and the ones that it is dominated by/less preferred than.
We update the information on boundmatrix accordingly. We then count the number of
alternatives whose rank we know, i.e, whose maximum and minimum possible ranks are
equal. This information is then used to decide whether to terminate the algorithm.
4.5 Computational Experiments
In this section we provide the results of our computational experiments on the performance
of the algorithm. We present our experimental setting, state our performance measures
and discuss the results of the experiments.
4.5.1 Experimental Setting
Two di¤erent data settings are used in the experiments. The rst setting is based on
real life data on income distributions of di¤erent countries. In the second setting the
alternatives are generated using the random number generator of MATLAB.
In the rst data set we use income distribution information of di¤erent countries from
the World Bank [179] and UNU-WIDER (United Nations University- World Institute
for Development Economics Research) [180] databases. We use the quintile values to
represent a countrys income distribution. For each country we take the percentage share
of income that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by quintiles. Let us denote
these percentage shares as Si i = 1; :::; 5, where Si% is the income share held by the ith
20% of the population. Given these percentage shares, for each country, we can nd mean
income levels for each quintile, i : i = 1; :::; 5 as follows:
i =
TI  Si
TP  20 i = 1; :::; 5
where TI and TP are the total income and population of the corresponding country.
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Note that TI=TP is the mean income level for that country. We use GNI (Gross National
Income) [181] values to estimate TI=TP , hence use the following equation:
i = GNI 
Si
20
i = 1; :::; 5
Hence for each country we use a distribution vector of size 5 consisting of the mean
income levels of each quintile. One can think of these i values as the income levels of 5
representative people in the population. In this setting we could be able to obtain samples
of size (n) 14, 15, 26, 39, 54 and 66. These samples di¤er from each other in terms of
income sharing unit and unit of analysis reported in the database. Note that since we
work on quintiles p = 5.
In the second setting the alternatives are generated randomly from a uniform distri-
bution using MATLABs random number generator. In this set only equitably e¢ cient
alternatives are generated. This is ensured by generating the cumulative ordered vectors
rather than the alternatives themselves. Note that for a vector to be a cumulative ordered
vector, the di¤erence between its consecutive elements should be increasing. We generate
cumulative ordered vectors which are Pareto e¢ cient so that the alternatives will be eq-
uitably e¢ cient. Pareto e¢ ciency is ensured by generating the vectors on a quarter circle
( or on the boundary of a sphere) in the nonnegative orthant. If the generated vector
does not correspond to an ordered vector, we repair it. We then derive the original set of
alternatives by applying an inverse cumulative function to the cumulative order.
We refer to these two data sets as Income Distribution (ID) and Equitably e¢ cient
(EE), respectively. One can see that the di¢ culty of the problem is expected to increase
in the latter one.
The DMs responses are simulated using an underlying value function. Three types of
underlying value functions are used in the experiments:
1. Linear value function
max
i
Pp
j=1wj
 !z ij
where wj ; j = 1; :::; p are generated from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
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2. Product function
max
i
pQ
j=1
zij
3. Tchebyche¤ value function
max
i
fmin
j
 !z ijg = max
i
f !z i1g
Another parameter used in the algorithm is the sample size, denoted by s. We use an
s value of 2 in the experiments, that is we only ask for binary comparisons.
In the EE data set, for each combination of the settings discussed above, we generate
instances starting with n = 10 and p = 2, increasing them in increments of 10 and 1,
respectively. For each such combination we generate 10 problem instances.
4.5.2 Performance Measures
We now discuss the performance measures used to evaluate the algorithm and the perfor-
mance of convex cones approach. We use the following measures:
1. CPU time in seconds
2. Number of LP4 problems solved
3. Number of LP5 problems solved
4. Number of binary comparisons gathered from the DM
5. Ratio of the binary comparisons gathered from the DM
6. Ratio of the binary comparisons gained through convex cones
The denitions of measures 1,2 and 3 are clear. Let us explain measures 4, 5 and 6.
Number of binary comparisons gathered from the DM: The calculation of this measure
is obvious when we only gather pairwise comparisons from the DM. In the cases where we
present more than two alternatives, we report the information that we gain in terms of
the underlying pairwise comparisons made by the DM. For example, if we present the DM
three alternatives for him to rank, we say that he provides
 
3
2

= 6 pairwise comparisons.
Hence for a sample size of s, at each iteration, the number of binary comparisons gathered
is
 
s
2

: In t iterations, we have t   s2:
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Ratio of the binary comparisons gathered from the DM (qratio) : This is another way
to measure the amount of information taken from the DM. In order to achieve a complete
ranking of n alternatives, one has to know the relation between each pair of alternatives
in this set. Hence, we should know the result of
 
n
2

binary comparisons. The ratio is then
calculated as follows:
qratio = t   s2= n2
Recall that in Dominancecheck subroutine we nd the number of pairwise equitable
dominance relations. Let us denote it by d. In the output we also report the ratio of
the equitable dominance relations which is a property of the problem set rather than a
performance measure. We call it dratio and calculate as follows:
dratio = d=
 
n
2

.
Ratio of the binary comparisons gained through convex cones (gainratio): Similar to
qratio, this measure is used to see the amount of information that we gain by using convex
cones. It is calculated as follows:
gainratio=1-qratio-dratio
The optimal solutions of the LPs are found by using CPLEX 12.2. We set a termination
limit of 30 minutes to the algorithm. All experimentations are done in Intel Core i5 2.27
GHz, 4 GB RAM. The algorithm is coded with MATLAB.
4.5.3 Experiments
In this part we present the results of our experiments.
Table 4.4 shows our results for the rst data set where we use income distribution
information. For the linear utility function case for each n value we generate 10 problem
instances, each with randomly generated objective function weights. We then report the
average values over all these 10 instances. In the other cases, we solve the algorithm once.
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Table 4.4: Results for WorldBank and UNU-WIDER Data
n Utility dratio LP4 LP5 Solution Time gainratio qratio Number of Number of
Function (CPU seconds) comparisons gained questions asked
14 1 0.901 3 3 0.443 0.022 0.077 2.00 7.01
2 0.901 3 3 0.490 0.022 0.077 2.00 7.01
3 0.901 6 6 0.890 0.044 0.055 4.00 5.01
15 1 0.876 10.6 9.9 1.423 0.054 0.070 5.69 7.33
2 0.876 7 7 1.020 0.057 0.067 5.99 7.04
3 0.876 12 12 1.740 0.019 0.105 2.00 11.03
26 1 0.895 43.2 43.1 5.480 0.032 0.073 10.37 23.76
2 0.895 43 43 6.530 0.028 0.077 9.10 25.03
3 0.895 45 44 6.280 0.040 0.065 13.00 21.13
39 1 0.916 73.3 72.4 9.721 0.030 0.054 21.86 40.09
2 0.916 73 72 10.580 0.028 0.055 20.75 40.76
3 0.916 58 54 8.300 0.050 0.034 37.05 25.19
54 1 0.932 125 123.2 16.786 0.028 0.040 40.07 57.24
2 0.932 156 156 23.160 0.022 0.045 31.48 64.40
3 0.932 115 113 16.800 0.038 0.030 54.38 42.93
66 1 0.898 594.1 590.6 80.617 0.056 0.046 119.05 99.31
2 0.898 608 605 85.530 0.054 0.048 115.83 102.96
3 0.898 480 470 66.270 0.068 0.034 145.86 72.93
It is observed that in this data set, dratio is very high, with a minimum value of 0.895.
That is in at least 89.5% of all the pairs in the set, we can observe equitable dominance
before asking to the DM for preference information. Hence, there is not much to ask the
DM. This fact is observed in the average number of questions asked, in the qratio and the
average number of the two LPs solved. Consequently, gainratio is quite low, the maximum
is observed as 0.068 in the case where n = 66 and the DM has a Tchebyche¤ type of utility
function.
One interesting observation is made regarding the ratio of gainings through cones to
the questions asked (gainratio/qratio). This gives us how many extra binary comparisons
we can infer, given a binary comparison from the DM. This ratio increases as the problem
size, n, increases. In the set with 14 alternatives and the DM has a linear utility function
this ratio is 0.29 while it increases to 2 in the set with 66 alternatives and the DM has a
Tchebyche¤ type of utility function. This indicates that the gain that we obtain through
cones tends to increase as the problem gets larger.
Note here that, these results are preliminary results for real life income distribution
data. Since we are representing the income distributions with a vector of size 5, it becomes
harder to capture the underlying distribution and the results are sensitive to changes in
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the data quality. A number of assumptions are made regarding the income distributions
of di¤erent countries while collecting the data which may a¤ect the results signicantly
(see [179] and [180] for more information). More detailed experiments in this area await
further attention.
We now discuss the performance of our algorithm for the EE setting. For each combi-
nation of utility function, p and n values, 10 problem instances are generated. The average
performance measure values over the 10 instances are shown in Table 4.5. Recall that in
each problem instance none of the alternatives are equitably dominating each other, i.e,
dratio=0. Hence this set consists of more di¢ cult problems in that sense.
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Table 4.5: Results for the EE set
Utility p n Number of LP4 Number of LP5 Solution Time gainratio qratio Number of
Function (CPU seconds) questions asked
1 2 10 32.60 18.80 3.32 0.95 0.05 2.40
20 192.40 149.30 21.66 0.96 0.04 7.90
30 589.70 506.20 85.97 0.97 0.03 11.40
40 944.20 813.00 121.55 0.98 0.02 13.70
50 1714.20 1543.40 248.86 0.98 0.02 19.80
60 2258.50 2005.80 341.17 0.99 0.01 17.80
70 2159.40 1847.70 313.64 1.00 0.00 10.60
3 10 100.90 94.10 12.27 0.68 0.32 14.50
20 707.80 694.40 113.45 0.77 0.23 44.60
30 2061.00 2011.50 320.35 0.84 0.16 70.60
40 3446.10 3351.40 612.62 0.89 0.11 88.60
50 6397.10 6308.70 1438.71 0.91 0.09 111.90
4 10 129.50 128.70 16.43 0.54 0.46 20.90
20 884.80 874.10 124.20 0.73 0.27 52.00
30 2778.30 2757.50 472.12 0.78 0.22 95.80
40 5737.00 5706.60 1278.61 0.82 0.18 140.90
5 10 133.40 132.70 16.95 0.49 0.51 23.00
20 1070.80 1065.30 149.77 0.64 0.36 67.70
30 3100.40 3089.80 533.22 0.75 0.25 109.20
40 6895.75 6881.38 1483.24 0.81 0.19 145.88
2 2 10 46.70 33.40 5.07 0.91 0.09 4.10
20 260.80 220.70 31.30 0.95 0.05 9.90
30 739.70 669.60 96.78 0.96 0.04 17.50
40 1399.70 1296.20 197.30 0.97 0.03 22.00
50 2617.40 2466.60 418.67 0.98 0.02 28.10
60 4026.70 3826.20 733.58 0.98 0.02 34.40
70 5528.70 5267.70 1110.43 0.98 0.02 38.50
3 10 98.50 92.90 12.11 0.64 0.36 16.20
20 752.30 729.20 101.44 0.77 0.23 43.00
30 2075.00 2035.50 325.55 0.81 0.19 82.20
40 4332.30 4272.80 843.19 0.85 0.15 119.60
4 10 123.50 122.40 15.80 0.52 0.48 21.70
20 971.80 967.10 137.55 0.68 0.32 60.40
30 2946.70 2934.10 508.64 0.76 0.24 104.70
40 6290.67 6265.67 1213.64 0.80 0.20 152.67
5 10 127.20 126.40 16.37 0.50 0.50 22.50
20 1092.20 1088.70 153.25 0.66 0.34 64.70
30 3380.00 3375.30 611.02 0.73 0.27 119.20
3 2 10 27.20 11.80 2.51 0.96 0.04 1.80
20 106.30 58.70 10.48 0.98 0.02 4.50
30 263.00 157.40 26.79 0.99 0.01 3.20
40 467.30 320.60 51.32 1.00 0.00 3.50
50 573.20 375.60 73.15 1.00 0.00 3.40
60 943.60 692.20 112.40 1.00 0.00 3.10
70 1286.00 966.10 159.81 1.00 0.00 3.10
3 10 96.00 90.30 11.77 0.67 0.33 14.90
20 717.80 696.90 95.15 0.77 0.23 43.60
30 2063.30 2019.90 323.04 0.84 0.16 71.70
40 4189.10 4118.70 795.93 0.87 0.13 103.30
4 10 128.20 127.00 16.56 0.49 0.51 23.10
20 985.20 978.90 142.83 0.70 0.30 56.30
30 2758.30 2740.40 562.76 0.78 0.22 95.10
40 6040.00 6009.90 1324.71 0.81 0.19 147.10
5 10 128.30 127.60 62.92 0.50 0.50 22.70
20 1055.70 1052.00 531.56 0.66 0.34 64.20
30 3275.90 3269.90 586.79 0.74 0.26 113.30
40 4606.70 4594.50 1832.07 0.94 0.06 47.70
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We can nd complete rankings for problems with up to 70 alternatives when the number
of parties, p, is two, and up to 40 alternatives when p is three, four and ve in our time
limit of 30 minutes.
These results reveal the contribution of convex cones. The minimum average gainratio
value is 0.49, that is, at least about 50% of the binary comparisons are provided by the
convex cones. This indicates a satisfactory performance for the convex cones approach.
Note here that in some instances gainratio is seen as 0, which is due to rounding.
We can see the e¤ect of problem size on the performance of the algorithm and on the
amount of information gained from cones.
As can be observed from the table when the number of alternatives, n; increases
gainratio increases. Hence for constant p, the contribution of convex cones approach to
the solution increases as n increases. Note that although qratio decreases with increasing
n, the actual number of questions increases, resulting in an increase in the number of
cones/polyhedrons generated. Moreover as n increases so does the the number of LPs
solved per cone/polyhedron. As a result, we observe an increase in the number of LPs
solved and the solution time.
The e¤ect of number of parties, p, is also notable in the performance of the convex
cones. As p increases the number and ratio of the comparisons required from the DM
increase. As a result of the increase in the ratio of the comparisons required, the ratio
of information gained through cones decreases. Moreover the increase in the number of
comparisons provided by the DM leads to an increase in the number of LP models solved
and in turn an increase in solution time.
It is also observed that the e¤ects of p and n are consistent over the three types of
utility functions used.
4.6 Conclusion and Further Research
In this study we consider a method to incorporate preference information for multicriteria
problems with equity concerns. We are motivated by the fact that problems involving eq-
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uity concerns are widely encountered in real life, especially in public sector. Such problems
include, facility location, income distribution and resource/service allocation problems.
We analyze a method based on convex cones that is frequently used to represent DMs
preferences in multi criteria decision making environment. Based on the reported satisfac-
tory performance of convex cones in reducing the amount of information required from the
DM to solve di¤erent MCDM problems, we consider extending their use for problems with
equity concerns. We provide theoretical results and discuss a way to partially handle the
computational complexities due to symmetry. This allows us to use convex cones approach
in problems with impartiality without signicantly increasing the computational e¤orts.
Related to the cones, we also discuss the use of polyhedrons in a ranking problematique.
We check the performance of the suggested approach by using it in a ranking algorithm.
In the most di¢ cult setting, where all the alternatives in the set are equitably e¢ cient, our
algorithm provides complete rankings for problems with up to 70 alternatives when the
number of parties is two, and up to 40 alternatives when the number of parties is three,
four and ve in less than 30 minutes requiring a reasonable number of comparisons from
the DM. It is observed that this satisfactory performance of the algorithm is mostly due
to the high ratio of information gained by convex cones and polyhedrons. At least 50%
of the information is obtained through cones and polyhedrons in this setting. We observe
that the number of parties and the number of alternatives a¤ect the problem complexity
and the percentage of the information gained through cones.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst extensive study that attempts to
incorporate DMs preference information in MCDM problems with equity concerns where
the utility function is not assumed to be linear. This is also the rst discussion on the
convex cones approach in a symmetric environment and the rst study that reports results
for a ranking algorithm that uses the information from cones and polyhedrons.
In the near future, this study can be extended by working more on the MCDM models
and generalizing the use of convex cones in this context. This includes four main areas:
Searching for alternative ways to handle computational complexity due to symmetry, using
convex cones in selecting the best and sorting problematiques, using convex cones in
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di¤erent feasible sets and performing an experimental study to use convex cones approach
as e¢ ciently as possible. These potential research topics are discussed below.
1. More on Handling the Computational Complexity: Recall that the method we pro-
pose to handle computational complexities due to symmetry reduces many of the
permutational computations. However, in LP4 we still have to nd all the per-
mutations of the lower generator of each cone. In the near future, more theoretical
studies may be performed to see whether there exists a way to obtain the information
without any permutational calculations.
2. Interactive Algorithms for Selecting the Best and Sorting Problematiques: Selecting
the best alternative in an MCDM setting involving equity concerns is a problema-
tique that is encountered in the public sector as discussed before. It has applications
in location and public service/resource allocation decisions. We use di¤erent ways
to gather and use DMs preference information in di¤erent problematiques. For ex-
ample, in a sorting environment, instead of taking pairwise comparisons or rankings,
we may request him/her to assign the alternatives into the classes.
3. Use of Convex Cones for Problems with Di¤erent Feasible Sets One can study di¤er-
ent problem environments where the feasible region is dened by constraints. More
research can be done to generalize the use of convex cones in such environments.
4. Experimental Study on Convex Cones: While designing an algorithm the analyst
makes various decisions regarding convex cones that may a¤ect the performance of
the proposed method. These decisions are mostly related to the ways to collect pref-
erence information from the DM. The performance of the algorithm may vary based
on the size of the sample used for gathering preference information, the selection
rule applied to select the alternatives in the sample and the form of the information
the DM provides. For example, given a set of k alternatives, we may require the
DM to rank them or select the best/worst alternatives in the sample. We can per-
form an experimental study to see the e¤ects of such decisions that are made in the
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approaches using convex cones theory.
4.A Results for the 2-point Polyhedrons Case
Lemma 47 For z1; z2 2 Rp+, if z 2 P (z1;
 !
z2) then z 2 UP ( !z1; !z2):
Proof. Let z1 6=  !z1 (Otherwise, the result is immediate). Let h be the minimum value
for which z1h > z
1
h+1 holds. Dene z
10 as the permutation obtained from z1 by swapping
z1h and z
1
h+1. That is, z
1 = (z11 ; z
1
2 ; :::; z
1
h; z
1
h+1; :::; z
1
p) and z
10 = (z11 ; z12 ; :::; z1h+1; z
1
h; :::; z
1
p)
where z1h > z
1
h+1.
Suppose for an arbitrary   0 we have a point z 2 P (z1; !z2) : z =  !z2 + (1   )z1:
Dene z
0 2 P (z10; !z2) : z0 =  !z2 + (1  )z10:
z and z0 have the same elements except the hth and h + 1th elements, which are as
follows:
zh = 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h;
zh+1 = 
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1h+1;
z0h = 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1;
z0h+1 = 
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1h:
From Lemma 27 we know that z0 e z if Minfz0h; z0h+1g  Minfzh; zh+1g and z0h +
z0h+1  zh + zh+1: Let us check (Recall that z1h > z1h+1):
Minfz0h; z0h+1g = Minf
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1; 
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1hg
= 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1 = z0h:
We do not know what Minfzh; zh+1g is, hence we will compare z0h with both zh and
zh+1:
z0h = 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1  
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h = zh
z0h = 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1  
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1h+1 = zh+1: Hence,
Minfz0h; z0h+1g Minfzh; zh+1g (4.19)
zh + zh+1 = 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h + 
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1h+1
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= 
 !
z2h + (1  )z1h+1 + 
 !
z2h+1 + (1  )z1h
= z0h + z
0
h+1: That is,
z0h + z
0
h+1  zh + zh+1 (4.20)
From 4:19 and 4:20 the conditions of Lemma 27 is satised so z0 e z . Since  is
arbitrary, this result is valid for every z 2 P (z1; !z2):
We showed that if z 2 P (z1; !z2), then 9z0 2 P (z10; !z2) such that z0 e z; where z10 is
the permutation obtained by a single swap of two consecutive elements of z1 as dened
above.
Any permutation of vector z1 will result in
 !
z1 if we apply a nite number of such binary
contiguous swaps. Starting from the rst element which is higher than its consecutive
element, these type of swaps will eventually result in
 !
z1. Hence, we have the following
result:
For any z2; z1 2 Rp+, if z 2 P (z1;
 !
z2) then 9z0 2 P ( !z1; !z2) such that z0 e z: That is,
z 2 UP ( !z1; !z2).
Proposition 48 For any z2; z1 2 Rp+, if z 2 P (z1; z2) then z 2 UP (
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
Proof. Let z1 = s(
 !
z1) and z2 = q(
 !
z2): Then z = (q(
 !
z2)) + (1  )(s( !z1)): Let the
inverse permutation of q be r and let r(s) = t:
We can rewrite the condition as follows: If r(z) 2 P (t( !z1); !z2) then r(z) 2
UP (
 !
z1;
 !
z2) 8t; implied by Lemma 47 proved above.
Theorem 49 For any z2; z1; z 2 Rp+, if z 2 UP (z1; z2) then z 2 UP (
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
Proof. If z 2 UP (z1; z2) there exists a z0 2 P (z1; z2) : z0 e z. From Proposition 48 z0
2 UP ( !z1; !z2): Then from transitivity of e, z 2 UP (
 !
z1;
 !
z2):
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4.B Generalization for the k-point Polyhedrons Case
Lemma 50 Every point in a k-point polyhedron is a convex combination of k   1 points
which are in the k 1 distinct 2-point polyhedrons generated by one of the upper generators
and the lower generator. That is, given zi such that zi  zk; 8i 2 I r fkg we have the
following:
If z 2 P (z1; z2; :::; zk 1; zk) then there exists i and yi 2 P (zi; zk) for i = 1; :::; k   1
such that z =
Pk 1
i=1 iy
i,
Pk 1
i=1 i = 1:
Proof. z = zk +
Pk 1
i=1 iz
i such that +
Pk 1
i=1 i = 1:
Let yi = (1  0i)zk + 0izi 8i:
Now we will show that there exist i i = 1; :::; k   1 such that z =
Pk 1
i=1 iy
i: Given
i corresponding to vector z; we will show that is and 
0
is exist as dened so that we can
write z as a convex combination of yis. Suppose that we have i values for i = 1; ::; k   2
such that i > 0 and
Pk 2
i=1 i < 1 and we set k 1 = 1 
Pk 2
i=1 i: Given these i and i;
we can set 0i values as follows:
i = i
0
i for i = 1; ::; k   1
0i = i=i. Since i > 0 and i  0; we have 0i  0:
z = zk +
k 1X
i=1
iz
i
= (1 
k 1X
i=1
i
0
i)z
k +
k 1X
i=1
i
0
iz
i (Since  = 1 
k 1X
i=1
i = 1 
k 1X
i=1
i
0
i)
=
k 1X
i=1
i(1  0i)zk +
k 1X
i=1
i
0
iz
i:
=
k 1X
i=1
i[(1  0i)zk + 0izi]
=
k 1X
i=1
iy
i
Remark 51 If an alternative z 2 UP (zi; zk) then it is in the upper side of any k-point
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polyhedron having zi and zk as two of the generators (zk being the lower generator).
Theorem 52 If z 2 P (z1; z2; :::; zk 1; zk) then z 2 UP ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk).
Proof. From Lemma 50 if z 2 P (z1; z2; :::; zk 1; zk) =)we can nd yi 2 P (zi; zk) :
z =
Pk 1
i=1 iy
i for i = 1; :::; k   1where Pk 1i=1 i = 1.
By Theorem 49, yi 2 P (zi; zk)) yi 2 UP ( !zi ;
 !
zk);
By Remark 51 yi 2 UP ( !zi ;
 !
zk) =) yi 2 UP ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk) for all i =
1; :::; k   1.
Since yis, as dened above, are all in UP (
 !
z1; :::;
 !
zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk) and UP (
 !
z1; :::;
 !
zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk)
is convex; any convex combination of them will also be in UP (
 !
z1; :::;
 !
zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk).
Hence, z 2 UP ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk):
4.C Checking for Polyhedrons
If z 2 P (z1; z2; :::; zk 1; zk) then z 2 UP ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk). Hence, for each alternative
z we have to check whether there exists z0 2 P ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk) : z0 e z:
The following model will be used for that purpose:
(LP5)
Max 
subject to
z0h   
 !
zkh  
k 1X
i=1
i(
 !
zi h) = 0 for h = 1; :::; p (4.21)
nX
h=1
z0h +  
nX
h=1
 !z h for n = 1; :::; p (4.22)
k 1X
i=1
i +  = 1 (4.23)
i  0 8i
  0
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Constraint sets 4.21 and 4.23 ensure that z0 2 P ( !z1; :::; !zi ; :::;
  !
zk 1;
 !
zk) and constraint set
4.22 ensures that z0 e z by ensuring (z0)  (z):
It is an LP problem with p+ k + 1 variables and 2p+ 1 constraints excluding the set
constraints.
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Chapter 5
Incorporating Balance Concerns in
Resource Allocation Decisions: A
Bi-criteria Modelling Approach
5.1 Introduction
Resource allocation (distribution) is a process by which resources (inputs) are allocated to
di¤erent entities such as activities, projects or departments [182]. The inputs are usually
allocated in a way that maximizes some output value.
A common goal in resource allocation in organizations alongside maximization of out-
put (e¢ ciency) is balance [182]. Balance can be sought in terms of various attributes
such as risk (high risk vs. sure bets), internal vs. outsourced work, distribution of resources
across industries, various markets the business is in, di¤erent project types etc. [183]. Fail-
ure to achieve a balanced portfolio is often revealed by a decision maker (DM) who claims
that there is too muchor too littleresource going to activities of a particular type.
A related concept considered in many allocation decisions is equity (fairness). However,
as we use the term, a perfectly balanced distribution is not necessarily a distribution
where each category receives the same amount. We dene balance as a more general
concept, of which equity might be considered as a special case. We assume that the DM has
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a balance distribution based on which she evaluates the balance in a given distribution. We
refer to a distribution that has the desired proportionsshown by the balance distribution
as a perfectly balanced distributioneven if this distribution gives some categories more
than the others. Equity concerns can be represented as the special case where the DMs
balance distribution gives each category an equal amount.
The contributions of the current study are as follows:
 We propose a means to handle balance concerns alongside e¢ ciency concerns in
allocation problems and hence provide a bi-criteria framework to think about trading
balance o¤ against e¢ ciency.
 We discuss ways to measure the deviation from a distribution which the DM considers
as balanced and hence dene and classify imbalance indicators.
 We propose formulations and algorithms which provide insight to the decision makers
in general resource allocation settings.
Section 5.2 discusses an example allocation setting. Section 5.3 discusses alternative
ways in which balance concerns have been handled in mathematical programming models
and provides a brief review of related works from the literature. Section 5.4 introduces
some imbalance indicators, which can be used to assess the degree of balance in a distrib-
ution. We introduce these indicators as another criterion to be optimized in the classical
maximize output setting and provide bi-criteria models in section 5.5. In section 5.6 we
discuss a way to solve the bi-criteria models and obtain nondominated solutions. We pro-
vide the results of our computational experiments on the performance of the suggested
approach in section 5.7. We also provide results for 3-criteria extensions of the approach
as well as a tabu search algorithm that can be used to solve large-sized problems. We
conclude our discussion in Section 5.8.
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5.2 The Balance Concept
Consider a setting where a DM is faced with m R&D projects and s/he will decide which
ones to initiate given an available budget, B, which typically is not su¢ cient to initiate
all projects. Each project i incurs a cost (input) ci and returns an output value bi.
Suppose that it is possible to categorize the projects into n categories (e.g. based on the
technological area or based on the department they are proposed by) and each project
belongs to one (and only one) of these categories.
Each feasible portfolio corresponds to two portfolio-related distributions: a distrib-
ution of the budget B to di¤erent project categories and a distribution that shows the
contribution of each category in terms of the output. Suppose that the DM wants to
ensure balance in one or both of these distributions as well as having a high total output
from the selected portfolio.
This is an example of an allocation problem in which the DM has concerns about
ensuring balance. In this study we provide a general framework that can be used for
many allocation problems. To have a structured discussion, we will illustrate the general
idea using this R&D project selection example and discuss possible generalizations in the
conclusion.
We distinguish the cases based on the space balance is sought, i.e. based on whether
balance is sought in the input distribution or the output distribution. Which balance con-
cept is more appropriate depends on the nature of the problem. For example in healthcare,
the policy maker may want a balanced input allocation on the grounds that people should
be responsible for their own health and the policy makers can only be responsible for
providing them with a balanced allocation of inputs. On the other hand, the policy maker
may prefer a balanced distribution of health (the output) on the grounds that health policy
should aim at equal health for all.
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5.3 Literature Review on Incorporating Balance into Mod-
els
In this section we mention some noteworthy studies that consider the balance concept in
portfolio selection and allocation decisions in an explicit way. We refer the interested reader
to [184] for a more detailed discussion on balance in project portfolio selection problems.
There is also a wide range of applications in which equity concerns are incorporated into
mathematical models, including but not limited to drug allocation [95], HIV prevention
funds allocation [14], water allocation [120], bandwidth allocation [10], workload allocation
[27] problems, and location-allocation problems in homeland defense [36].
E¢ ciency concerns are reected to the model by maximizing the total output. From
a modelling point of view, balance concerns may be handled in two ways:
 Modifying the feasible region by introducing constraints: In this approach the analyst
changes the feasible region of the problem so that the feasible allocations will ensure
a certain degree of balance.
[185] considers selecting a portfolio of solar energy projects using multiattribute pref-
erence theory. As a way of ensuring a balanced portfolio, they use lower bounds on the
number (or monetary value) of the projects of a certain type that are included in a port-
folio. Similarly, [186] uses linear programming to maximize the total technical score of
funded projects on a smoking intervention study. Balance related constraints are used
to ensure geographic equity in project proposal fundings and to ensure a spread of
changes across di¤erent quartiles of the population with respect to smoking preference
and decline in smoking rate. [187] proposes an integer programming model for selecting
and scheduling an optimal project portfolio. The balance related constraints enforce an
upper limit on the percentage of total investment made on di¤erent project categories,
such as high risk and long term projects. The authors illustrate their approach by solving
a small-size problem with 12 projects. [188] considers a multi-dimensional integer knap-
sack problem and introduces constraints to incorporate balance concerns into the model.
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The constraints are used to apply upper and lower bounds on the fraction of the resources
allocated to di¤erent project categories. The authors, however, mostly focus on the linear
programming relaxation of the integer programming formulation and hence assume that
partial resource allocation to projects is possible. [189] develops a nonlinear integer pro-
gramming model to optimize a portfolio of (possibly interdependent) product development
improvement projects over multiple periods. The projects are categorized based on the
strategic objectives that they support and balance over di¤erent objectives is ensured by
incorporating a constraint that shows the minimum number of projects from each cat-
egory. [190] discusses a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) framework to allocate
shing rights to candidates in South Africa. As part of their decision support system they
provide an integer formulation for the candidate selection problem in which balance con-
cerns are reected using constraints. These constraints ensure that the proportion of the
number of candidates selected from a designated group exceeds a minimum desired level
for this group. [183] propose a DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based methodology to
construct and evaluate balanced portfolios of R&D projects with binary interactions. As
part of their proposed methodology, they compute indices of risk, e¢ ciency and balance
for each project. They use a maximum threshold for risk index and minimal thresholds
for e¢ ciency and balance indices and screen the initial list of candidate projects. Only
the ones that satisfy the requirements set by the indices are considered further. A similar
approach is used in [191] to evaluate R&D projects in di¤erent stages of their life cycle.
[192] develop a fuzzy R&D project selection model in which balance in spending be-
tween di¤erent strategic goals is enforced in constraints. These constraints specify upper
and lower bounds on the spending for each strategic goal (see also [193]).
 Modifying the objective: In this approach the analyst increases the number of criteria
of the corresponding model; turning it into a bi/multi criteria problem. The approach
we take falls into this category. We use this approach as it is possible to observe the
trade-o¤ between di¤erent criteria by nding di¤erent solutions to the problem.
Modifying the objective typically relies on the use of a balance indicator, zI(x); which
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assigns a value that shows the level of balance in a distribution x. Using the indicator one
can dene a balance criterion along with the e¢ ciency criterion (zT (x)).
Note that if balance is considered over di¤erent aspects such as technology areas, mar-
kets etc., it is possible to use a balance indicator for each aspect and hence generate a multi
criteria model. [194], [195], [196] and [197] use multiattribute models which tackle balance
concerns over multiple attributes and then use Multiattribute Value/Multiattribute Util-
ity models to aggregate the set of attributes into a single index. One of the restrictions on
the generality of the proposed models is the assumption that the number of items in the
subset is constant. Moreover, an additive value function may not always be appropriate,
and even when it is appropriate, determining weights may not be easy.
[198] models the concern for balance as a separate set of criteria which minimize the
deviation from the ideal allocation of manpower to di¤erent project categories and also to
di¤erent client categories. With additional criteria which are not balance related, he formu-
lates a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) model for the project portfolio selection
problem. The reference point approach (see [158]) is used, which involves solving non-
linear integer programming problems subject to linear resource constraints. The approach
is used in an interactive setting. For various reasons including the technical di¢ culty due
to nonlinearity, a heuristic method is used to solve the resulting optimization problems.
The same approach is also used in [199].
As it expresses balance criteria as measures of deviation from a desired allocation,
this approach is similar to the approach used to incorporate balance in this paper. We,
however, mostly focus on a bi-criteria setting and use linear (integer) models whenever
possible. The underlying reason for this choice is the ease of presentation. The ideas
proposed here are easily generalizable to multidimensional settings where balance is desired
over multiple attributes. Balance concern for each such attribute can be reected as a
criterion to the model and appropriate multicriteria optimization or heuristic methods
can be implemented to obtain solutions. The emphasis of this paper is to introduce the
idea of balance distribution based balance indicator as a way of handling balance concerns
in an explicit and tractable way.
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Unlike [198], we do not assume an interactive setting; we rather present the DM with
a dispersed subset of nondominated portfolios. This is an alternative approach to the one
used in [198]; empirical research should be performed to see which one is more appropriate
in di¤erent problem environments. We provide graphical displays of the set of nondomi-
nated solutions which visualize the tradeo¤ between e¢ ciency and balance. These graphs
can be used as a starting point for further discussion with decision makers.
We also provide an explicit link between inequality measurement literature by making
an analogy between the perfect balance line and the perfect equality line. This will be
explained in detail in the next section. We discuss di¤erent indicators that can be used
to assess imbalance. Our solution approach allows one to incorporate di¤erent imbalance
indicators into the same model and hence observe the tradeo¤ between them.
5.4 Imbalance Indicators
In this section we propose imbalance indicators that measure how di¤erent a distribution
is from an ideally balanced distribution. The indicators rely on a balance distribution
which is provided by the DM. This balance distribution shows how the DM would allocate
a certain amount of the input/output across the categories involved. This might be for
example, the status quo or previous years allocation.
We will use the following terminology and notation to frame our discussion:
We refer to the entities over which the balance is sought as categories. J = f1; 2; :::; ng
is the set of the categories. The vector x 2 Rm is used to show the decision vector
related to input allocation. Note that m is not necessarily equal to n unless we make
explicit allocation decisions to categories themselves. For example, in the project selection
problem m is the number of projects and x is the corresponding binary decision vector
and we expect n < m unless each project is considered as a di¤erent category.
x can be continuous or discrete and includes the decision variables which dictate the
input allocation to categories (this dictation can be indirect as in the project selection
problem: in that case, x shows the portfolio of projects, from which we can infer the
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allocation to categories). Any function dened over the input allocation is a function of
the decision vector x. Let a(x) 2 Rn be the distribution over which the balance is sought,
hence it can either show the input or the output distribution to categories.
We denote the balance distribution of either input or output by r 2 Rn where rj is the
amount allocated to category j in the balance distribution. Which of these (input/output)
is intended will be clear from context. For notational simplicity we will normalize the
balance distribution so as to obtain balance shares (proportions) for each category. Let
us denote the balance share of category j as j . By denition j = rj=
P
j2J rj . Hence,
 2 Rn is the balance distribution in terms of shares.
Suppose that given , we want to assess how balanced a distribution a(x) is. Using ;
we can obtain a target point r(x) as follows: r(x)j = j 
P
j2J a(x)j :One can think of the
elements of r(x) 2 Rn as target (desired) amounts for the di¤erent categories involved.
We denote the componentwise deviations of the distribution a(x) from the correspond-
ing r(x) as d(x)j 8j 2 J . That is, d(x)j = ja(x)j   r(x)j j =
a(x)j   j Pj2J a(x)j
8j 2 J:
Figure 5.1 visualizes componentwise deviations in a 2 dimensional environment. Note
that except r, all the terms are functions of the input allocation x. d1 and d2 are the
componentwise distances of point a to the inated balance point.
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Figure 5.1: Distances from the balance point in 2D
It does not seem appropriate to capture balance using a distance measure from the
balance distribution itself (r). The rescaling of r, i.e. generating r(x), is necessary to
obtain an appropriate evaluation. Consider, for example, the case where r = (1; 2), that
is the DM considers (1; 2) as a balanced distribution, and we want to assess how balanced
distribution a(x) = (2; 4) is. Using just a distance measure would mislead us by concluding
that (2; 4) is not balanced (as the componentwise absolute deviations between (1; 2) and
(2; 4) are not equal to zero). However if (1; 2) is balanced, it would seem natural to suppose
that (2; 4) is also balanced. This is clearly seen when we rescale r = (1; 2) with respect
to (2; 4). We nd r(x) = (1=3; 2=3)a(x) = (2; 4). Since a(x) = r(x), the componentwise
deviations are all zero hence we capture that a(x) has perfect balance. That is why, we
avoid using just a distance measure from the given balance distribution to account for
balance and instead generate a balance line based on the balance distribution.
The intuition behind our approach generalizes the perfect equality line concept used in
inequality measurement theory ([127]). The perfect equality line consists of points whose
143
CHAPTER 5. INCORPORATING BALANCE CONCERNS IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION DECISIONS: A BI-CRITERIA MODELLING APPROACH
components are equal in all dimensions, i.e, it consists of the distributions where everyone
gets the same income. Despite being di¤erent in the total income, all points on this line
are considered to have perfect equality, i.e. zero inequality. Similarly, we derive a line
of perfect balance passing through the origin and the balance point (see Figure 5.1) and
derive our balance indicators accordingly.
We now dene the four imbalance indicators as follows.
Indicator 1: The total proportional deviation from the target.
I1(x) =
P
j2J d(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
=
P
j2J
a(x)j   j Pj2J a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
=
X
j2J
j a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
  j j
This is the sum of the absolute di¤erences between the actual share and the desired
share for each category. Taken in its input oriented sense, this indicator is the fraction of
input which is misallocated. Taking the proportional deviation also implies the following:
of two alternative distributions with the same total absolute distance from the balance
line, the one that has a larger sum will have a smaller imbalance value, hence will be
favoured. Special cases of I1(x) where the balance distribution is the one with perfect
equality, i.e., each category receives an equal share, have been used in the literature (e.g.,
in [111]).
Indicator 2: The maximum proportional deviation from the target. Unlike I1(x) this
indicator focuses only on the worst-o¤ deviation.
I2(x) =
Maxj2Jfd(x)jgP
j2J a(x)j
= Maxj2J j a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
  j j
Indicator 3: The total componentwise proportional deviation. Compared to the rst
two indicators this is a more individual oriented measure as it is the sum of fractional
misallocations to each party.
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I3(x) =
X
j2J
d(x)j
r(x)j
=
X
j2J
a(x)j   j Pj2J a(x)j
j 
P
j2J a(x)j
=
X
j2J
1
j
j a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
  j j
This measure is a weighted sum of the absolute di¤erences between the actual share
and the desired share for each category where weight for category j is 1j . This allows one
to penalize the deviations from the categories that are already assigned a low target share
value. We note that for this measure to be meaningful, one should have j > 0 for all j.
Indicator 4: The maximum proportional deviation from the corresponding target
value over all elements of the distribution. Unlike I3(x) this indicator focuses only on the
worst-o¤ deviation.
I4(x) = Max
j2J
fd(x)j
r(x)j
g = Max
j2J
f 1
j
j a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
  j jg
Which indicator one chooses to use, might have material signicance for the solutions
which are bi-criteria e¢ cient in the biobjective formulations. However, when n is low as
in Proposition 53, whichever indicator one chooses, one will get the same ordering and
thus the same e¢ cient frontier. Hence in this case, which indicator one chooses does not
matter: one can choose any indicator and be condent of getting the same result.
Proposition 53 For n  3 we have I1(x) = 2  I2(x). Moreover when n = 2 the four
indices provide us with the same order. That is, for any two distributions x1 and x2 where
n = 2 (that is a(x1); a(x2) 2 R2), the following holds: I1(x1)  I1(x2) () I2(x1) 
I2(x
2) () I3(x1)  I3(x2) () I4(x1)  I4(x2):
Proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 54 In general, Proposition 53 no longer holds for I1(x); I3(x); I4(x) and I2(x);
I3(x); I4(x) in problems where n > 2. As for I1(x) and I2(x) it no longer holds when
n > 3:
Proof is provided in Appendix A.
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Table 5.1 summarizes the classication of the imbalance indicators.
Table 5.1: Imbalance indicators
Imbalance Indicators
ObjectivenFocus Collective Individual Oriented
Sum I1(x) =
P
j2J d(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
I3(x) =
P
j2J
d(x)j
r(x)j
Bottleneck I2(x) =
Maxj2Jfd(x)jgP
j2J a(x)j
I4(x) = Max
j2J
fd(x)jr(x)j g
5.5 Bi-criteria Models
In this section we develop bi-criteria models for allocation problems with objectives of
maximizing total output and minimizing an imbalance indicator.
Although all the models we discuss are based on the same general idea, they di¤er
in technical aspects depending on the problem type, i.e., based on whether the alloca-
tion is discrete or continuous and whether the balance is sought in the output or input
distribution.
For our project selection problem we provide mixed integer formulations for the bi-
criteria models, which exploit the fact that the decision variables are 0-1 variables to tackle
nonlinearity due to the imbalance indicators.
We rst provide a complete analysis for the case the DM desires a balanced input
distribution as this problem naturally arises in many situations. It is straightforward to
develop models for the case where a balanced output distribution is desired when we have
a discrete setting.
5.5.1 Discrete Allocation
The general method proposed in this paper is applicable to di¤erent combinatorial prob-
lems that can be formulated as a binary integer problem (BIP), like some location prob-
lems. We use project selection problems as an example.
Consider the project selection problem discussed in Section 2. Suppose that the DM
wants to have a portfolio where input is allocated to di¤erent project types in a balanced
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way and gives an example input allocation r 2 Rn, which he considers balanced. The
corresponding proportional allocation is denoted as  2 Rn as before.
We use an m n incidence matrix G with elements gij for i 2 I and j 2 J as follows:
gij =
1 if project i belongs to category j
0 otherwise
The binary variable associated with each project is as follows:
xi =
1 if project i is initiated
0 otherwise
for i 2 I
Note that we seek balance in the input space and a(x)j =
P
i2I
cigijxi for all j 2 J;
that is, the input allocated to a certain category is the sum of the costs of the initiated
projects in that category. In what follows, we assume that at least one of the projects will
be initiated in a feasible solution. We also have
P
j2J a(x)j =
P
i2I cixi.
We now provide an example model that uses the indicator I1(x) as the second objective.
For the project selection problem I1(x) is as follows:
I1(x) =
P
j2J
j Pj2J a(x)j   a(x)jP
j2J a(x)j
=
P
j2J
P
i2I jcixi  
P
i2I cigijxi
P
i2I cixi
:
We have the following model where we use variables ZT and ZI to denote zT (x) and zI(x),
respectively.
Max fZT ; ZIg (5.1a)
s:t:
X
i2I
cixi  B (5.1b)
ZT =
X
i2I
bixi (5.1c)
ZI =
P
j2J
P
i2I jcixi  
P
i2I cigijxi
P
i2I cixi
(5.1d)
xi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 I (5.1e)
The above model is nonlinear due to constraint set 5.1d. We linearize it by introducing
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auxiliary variables dj ; yj and tj and obtain the following MIP model (See [200] and [201]
for more information on such linearizations):
Model 1
Max fZT ; ZIg (5.2a)
s:t:
X
i2I
cixi  B (5.2b)
ZT =
X
i2I
bixi (5.2c)
X
i2I
ci(j   gij)xi  dj 8j 2 J (5.2d)
X
i2I
ci(gij   j)xi  dj 8j 2 J (5.2e)
dj  
X
i2I
ci(j   gij)xi  2  dUB  yj 8j 2 J (5.2f)
dj  
X
i2I
ci(gij   j)xi  2  dUB  (1  yj) 8j 2 J (5.2g)
ZLBI xi  ti  ZUBI xi 8i 2 I (5.2h)
ZLBI (1  xi)  ZI   ti  ZUBI (1  xi) 8i 2 I (5.2i)X
j2J
dj =
X
i2I
citi (5.2j)
xi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 I (5.2k)
yj 2 f0; 1g 8j 2 J (5.2l)
ti  0 8i 2 I (5.2m)
Constraint set 5.2b ensures that the total budget is not exceeded and the constraint
set 5.2c denes ZT , total output of the portfolio. We dene new variables djs that show
the absolute distances, i.e. dj =
P
i2I ci(j   gij)xi
 8i. Constraint sets 5.2d, 5.2e, 5.2f,
5.2g and auxiliary binary variables (yjs) are used to dene the absolute distances (djs)
and tackle the nonlinearity due to the absolute function. dUB is an upper bound for
148
CHAPTER 5. INCORPORATING BALANCE CONCERNS IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION DECISIONS: A BI-CRITERIA MODELLING APPROACH
the continuous dj variables. We use the same upper bound for all the dj variables and
calculate the bound as follows: dUB =
P
i2I ci: Constraint sets 5.2h, 5.2i and 5.2j are used
to tackle the nonlinearity due to the ratio terms in the denition of ZI (see constraint set
5.1d) as follows: In constraint set 5.1d we have
P
j2J dj = ZI 
P
i2I cixi =
P
i2I ciZIxi.
We dene auxiliary continuous variables ti such that ti = ZI  xi 8i 2 I hence obtain
constraint set 5.2j. Constraint sets 5.2h and 5.2i ensure that ti = ZI  xi 8i hold. ZUBI
and ZLBI are upper and lower bound parameters for ZI , respectively. From the denition
of ZI , ZLBI = 0. We dene Z
UB
I as follows: Z
UB
I = n  dUB=Mini fcig.
Model 1 has 2m+2n+2 variables and 2m+4n+3 constraints excluding set constraints.
Remark 55 dUB is an upper bound for all dj.
Proof. dj =
P
i2I ci(j   gij)xi
 = Pi2I ci jj   gij jxi. Since both 0  j  1 8j and
0  gij  1 8i; j we have jj   gij j  1. Hence
P
i2I ci(j   gij)xi
  Pi2I cixi P
i2I ci.
It is possible to include additional constraints in cases where certain projects are mutu-
ally exclusive for some underlying technical reasons. We note that these are easily handled
computationally, hence for ease of presentation we do not include such constraints into
the formulation explicitly. The models involving I2(x); I3(x) and I4(x) are very similar
hence are provided in Appendix B.
It is straightforward to develop models for the case where a balanced output distri-
bution is desired when we have a discrete setting. The model will be the same except
the following: We use bi instead of ci in constraint sets 5.2d, 5.2e, 5.2f, 5.2g and 5.2j and
change dUB and ZUBI accordingly.
5.5.2 Continuous Allocation
Suppose that a DM should decide how to allocate a given input B among m projects
but this time the allocation can be performed in a continuous manner. We use the same
notation as in the discrete case with a di¤erence in the decision variable and output
denition.
149
CHAPTER 5. INCORPORATING BALANCE CONCERNS IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION DECISIONS: A BI-CRITERIA MODELLING APPROACH
Let xi be the allocated input to project i and let fi(xi) be the resulting output.
The input allocated to category j denoted as a(x)j is a linear function of x such that
a(x)j =
P
i2I
gijxi for all j 2 J . In such cases the total input allocation is always B, i.e.,P
j2J a(x)j = B. Note that the properties of the production functions fi(xi) will a¤ect
the complexity of the problem and the resulting models may be di¢ cult to solve when e.g.
these functions are nonlinear. However, if production functions are concave it is possible
to use piecewise linearization and obtain a linear problem as we show in the example in
the next section.
Recall that the indicators in the discrete setting have decision variables in the denomi-
nator and hence require linearization. As Remark ?? shows the balance criterion no longer
requires such linearization in the input oriented continuous setting.
Remark 56 For the continuous allocation the indicators (I1(x),I2(x),I3(x) and I4(x)) in
the input oriented setting reduce to linear functions of deviations.
Proof. Given a balance resource distribution , I1(x) is as follows: I1(x) =
P
j2J jjB a(x)j j
B =P
j2J d(x)j
B . Hence minimizing I1(x) is equivalent to minimizing
P
j2J d(x)j . Similarly, it
is possible to show that minimizing I2(x); I3(x) and I4(x) are equivalent to minimizing
Max
j2J
fd(x)jg,
P
j2J
Q
i 6=j
id(x)j , andMax
j
fQ
i 6=j
id(x)jg, respectively. Also note that one does
not need the auxiliary binary variables (e.g. yjs in model 1) to linearize the nonlinear-
ity due to the absolute function as we directly minimize linear functions of the absolute
distances.
5.6 Solution Approach
Our models are bi-criteria versions of the knapsack problem. In the discrete case knapsack
problem is considered to be a nondeterministic polynomial-time hard (NP-hard) problem
([202]).
We dene set Z as follows: Z = f(ZT ; ZI) : ZT = zT (x) and ZI = zI(x); x 2 Xg:
Denition 57 For two points (ZT ; ZI) and (Z 0T ; Z
0
I), (ZT ; ZI) dominates (Z
0
T ; Z
0
I) if
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ZT  Z 0T and ZI  Z 0I with strict inequality holding at least once.
Denition 58 A point (ZT ; ZI) is nondominated and the corresponding solution (x) is
e¢ cient if there is no other point in Z that dominates it.
We call all the nondominated solutions for a problem the nondominated set.
We use the epsilon constraint method to obtain nondominated (/e¢ cient) solutions
for the bi-criteria problems considered here. This method is based on sequentially solving
single objective problems in which the value of the second objective is controlled using a
constraint (see [203] and [204] for a discussion of the epsilon constraint method).
The general algorithm is as follows (note that lex max refers to lexicographic maxi-
mization).
Step 0. Solve lex max (zT (x); zI(x))
s.t. x 2 X
Let the optimal value for zI(x) be ZI
Step 1. If ZI  ZLBI Stop.
Otherwise, set k = ZI   Stepsize:
Step 2. Solve lex max (zT (x); zI(x))
s.t. x 2 X
zI(x)  k
Let the optimal value for zI(x) be ZI
Go to Step 1.
When the objective function values are integer, it is possible to generate all nondomi-
nated points with this method. In this paper we use the method to generate a subset of
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the nondominated set as our objective function values are not necessarily integer. We rst
generate the solution that has the maximum output (ZT ) value and obtain a nondominated
solution at each iteration until we generate the one that has the minimum imbalance (ZI)
value. We use a parameter Stepsize to control the maximum di¤erence between two con-
secutively generated nondominated points in terms of their imbalance values. The smaller
the Stepsize, the higher the number of nondominated solutions found. On the other hand,
the higher the computational time is. Note that it is also possible to modify the algorithm
such that it starts with the solution that has the minimum imbalance and moves toward
the ones with higher total output values by controlling zT (x) by a constraint.
5.6.1 An Example Problem
We now provide a real life example for the input oriented discrete case based on data
given to us by a public sector agency whose R&D portfolio selection problem provided the
immediate motivation for the current work. The problem is a project selection problem
subject to the available budget. The cost and value gures for each project are tabulated
below (see Table 5.2). The values are a weighted average of performances of each project
over multiple criteria. Note that the projects are of three types and the cost values are
normalized to protect condentiality. The budget and value correspond to input and
output, respectively.
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Table 5.2: Data for the example problem
Project Project Cost Overall Project Project Cost Overall
Index Type Value Index Type Value
1 Type 1 0.19 1.39 21 Type 2 0.88 1.71
2 Type 1 0.16 1.13 22 Type 2 0.86 1.34
3 Type 1 0.30 1.67 23 Type 3 0.05 2.15
4 Type 1 0.29 1.48 24 Type 3 0.18 2.47
5 Type 1 0.55 2.13 25 Type 3 0.16 1.96
6 Type 1 0.57 1.43 26 Type 3 0.31 3.42
7 Type 1 0.96 1.50 27 Type 3 0.43 3.92
8 Type 1 0.99 1.44 28 Type 3 0.42 3.42
9 Type 1 0.74 0.99 29 Type 3 0.42 2.97
10 Type 1 0.67 0.85 30 Type 3 0.33 2.29
11 Type 2 0.21 3.13 31 Type 3 0.37 1.67
12 Type 2 0.28 2.52 32 Type 3 0.59 2.60
13 Type 2 0.28 2.11 33 Type 3 0.42 1.79
14 Type 2 0.40 2.43 34 Type 3 0.96 4.08
15 Type 2 0.24 1.49 35 Type 3 0.54 2.11
16 Type 2 0.58 2.91 36 Type 3 0.54 2.08
17 Type 2 0.95 3.15 37 Type 3 0.90 3.25
18 Type 2 0.89 2.82 38 Type 3 0.75 2.20
19 Type 2 0.91 2.47 39 Type 3 0.81 2.06
20 Type 2 0.61 1.57
Suppose that the agency has a budget (total input) of 9.31 units, which is about 45% of
the total cost of all the projects available. Given this budget, the portfolio that maximizes
the total output has a total output of 59.32 and requires an input of 9.2 units. The
allocation of this total input to the three type of projects are 1.49 units, 1.99 units, 5.72
units, for types 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Suppose that the DM considers an input allocation that has equal percentages as
balanced. That is, in a perfectly balanced portfolio the total amount allocated to each
project type should be 33% of the overall input.
For explanatory purposes we will use one of the indicators, I3(x), and show the port-
folios obtained by solving the corresponding bi-criteria problems. A subset of the e¢ cient
portfolios obtained using I3(x) using Stepsize of 0.05 are visualized in Figure 5.2. The
gure shows 13 portfolios each of which is obtained through one iteration of the algorithm.
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Figure 5.2: Solutions obtained using I3(x)
The rst portfolio is the one that gives the maximum total output and type 3 projects
are allocated more input than the other two types in this portfolio. It is seen that in
each new solution the algorithm returns a portfolio where the three types are closer in
input usage. In the rst iterations, balance is increased via increasing the input allocation
to type 2 projects. As we restrict the solution to become more and more balanced, the
allocation to type 1 projects increases. One can also see the amount of sacrice from
e¢ ciency (total output) by moving towards more balanced portfolios in Figure 5.3, which
is the total output vs. imbalance graph.
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Figure 5.3: E¢ ciency vs. balance
The epsilon constraint approach allows us to visit the whole nondominated set in
a uniform way, i.e., we provide representative portfolios for di¤erent parts of the whole
nondominated set. Seeing such a uniform subset of the nondominated set has advantages in
terms of clarity and transparency. The results show the tradeo¤between the e¢ ciency and
balance criteria. For example, moving from the rst solution to the second one sacrices
from e¢ ciency around 0.8% and this increases balance around 20%. On the other hand, it
is seen that as we restrict the solution to become more and more balanced, the e¢ ciency
sacrice that we have to make may increase signicantly. In addition to seeing the tradeo¤
between the two criteria, one can have more information about the solution structure. A
quick review would give us an idea about the more powerful projects, the ones that
occur in most of the nondominated solutions. In the above example we observed that the
projects 1,3,4,5; 11,16; and 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 are included in most of the portfolios.
As a way of simplifying the decision making process, these projects can be xed and the
others might be analyzed in more detail.
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Figure 5.4: Di¤erent balance points
We have also generated solutions by using I1(x), I2(x) and I4(x) using a Stepsize of
0.05. We observed a similar trend as in Figure 5.2.
It is also possible to use other balance distributions and see the resulting solutions.
Figure 5.4 (a)-(d) show the rst 10 solutions obtained using the balance distributions
(33, 33, 33); (60, 20, 20); (20, 20, 60); (20, 60, 20) respectively with I3(x). Note that
in the third case we report only 4 solutions as these were the only solutions obtained
using a Stepsize of 0.05 in the algorithm. This is because the output maximizing solution
already has low imbalance with respect to the given balance distribution. No signicant
adjustment was necessary in this case.
As another example, we consider a linearized version of the above problem to analyze
the case where we have continuous allocations. We assume that the production functions
fi(xi) are concave of the form fi(xi) = si  xii for all i. We generate si and i values
from uniform distributions U(0; 5) and U(0; 0:5), respectively. We solve the problem using
piecewise linear approximation for the concave production functions. Figure 5.5 shows a
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Figure 5.5: Continuous case using I3(x) with balance distribution (0.33,0.33,0.33)
set of e¢ cient allocations which are obtained setting Stepsize to 0.1. One can clearly see
that we move to more balanced allocations towards the end of the spectrum. Also note
that unlike the discrete case, all of the allocations have the same total input value. The
tradeo¤ between the two criteria is clearly seen in Figure 5.6, which shows the total output
value vs. imbalance value for this continuous case.
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Figure 5.6: E¢ ciency vs. balance in the continuous case
5.7 Computational Study
In this part we discuss the computational aspects of the recommended epsilon constraint
approach by providing the results of an experimental study. For the experimental study
we again use the project selection problem. The aim of this section is to see the size of
problems for which we can obtain a subset of the nondominated solutions to present the
DM in reasonable time, using the formulations developed in the previous sections of this
paper.
We consider the (discrete) project portfolio selection problem where m and n denote
the number of projects and the number of project categories, respectively. As in [204] the
output (bi) and the input (ci) values are randomly generated integers between 10 and 100.
We set B = 0:5
P
ci. We start with m =50 increasing in increments of 50. As for n, we
use 3 and 5. For each m and n combination, we generate 10 problem instances.
We use the (adaptive) epsilon constraint approach discussed in [204], which is a gen-
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eralization of the scheme we discussed in section 6 for arbitrary numbers of objectives.
The algorithms are coded in Visual C++ and solved by a dual core (Intel Core i5 2.27
GHz) computer with 4 GB RAM. The optimal solutions are found by CPLEX 12.2. The
solution times are expressed in central processing unit (CPU) seconds. We set a time limit
of 1 hour for the execution of the epsilon constraint approach.
We rst discuss the results for problems where we seek balance in the input space as
in our experience most applications involve concerns about ensuring balance in the input
distribution to categories. In most cases we report the results for the models using I3
(I3(x)) as the imbalance indicator. That is because I3 is likely to be computationally
more complex than the others. We also report results for the cases where we introduce 2
imbalance indicators, in which case we use I3 and I2 (I2(x)) as the two indicators. The
balance distributions (r) are taken as (50; 30; 20) and (50; 30; 20; 10; 80) for the n = 3 and
n = 5 settings, respectively. Hence  is (0:5; 0:3; 0:2) and (0:26; 0:16; 0:11; 0:05; 0:42) for
these two settings.
We ran extensive experiments and we show a sample of the more interesting results
in Table 5.3. In this table we report the average and maximum values for solution times
and number of calls to CPLEX. We also report the average and minimum number of non-
dominated solutions (jNDj) returned by the algorithm. Note that the number of instances
for which the algorithm could not terminate in 1 hour are indicated in parenthesis for the
settings where the maximum solution time is 3600 seconds and these settings are reported
in italics. The table also reports the value of the parameter Stepsize, which is used to
adjust the right hand side of the constraint restricting the criterion value that is treated
in the constraint for the bi-criteria problems. We report results for problems with a single
type of input (indicated as Inp=1) and with two types of inputs (indicated as Inp=2).
For the instances where we obtain the nondominated set we set the optimality gap
() to 0.01% for CPLEX. We optimize the model that minimizes the imbalance while
restricting the total output value with a constraint. As we assume integer values for the
total output, setting Stepsize to 1 ensures that none of the nondominated points is missed.
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Table 5.3: Performance results for the epsilon constraint approach
Inp=1
CPU Time jNDj Stepsize Calls to CPLEX
Criteria Gap m n Avg Max Avg Min Avg Max Avg Max
2 0 50 3 363.92 930.81 64 31 1.0 1.0 128 219
5 2024.80 3600 (1) 103 70 1.0 1.0 207 283
0.01 50 3 4.31 13.61 13 5 9.9 15.9 27 37
5 39.65 249.96 10 5 50.1 56.5 21 45
100 3 6.46 10.70 15 8 13.1 29.3 30 39
5 831.51 3600 (2) 16 2 53.1 95.0 40 51
150 3 8.04 11.78 16 13 16.3 24.8 33 43
0.05 50 3 0.69 0.98 7 4 9.9 15.9 14 19
5 3.98 16.07 6 3 50.1 56.5 14 21
100 3 1.94 3.77 10 4 13.1 29.3 21 41
5 10.01 24.21 12 5 44.4 57.1 26 39
150 3 3.88 5.48 12 6 16.3 24.8 25 39
5 25.15 74.90 15 9 55.4 81.6 31 43
50 3 1.24 1.86 11 8 1.0 1.0 24 37
5 20.68 46.29 35 22 1.0 1.0 71 103
100 3 4.31 6.53 20 5 1.0 1.0 40 69
5 94.50 271.34 70 26 1.0 1.0 142 257
150 3 8.82 14.97 26 15 1.0 1.0 53 95
5 181.16 664.59 77 23 1.0 1.0 154 333
3 0.01 50 3 10.11 30.51 10 2 - - 62 136
5 332.66 1060.22 40 8 - - 261 779
100 3 49.27 372.90 11 2 - - 56 84
5 2507.664 3600 (4) 65 9 - - 426 785
0.05 50 3 6.21 38.75 8 1 - - 47 83
5 612.30 3311.74 31 7 - - 190 444
100 3 7.93 11.36 9 3 - - 60 83
5 461.85 3600 (1) 29 9 - - 163 286
150 3 12.09 23.48 7 2 - - 55 100
5 395.25 1363.90 40 9 - - 224 585
Inp=2
3 0.05 50 3 138.80 1230.46 21 3 - - 97 263
5 2885.29 3600 (7) 84 11 - - 992 2095
100 3 23.44 143.64 15 4 - - 87 342
5 3253.64 3600 (9) 61 4 - - 328 328
150 3 15.02 31.25 9 5 - - 51 84
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As seen from Table 5.3 the cardinality of the nondominated set and the solution time
required to solve the single-objective subproblems increase as the number of categories
increases. These results also indicate that for larger problems, the size of the nondominated
set or the solution time of the single-objective subproblems may be prohibitively large to
allow us to obtain the whole nondominated frontier in reasonable time. However, in
many cases presenting a large number of solutions to the decision maker may be neither
necessary nor desirable. We rather suggest obtaining a moderate number of solutions
which approximate the nondominated solutions and spread over the nondominated region
in a uniform way.
To determine an appropriate Stepsize value we nd the two nondominated solutions
at the two ends of the nondominated frontier: The solution that has the largest ZT value
and the solution that has the smallest ZI value. These solutions provide us the maximum
and minimum total output values in the nondominated set: ZTMax = MaxfZT : (ZT ; ZI)
2 Zg and ZTMin = MinfZT : (ZT ; ZI) 2 Zg, respectively. We set Stepsize = (ZTMax  
ZTMin)=40. We solve the single objective sub-problems with a predened optimality gap
; hence nd approximate nondominated solutions with a worst case quality guarantee.
We report the results in Table 5.3. We also report results for  = 5% case with a xed
Stepsize value of 1.
The results indicate that the solution times increase as n increases for xedm although
the number of solutions returned decreases or stays similar. It indicates that the single
objective subproblems become more di¢ cult when n increases. For xed n, the solution
times and the average number of solutions increase as we increasem. As expected, increas-
ing the optimality gap parameter () leads to a decrease in solution times. The number
of calls to CPLEX also decreases as  increases, this is because the algorithm starts with
a solution that has larger imbalance values and hence returns solutions which lie at the
center of the frontier.
We next perform experiments for 3-criteria problems where there is a single input and
there are 2 di¤erent indicators. For these experiments we use I2 (collective-bottleneck
indicator) and I3 (individual oriented-sum indicator) as the two additional criteria to the
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total output criterion. We express the two imbalance criteria in the form of constraints
and set the corresponding Stepsize values as 0:05 and 0:5 for I2 and I3, respectively.
It is possible to observe the e¤ect of the number of categories (n) to the solution times.
The e¤ect of the number of projects on solution times does not seem to be as predictable
as the e¤ect of the number of categories. In some settings we even observe smaller solution
times as m gets larger for xed n.
We also note that the correlation coe¢ cient between the values of the indicators I2
and I3 is quite high: it is between 0.8 and 0.96 for all settings. This indicates that for
most cases if a portfolio has a high I2 value, it is likely to have a high I3 value as well.
As expected, highest correlation is observed for the settings with n = 3 categories. This
is because, for such cases if the worst-o¤ category has high deviation from the target it
is likely that the sum of all deviations will be high as well. As the number of categories
increases the e¤ect of the worst-o¤ value to the total deviation decreases, resulting in
di¤erences between sum-oriented and bottleneck-oriented indicators.
Finally, we consider the case where there are two inputs. In this setting the projects
consume two inputs and return a single output. The output and input values are randomly
generated integers between 10 and 100, as before. The resulting model is a 3-criteria
model, where we have the total output criteria and two imbalance criteria corresponding
to the distributions of the two inputs over project categories. We report the results of our
experiments in Table 5.3 for  = 5%, where we use I3 as the imbalance indicator. The
two imbalance criteria are incorporated in the form of constraints with the same Stepsize
values of 0:5.
It is seen from Table 5.3 that the solution times and the number of solutions increase
considerably when the number of categories increases. Moreover, as there are two di¤erent
inputs, the correlation between the values of the imbalance indicator that correspond to
distributions of these two inputs is expected to decrease compared to the previous 3-criteria
instances. The correlation coe¢ cients were between 0.46 and 0.78 for the all the settings.
Our computational results indicate that the heuristic version of the epsilon constraint
approach with appropriate Stepsize and optimality gap parameters can be used for small
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to medium-size problems. We observe that the solution times tend to increase signicantly
as the number of categories increases. For large-size problems with more than 150 projects
di¤erent heuristic algorithms can be employed to obtain solutions in reasonable time.
We have also attempted to obtain nondominated solutions for problems for which the
imbalance criterion is dened over the output distribution to categories. We observe that
these problems are harder to solve. Even for the smallest problems considered (m=50,
n=3) the epsilon-constraint based heuristic with 5% optimality gap fails to return solutions
in 1 hour for some instances. To obtain solutions to these problems in reasonable time
heuristic algorithms can be explored. One such approach is described here and some
preliminary results are provided.
We designed a tabu search (TS) heuristic that starts with the solution that maximizes
the total output. Using this initial feasible solution, we try to nd solutions with improved
balance values by searching its neighborhood. Given a solution, we search its neighbor-
hood by switching the status of the projects in a pairwise manner. That is, for each pair
of projects one of which is in the portfolio and the other is not, we exclude the former and
include the latter if such an interchange is feasible. We calculate the potential improve-
ment in balance for each such move, and perform the move that leads to the maximum
improvement. We terminate when the number of non-improving moves reaches to 250 or
number of the iterations reaches to 1000. We set tabu tenure to 50, i.e., we do not undo a
selected move for the next 50 iterations. We use aspiration criterion as the best solution,
i.e., tabu status of the moves that improve the best solution is overridden. We keep the
candidate solutions in a set called incumbent set.
The TS algorithm executes to improve the ZI value. Meanwhile we keep track of
the corresponding ZT values and update the incumbent set whenever we nd an eligible
solution, i.e., a solution which is non-dominated by the incumbent set.
Our experiments showed that the TS has satisfactory performance in terms of solution
quality and computational time. We now report computational results for TS. As it was
not possible to obtain the exact nondominated set for the case where we seek balance in
the output space we report the performance of the TS algorithm for the input-oriented
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Figure 5.7: TS algorithm vs. ECM for a problem with m=50 n=3
case. Figure 5.7 shows the solutions obtained by the TS algorithm and the (exact) epsilon
constraint method (ECM) in an example instance for m=50 n=3 case. As seen the TS
approximates the nondominated set quite well.
We also compared TS with our (heuristic) epsilon constraint method (ECM) with 1%
optimality gap (ECM(1%)) with variable Stepsize values (As reported in Table 5.3). In
terms of solution time TS massively outperforms ECM as it takes less than 2 seconds for
TS to return a set of candidate solutions even for the largest problem instances considered
as opposed to 363 seconds for ECM. However, the TS method clearly does not give guar-
antees of optimality and so knowing how good the generated solutions are in general is
problematic. To assess the quality of solutions returned by the algorithms in this particu-
lar case, we use three performance metrics, namely P, D1 and D2. We denote the solutions
returned by the TS or the heuristic ECM as the ANS (approximate nondominated set). P
is the percentage of exact non-dominated objective vectors returned by the TS (or heuristic
ECM). D1 and D2 give information about the average and maximum distances between
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of ECM (Heuristic) and TS for an instance with average distance
values
the points of the nondominated set and the points in set ANS, respectively (See [205] for
the formulations of these metrics).
Table 5.4 shows the results. To give an idea about the scale of the distance metric
we provide a graphical display of the solutions returned by the algorithms for an example
instance which has the average distance values for both TS and ECM. For this instance
TS has values of 0.07 and 0.13 and ECM(1%) has 0.01 and 0.03 for distance metrics D1
and D2, respectively.
As seen from the Table 5.4 and Figure 5.8, ECM outperforms the TS but the perfor-
mance of TS algorithm is still satisfactory for these problems.
Table 5.4: Performance results for TS and ECM with 1% optimality gap
P D1 D2
m n Algorithm Avg Min Avg Max Avg Max
50 3 TS 1.18 0 0.06 0.1 0.13 0.22
ECM (1%) 1.69 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
50 5 TS 0.68 0 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.24
ECM (1%) 13.83 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13
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Figure 5.9: TS algorithm vs ECM with 5% optimality gap
For the output case we were unable to obtain the (approximate) nondominated set
in reasonable time using the epsilon constraint approach with 5% optimality gap. Figure
5.9 shows the results of the ECM with 5% optimality gap and TS for an example in-
stance where m=50 and n=3. We leave a detailed comparative study of di¤erent solution
approaches for the output-oriented case to future research.
We observe that the TS algorithm returns a set of good solutions in negligible time for
the input-oriented cases. For the output-oriented case the algorithm nds a set of solutions
in negligible time. We have also done some explorations to extend the TS algorithm
for multicriteria problems and observed that the solution times are negligible. However,
further research should focus on generating a diverse set of solutions for multicriteria
cases using algorithms that are computationally e¢ cient. We hope this interesting and
challenging question stimulates further research.
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5.8 Conclusion
Allocation problems include a wide range of applications where inputs are allocated to
entities so as to maximize the total output. Taking our motivation from various real life
cases where a balanced (input/ output) distribution over categories is considered important
as well as total output maximization we provide a framework to trade balance o¤ against
e¢ ciency in such problems.
We dene and categorize balance distribution based (im)balance indicators and show
a way to incorporate these measures into the mathematical formulations of di¤erent al-
location problems. We propose bi-criteria modelling by introducing balance as another
criterion to the model alongside the total output criterion. We discuss an approach to
obtain a subset of nondominated solutions. The solutions obtained are distributed over
the entire nondominated set in a uniform way and range from the solution that has the
maximum total output to the solution that has maximum balance.
We illustrate the approach by solving a real life project selection problem. Consider-
ing balance explicitly as another criterion and showing a subset of the e¢ cient solutions
to the DM has many advantages like bringing transparency to decisions and facilitating
communication with the stakeholders. The generated graphs can help to initialize a struc-
tured discussion on balance. Observing how much one has to sacrice to get closer to an
ideally balanced distribution can provide justication for the decisions made for the nal
allocation.
We discuss the performance of the epsilon constraint approach by providing experimen-
tal results for larger bi-criteria and 3-criteria project selection problems. We are able to
obtain a subset of (approximate) nondominated solutions that spread uniformly over the
nondominated frontier, hence represent di¤erent regions of the frontier. We also suggest
a TS approach for large-size problems and those with output-oriented imbalance criteria.
We provide initial experimental results on the performance of the TS approach.
It is possible to use this modelling approach in other types of allocation problems
where we allocate a homogeneous good to multiple entities. We note that the nature of
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the allocation, i.e. whether it is discrete or continuous, has an e¤ect on the type of models
developed. For example, for problems where the input allocation is continuous and balance
is sought in the output space there is no obvious way to transform the decision model to
a tractable mixed integer program when one is using the imbalance indicators discussed
here: in these problems we cannot assume that the denominator is constant nor do we
have binary variables and so cannot linearize using the idea we deployed in the discrete
cases.
We have taken an initial step to bring in the perfect equality line concept to consider
balance in resource (or output) distributions. There are possible further steps that can be
taken. For example:
 Further research can be done on generalizing the proposed approach to a multi-
criteria case where balance concerns are dened over multiple aspects and on devel-
oping ways to present the problem to the DM in a way that is easily communicated.
Related algorithmic challenges can be addressed using appropriate methods such as
metaheuristics.
 The balance line concept can also be extended by allowing a piecewise linear struc-
ture for the balance line. For example when the total amount available is very low
the DM might tend to desire an equitable allocation, and as the total amount dis-
tributed increases, some other allocations may become more desirable than the equal
allocation. The balance line approach can also be generalized to a balance cone ap-
proach where the extreme points and rays of the cone are generated based on the
information given by the DM. Regarding any allocation within the cone as perfectly
balanced one might assess the balance of alternative allocations and provide a subset
of nondominated points to the DM.
 Axiomatic discussion of the di¤erence imbalance indicators is another research area
that we believe would be interesting. Presumably a key idea in axiomatizing balance
would involve the observation that the points on the balance line are equally balanced
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and that as one moves towards the balance line one gets points which are better in
terms of balance.
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5.A Proofs of Propositions 53 and 54
5.A.1 Proof of Proposition 53
We rst prove the rst part of the proposition and show that for n = 2; 3 we have I1(x) =
2I2(x).
Let n = 3, and let the input/output distribution over which balance is sought be
a(x): a(x) = (a(x)1; a(x)2; a(x)3) and a(x)1 + a(x)2 + a(x)3 = aT . Suppose the balance
distribution is (1; 2; 3). Let d(x)1, d(x)2 and d(x)3 be the componentwise absolute
deviations from the rescaled balance distribution. The following holds: d(x)1 + d(x)2 +
d(x)3 = 2  Maxfd(x)1; d(x)2; d(x)3g: To see this, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.)
assume that Maxfd(x)1; d(x)2; d(x)3g = d(x)1. Observe that the total negative compo-
nentwise deviation of a(x) from r(x) should be equal to the total positive component-
wise deviation. Hence we have Maxfd(x)1; d(x)2; d(x)3g = d(x)1 = d(x)2 + d(x)3 and
d(x)1 + d(x)2 + d(x)3 = 2 Maxfd(x)1; d(x)2; d(x)3g: Hence
I1(x) =
d(x)1 + d(x)2 + d(x)3
aT
=
2Maxfd(x)1; d(x)2; d(x)3g
aT
= 2I2(x):
Note that it is easy to verify that I1(x) = 2I2(x) for n = 2 in the same way.
We now prove the second part of the proposition: For n = 2, I1(x1)  I1(x2) ()
I2(x
1)  I2(x2) () I3(x1)  I3(x2) () I4(x1)  I4(x2): Note that I1(x1) = 2I2(x1)
(and I1(x2) = 2I2(x2)), hence I1(x1)  I1(x2) () I2(x1)  I2(x2) for n = 2.
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Let a(x1) = (a(x1)1; a(x1)2) and a(x2) = (a(x2)1; a(x2)2). Let a(x1)1 + a(x1)2 = a1T
and a(x2)1 +a(x2)2 = a2T . Suppose the balance allocation is (1; 2). Let r(x
1) and r(x2)
be the corresponding (adjusted) balance distributions, i.e., r(x1) = (a1T  1; a1T  2) and
r(x2) = (a2T  1; a2T  2). Note that d(x1)1 = d(x1)2 and d(x2)1 = d(x2)2.
1. We will rst show that I1(x1)  I1(x2) () I3(x1)  I3(x2):
(a) I1(x1)  I1(x2) =) I3(x1)  I3(x2)
Suppose that I1(x1)  I1(x2) while I3(x1) < I3(x2):
If I1(x1)  I1(x2) then
2d(x1)1
a1T
 2d(x
2)1
a2T
(5.3)
If I3(x1) < I3(x2) then
d(x1)1
a1T  1
+
d(x1)1
a1T  2
<
d(x2)1
a2T  1
+
d(x2)1
a2T  2
=)
d(x1)1
a1T

1
1
+
1
2

<
d(x2)1
a2T

1
1
+
1
2

=)
d(x1)1
a1T
<
d(x2)1
a2T
=) 2d(x
1)1
a1T
<
2d(x2)1
a2T
(5.4)
From equations 5.3 and 5.4 we have a contradiction hence there is no x1 and x2 such
that I1(x1)  I1(x2) while I3(x1) < I3(x2) for n = 2. It is easy to verify
I3(x
1)  I3(x2) =) I1(x1)  I1(x2) in the same way.
2. We will now show that I1(x1)  I1(x2) () I4(x1)  I4(x2):
I1(x
1)  I1(x2) =) I4(x1)  I4(x2)
Suppose that I1(x1)  I1(x2) while I4(x1) < I4(x2): From previous result if I1(x1) 
I1(x
2) equation 5.3 holds.
If I4(x1) < I4(x2) then
Maxf d(x
1)1
a1T  1
;
d(x1)2
a1T  2
g < Maxf d(x
2)1
a2T  1
;
d(x2)2
a2T  2
g
d(x1)1
Minfa1T  1; a1T  2g
<
d(x2)1
Minfa2T  1; a2T  2g
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Without loss of generality let 1 < 2: Then we have
d(x1)1
a1T 1
< d(x
2)1
a2T 1
=) d(x1)1
a1T
<
d(x2)1
a2T
. This is equation 5.4, hence the rest follows as in part 1 leading to a contra-
diction. Similarly, it is easy to show that I4(x1)  I4(x2) =) I1(x1)  I1(x2) also
holds.
5.A.2 Proof of Remark 54
Consider the following counterexamples:
Example 60 Consider two allocations x1 and x2 which have a(x1) and a(x2) as shown in
the table below and suppose that the balance distribution is r. The pairwise comparisons of
the two alternatives are di¤erent under I4(x). We have I1(x1) < I1(x2); I3(x1) < I3(x2)
but I4(x1) > I4(x2):
Allocation I1(x) I3(x) I4(x)
a(x1) =(16,16,13) 0.21 0.67 0.42
a(x2) =(18,20,20) 0.28 0.84 0.38
r =(36,20,24)
In the example case given below the pairwise comparisons of the two alternatives are
di¤erent under I1(x). Note that for n = 3 we have I1(x1)  I1(x2) () I2(x1)  I2(x2)
so I2(x) is also not consistent with I3(x) and I4(x).
Allocation I1(x) I3(x) I4(x)
a(x1) = (11,12,18) 0.17 0.49 0.24
a(x2) = (20,10,17) 0.16 0.51 0.28
r =(30,25,30)
In the example case given below the pairwise comparisons of the two alternatives are
di¤erent under I3(x):
Allocation I1(x) I3(x) I4(x)
a(x1) =(18,20,10) 0.25 0.80 0.42
a(x2) = (12,12,17) 0.26 0.78 0.47
r =(39,27,26)
Example 61 To show that I1(x) = 2  I2(x) no longer holds when n > 3; consider the
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below example where I1(x1) < I1(x2) but I2(x1) > I2(x2).
Allocation I1(x) I2(x)
a(x1) =(18,13,10,17) 0.25 0.13
a(x2) =(19,11,20,15) 0.28 0.11
r =(39,33,28,20)
5.B Models using other indicators
5.B.1 Using I2(x):
This model is very similar to Model 1, except for the constraints related to ZI . We use
decision variables Ij to denote componentwise misallocations, i.e., Ij = dj=
P
i2I cixi. We
nd upper and lower bounds for Ij . We use the same bounds for all Ij and denote them
as IUB and ILB , respectively. The bounds are as follows (dUB is as dened in Model 1):
IUB =
dUB
Minifcig
ILB =
dLBP
i2I cixi
= 0
ZI is the maximum componentwise deviation, i.e. Ij  ZI for all j 2 J and we
minimize ZI , hence ZUBI = I
UB. We have nonlinear terms in the equation dening Ijs.
We use the same techniques used in model 1 and obtain the following model.
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Model 2
Max fZT ; ZIg
Constraint sets 5.2b, 5.2c, 5.2d, 5.2e,5.2f, 5.2g
Ij  ZI 8j 2 J
dj =
X
i2I
citij 8j 2 J
ILBxi  tij  IUBxi 8i 2 I; j 2 J
ILB(1  xi)  Ij   tij  IUB(1  xi) 8i 2 I; j 2 J
xi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 I
yj 2 f0; 1g 8j 2 J
dj  0 8j; tij  0 8i 2 I; j 2 J
Model 2 has mn + m + 2n + 2 variables and 2mn + 6n + 2 constraints excluding the
set constraints.
5.B.2 Using I3(x):
This model uses I3(x) as the balance criterion. Recall that this indicator is the sum
of the componentwise proportional deviations. We use decision variables Ij to denote
the componentwise proportional deviations for the categories in the model. That is, Ij =
dj=j
P
i2I cixi:We use the following upper and lower bounds for Ij in the model, denoted
as IUBj and I
LB
j , respectively (We set d
UB as before):
IUBj = (
P
j2J rj
rj
)
dUBj
Minifcig = (
P
j2J rj
rj
)
dUB
Minifcig for all j 2 J
ILBj =
dLB
j
P
i2I cixi
= 0 for all j 2 J:
Using IUBj and I
LB
j we can set Z
UB
I =
P
j2J I
UB
j and Z
LB
I = 0.
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The resulting model is the following:
Model 3
Max fZT ; ZIg
Constraint sets 5.2b, 5.2c, 5.2d, 5.2e,5.2f, 5.2gX
j2J
Ij = ZI
dj =
X
i2I
cijtij 8j 2 J
ILBj xi  tij  IUBj xi 8i 2 I; j 2 J
ILBj (1  xi)  Ij   tij  IUBj (1  xi) 8i 2 I; j 2 J
xi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 I
yj 2 f0; 1g 8j 2 J
dj  0 8j; tij  0 8i 2 I; j 2 J
Model 3 has mn + m + 2n + 2 variables and 2mn + 5n + 3 constraints excluding the
set constraints.
5.B.3 Using I4(x):
This model uses I4(x) in the objective function. It is very similar to model 3 with a slight
change in the constraint dening ZI . We change it as follows:
Ij  ZI 8j 2 J
Where IUBj , I
LB
j and d
UB are as in model 3 and ZUBI = Maxj
f
P
j2J rj
rj
gdUB =
Max
j
f 1j gdUB. The resulting model has mn + m + 2n + 2 variables and 2mn + 6n + 2
constraints excluding the set constraints.
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Conclusion
In this work we reected upon handling equity concerns in operational research problems
(see [127], [128], [206] for more discussion on equity and fairness).
We rst provide a comprehensive review of the studies in the operational research (OR)
literature that try to handle equity concerns in mathematical models. We categorize the
equity related concerns into two main areas, namely equitability and balance.
We categorise the studies based on the approach used to address equity concerns and
discuss pros and cons of these di¤erent approaches. Alongside the Rawlsian approach,
which focuses on the worst o¤ entity rather than the distribution vector and hence is
rather crude, two approaches are used to handle equitability concerns. One approach uses
inequality indices and the other uses equitable aggregations. Balance concerns are handled
in similar ways: one approach uses imbalance indicators and another one uses a scaling
approach that converts the problem into an equitability problem, for which equitability-
handling methods can be used.
The equitable aggregation approach is based on a well-dened and commonly accepted
set of axioms and can be used as a gold-standard for other approaches. Finding the
equitably e¢ cient set of solutions, however, may not be of much help to a decision maker
who has to select the best solution or rank alternatives from best to the worst. In an
e¤ort to guide the decision maker through the set of candidate alternatives (the equitably
e¢ cient ones) we extend the current theory in interactive multi-criteria decision making
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literature. Specically, we extend the theory of convex cones such that they can be used
in a symmetric setting. After a discussion and review on the use of convex cones in non-
symmetric environments, we introduce our theoretical results that extend this approach
to symmetric environments. We then illustrate the use of our theoretical ndings by
designing an interactive ranking algorithm and solving example problem instances.
The equitable e¢ ciency concept is based on an axiomatically justied notion of fairness;
however, it may result in prohibitively high computational e¤ort, especially in problems
where the set of alternatives are implicitly dened by constraints. One other way to
incorporate equity concerns is using inequality indices in the models. These indices return
scalar values that show the degree of disparity in a distribution and have a value of zero
at the perfect equality line, i.e. the line of distributions where everyone receives an equal
amount. We generalize the perfect equality line concept and dene the perfect balance
line, which consists of points that have the same proportional allocation as a reference
distribution the decision maker (DM) provided. This concept provides a way to address
balance concerns, which occur in many resource allocation settings in real life. Not ignoring
the widely encountered e¢ ciency concerns, we discuss the use of bi-criteria modelling in
resource allocation settings, the two criteria being e¢ ciency and balance, respectively.
Some of the research directions that could be explored further are summarized below:
Algorithmic challenges:
There is a vast amount of potential real-life applications such as health care decision
making, resource allocation, and supply chain design, for which mathematical modelling
tools can provide solutions by considering the multiple concerns inherent in the prob-
lems. Most mathematical models considered in the recent OR literature are multi-criteria
decision making models where one (or sometimes all) of the criteria is equity related.
Multi-objective models are more di¢ cult than their single objective counterparts ([207]).
This renders it necessary to address the related algorithmic challenges and explore exact
and/or heuristic methods to solve these multi-objective models.
As a specic example, in models incorporating equity concerns via inequality indices, as
one moves away from simple inequality indices to more complicated but more realistic ones,
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the complexity of the resulting models may change signicantly. For example, the indices
that respect the strong version of the Pigou-Dalton Principle of transfers (PD), such as the
Gini coe¢ cient and the variance, often make the corresponding mathematical model harder
to solve than some simpler measures that do not respect strong PD such as the range. As a
result, there are relatively few studies in the literature which involve models that quantify
equity using such measures. Hence, designing computationally feasible algorithms for more
complicated models with indices which satisfy desired axioms on equitability and hence
would be accepted by many inequity-averse DMs is a relevant and stimulating research
topic.
Another example research question would be on handling computational challenges
when one has a multi-criteria approach to equitability, i.e. considers a preference model
with the symmetry axiom. We have so far discussed the problems where a discrete set
of alternatives is explicitly given and proposed an interactive solution method for such
problems. A natural extension of our work would be considering situations where the
alternatives are implicitly dened by constraints. Such problems are relevant in many
real-life applications. Hence, nding ways to deal with the computational challenges the
symmetry axiom brings (due to the combinatorial number of permutations) and designing
algorithms which, for example, return equitably e¢ cient solutions in reasonable time is
another relevant research topic. Moreover, further research can be performed in guiding
the DM through the set of equitably e¢ cient alternatives by using, for example, interactive
approaches.
Another specic research question would be about resource allocation settings where
the DMs have balance concerns over the output distribution. We have made initial at-
tempts along this line by proposing solution approaches for discrete problems and observed
that these models are signicantly more di¢ cult to solve than their counterparts, which
consider balance concerns in the input distribution. Moreover, the output distribution may
be generated by production functions based on the input allocation decision. In such set-
tings inputs and outputs are connected by the production functions, the forms of which
will a¤ect the complexity of the resulting mathematical models. For example, a nonlin-
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ear production function would be expected to lead to models, which are computationally
challenging yet relevant in many applications and interesting to explore.
Decision support:
We see great potential for further research in improving the decision support process
for real-life multi-criteria problems involving equity concerns. Researchers should reect
upon how the theoretical advances and analyses can be used within a real life decision
support context.
One of the main issues is choosing the type of the decision support in terms of the
timing of the interaction with the DM. As we have discussed in Chapter 3 there are three
main multicriteria decision aiding (MCDA) methods: a priori, a posterior and interactive
MCDA methods ([145]). All three approaches are meaningful and useful in their own way.
For a decision support system to be successfully implemented the analyst should choose
the appropriate type of support for the problem at hand. Hence, a relevant discussion in
inequity-averse decision makingcan be held on the application contexts where each of
these methods may make sense. Some example questions are the following: Are there
application contexts where more a priori approaches make sense as there is consensus about
the aggregation mechanism or equity index to be used? Are there contexts (perhaps health
care decision making) where making equity judgements is so sensitive that all that one can
do is present the DM with the e¢ cient set and ask her to choose one of the solutions in
this set? Where do interactive approaches make sense? Such discussions would help the
decision making practitioners in deciding the appropriate set (type) of support systems,
which would eventually contribute to the success and impact of the relevant decision aiding
applications and increase the practical value of the research outputs.
Some research questions regarding the interactive decision support can be considered
in the future. Experimental studies on interactive approaches can be performed in order
to answer questions like How easy do people nd it to express preferences over distri-
butions? or  What kind of questions result in the best performance of the interactive
procedure used in terms of e.g. the cognitive e¤ort or the time required from the DM?
What kinds of inconsistencies arise?. Alongside general discussions on these questions,
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specic interactive methods can be re-considered from these perspectives. For example,
our work on convex cones can be re-considered in the light of such questions. Recall
that, we propose an interactive method for symmetric cases that uses the convex cones
approach, which is based on using preference information from the DM. In our method
we used pairwise comparisons provided by the DM but other questioning modes are also
possible. It would be interesting to conduct an experimental study on alternative types of
interaction and analysis of inconsistencies that may arise within this context.
Designing a decision support system or choosing an appropriate one from the available
systems would involve considering behavioural aspects as well. In inequity-averse deci-
sion making, questions like What equity indices are closest to peoples intuitive ideas
of equity? await further attention. Such studies exist in the Economics literature but
more practice-oriented discussions can be held within the OR community, especially by
behavioural scientists.
The appropriateness and computational handling of particular structural assumptions
on the DMs preferences is also a fruitful area for further research. Within the aggregation
functional approaches to equitability we discuss the equitable dominance relation, which
is also the unanimity relation when DMs utility function is assumed to belong to any one
of the following sets: additive, concave, quasi-concave or Schur-concave. When preference
information from the DM is introduced, this unanimity no longer holds. In this thesis we
have considered the case where the utility function is assumed to be quasi-concave and
proposed a solution approach that incorporates the DMs preference information to obtain
a most preferred solution or a subset of good solutions, or to rene the ranking of the set
of solutions. An extension of this work that we have in our future research agenda involves
considering all these four assumptions on the functional form of the utility function and
proposing interactive solution approaches accordingly. We aim to discuss the advantages
and limitations of each approach.
Robustness:
Robustness is crucial for the decision maker(s) to be comfortable with the proposed
solution as a robust solution would make it easier to persuade the stakeholders to imple-
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ment it (see [208] and [209] for a discussion of robustness concerns in operational research
and decision aiding).
In general, robustness in multi-criteria decision making approaches is a relatively recent
topic; hence to the best of our knowledge, there is almost no work on the multi-criteria
decision making situations where equity is of concern. For example, in a decision making
setting where the feasible alternatives are implicitly dened by constraints, the decision
makers may want to obtain solutions which would always be among the goodsolutions
within the possible parameter value intervals. Further research can be performed especially
in MCDM settings with the symmetry property. In such settings some equitably e¢ cient
solutions may be less sensitive to changes in the considered parameters than the others.
Hence, one can focus on designing solution approaches that specically aim to nd such
robust solution sets.
Robustness concerns related to the fairness rules can also be explored further. For ex-
ample, in settings that quantify equity using an inequality measure, further analysis could
be performed to see the extent to which selecting the wronginequality approach a¤ects
the solutions in di¤erent problem settings (see [42] for an example study that considers a
single facility location problem). Such works would be of much help to the decision makers
who nd it di¢ cult to select one inequality measure from a number of alternative mea-
sures. Having knowledge on the robustness of solutions with respect to di¤erent measures
would guide the analyst on the amount of time to be devoted to discussion on the choice
of the measure to be used. If the solutions do not change signicantly when the index is
changed, then less time could be devoted to such discussions. If solutions would change
in a considerable way when di¤erent candidate measures are used, then more time would
be required to deliberate over these candidate measures and to choose the rightone.
Deepening our understanding of the concept and measurement of equity:
We have discussed various indices that can be used in the models to incorporate equity
related concerns. One future line of work can focus on axiomatisation of these inequality
and balance indices. An axiomatic analysis would make it possible to discuss limitations
and advantages of di¤erent indices in a more structured way.
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More research can be performed on how to measureor quantify equity in di¤erent
settings such as the ones where ordinal measures rather than cardinal ones should be used.
An example occurs in the ground delay problems, where there is a reference ordering in
which entities are served or processed and one wants to deviate from this order as little
as possible (see [108] for an example study). Imbalance measures can be dened and
classied for such settings along with a discussion on the underlying axioms assumed for
each measure.
Another extension of our work on imbalance indicators, which are based on the perfect
balance line, can be to examine the cases with di¤erent balance line forms, such as piecewise
linear ones. A piecewise linear balance line would reect preferences of a decision maker,
for whom the desired ratio allocations would change depending on the total amount of
good. For example, when the amount of good is relatively scarce, then the concern may
be allocating the good equitably (i.e. a perfectly balanced distribution allocates each
entity the same amount) whereas when the total amount of good is plenty then a perfectly
balanced allocation for the DM might involve di¤erent ratios than the equal ones. Such
a piecewise linear extension of the perfect balance line concept would result in a more
exible decision support system in terms of capturing di¤erent ideas of balance.
Multidimensional equity also seems of interest and links to a topic in economics ([210],
[211], [212], [213], [214], [215], [216], [217]). Multidimensional equity considerations are
relevant in many practical applications and involve assessing inequity in bundles of di¤erent
goods that di¤erent entities receive. Such cases are computationally and cognitively more
challenging since the distribution (allocation) vectors seen in the single good case are now
replaced with matrices in which each column (row) corresponds to the distribution of one
of the multiple goods. Hence decision making in such settings is associated with comparing
such allocation matrices. The denition of the anonymity property changes in such cases
because the preference model is expected to have the anonymity property over the entities
but not over the di¤erent goods. That is, symmetry holds over only one dimension of
the matrix. Similarly, the PD is dened in a slightly di¤erent way: everything else being
the same, an allocation matrix 1 should be considered more equal than another allocation
181
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
matrix 2, when it is obtained by applying matrix 2 a series of PD transfers for one or more
of the goods. Further research can be performed on generalizing the concepts and axioms
used in the single dimensional settings to multidimensional ones, proposing operational
means to compare two allocation matrices and designing solution approaches that can
incorporate preference information in these settings.
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